

LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICS

For Small Teams



Christopher E. Larsen

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Acknowledgment

It turns out that to write a book takes the influence of many people. It would be impractical to attempt to name them all on just a page or two. But to all the people I have worked with, taught, or those who have taught me—thank you for the time you've spent with me. From my days with the U.S. Army Infantry, to the time spent with One Shepherd Leadership Development, to the inspiring men I served with the Coalition Militaries Assistance Training Team (CMATT) while in Iraq...I've learned more from these men than they from me.

Thanks to both Hae-jung Larsen and John Sullivan for their photography talents while marching in the heat, rain, and cold with the troops of One Shepherd. My sincere appreciation goes to Phil Margetta-Cacace for his editing talents; to my mother, Carolyn Larsen, and to a dear friend, Ozy Sjahputera, for their copy editing skills. And to Jeong, Seung-chul for designing the cover of this book as well as the book format.

I also want to thank the many friends who have offered their support and enthusiasm, as well as the numerous other professionals who have contributed to this book in both small and significant ways.

Last but certainly not least, a very special thanks goes to my wife, Hae-jung. She is my most favorite person on this planet, and I want to thank her for her patience with this project—and during the long travels which this work entailed.

Foreword

The motivation for creating this book is to offer tactical guidelines and advice to the leaders and troops of *very small teams*—between 3–30 patrol members. I use the term "Battle Drill" loosely throughout this book. Some are in fact battle drills, others are more aptly called "maneuver combat concepts", but the term battle drill is more convenient. Furthermore, the skills and tactical battle drills addressed in this book are in no way a complete list of the tasks and competencies of an infantryman. You won't find chapters on 'chemical decontamination of equipment', or 'sucking chest wounds', or 'MOUT CQB'. The effort is to keep focused on patrolling tactics, and not to focus on every possible skill an infantryman could be tasked to do.

Tactics and leadership are an art form. Now, to be certain, the military has its sciences. With great accuracy we can predict where and when any given projectile will strike if the variables are known—velocity, angle of fire, terrain elevation, wind speed, and barometric conditions. Science can predict an outcome. But the will of humans are not so predicable. A soldier may continue to fight tenaciously even though it is obvious his team has lost the field of battle...or for that matter, troops may surrender even though they have superior resources in battle. Leadership and tactics are a performing art. We practice the battle drills as we see them in the book. But the application of these drills on the battlefield often looks radically different than the pictures in any book. Tactics are a common sense solution to a battlefield problem. Leaders must remain flexible if they expect to address each changing situation.

Finally, the intended audience of this book certainly includes military professionals, however the lessons should be applicable to non-military personnel as well. This is particularly true for enthusiasts engaged in recreational sports of paintball, air-soft and laser-tag. Modern military re-enactors, historians, and the just plain curious will also find valuable references in these pages. Who is *not* an intended audience of this book are those individuals or groups who seek to unlawfully harm other individuals or groups. The contents of this book are not intended to incite malice toward any group or individual, regardless of gender, race, creed, nationality, or lifestyle.

That being said, I hope you have as much fun reading this book as I did writing it. Now go forth and do infantry stuff. Or don't and just say you did!

"See you in my sights!"

—Christopher Larsen

Section I

INDIVIDUAL SKILL LEVEL

Individual Skill #1

CAMOUFLAGE

Knowing when to be seen and when not to be seen goes a long way in your effort not to break the first cardinal rule of battlefield survival—Don't become a casualty! Mastering the art of camouflage allows you to disappear on the battlefield.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

Camouflage is applied to the skin to break up the color and familiar shadows

Camouflage, the ability to hide within your environment, breaks down into two areas of concern. **Cover** refers to all forms of protective obstacles from enemy fire, such as a tree, stone, wall, ditch, or hole in the ground. These obstacles provide some protection from flying projectiles. **Concealment** refers to the art of blending in with your immediate surroundings. This is a form of protection from enemy observation, NOT protection from enemy fire!

Cover is the act of hiding behind protective obstacles to avoid enemy fire.

Concealment is the art of blending into the environment to avoid enemy observation.

Concealment includes the following considerations:

- Size, similar sized objects conceal more readily when together.
- Shape, rarely do perfect straight lines or circles appear in nature.
- Shine, typically caused by oils or smooth surfaces.
- Shadow, often give off patterns that are recognized even subconsciously.
- Silhouette, an object is recognized when cast against a light background.
- Texture, not only the roughness of surfaces, but the depth of view.
- Color, the dominant color patterns in your immediate area.

Camouflaging your skin

The deep features of the face, such as the eyes, under the nose, curl of the lips and jaw line all lend to an immediately recognizable pattern of shadow that makes up the human face. Ever look at a grainy, poor quality black and white photograph and even though you don't recognize the person in the picture, you're just able to make out a human face? Well, those tell-tale features that you see are actually just shadows thrown across the face of the person in the picture. Humans can recognize those shadow patterns even on inanimate objects such as clouds or the moon!



Two ink samples. Focus off center of the page. The one on the left is immediately recognizable.

These shadows must be filled in and distorted. To do this, use a light colored cream or grease stick in a majority of the deep facial features. But don't just reverse the shadows or you'll have the same pattern simply inverted! Use some dark colored creams or grease to "pull" the shadows out onto the forehead, cheeks and neck. Break up the smooth prominent features such as the nose, chin and brow by "cutting" them in half with the dark cream or grease. Remember to use colored grease and cream that match the dominant colors of your surrounding. For example, do not use a light gray if this is not a dominant color scheme.

Lastly, repeat this color scheme on the backs of your hands if you do not wear some sort of work gloves. Your hands typically move about much more than your head does. Since movement tends to give away concealment more than anything else, light skinned hands moving about act like signaling flags! For crying out loud, darken your hands!

Camouflage your body and gear

There are numerous and readily available camouflage patterns for uniforms. While all are good, some are better than others. Still other patterns, while maybe not as good as others in a given environment, may offer more versatility when changing from one environment to another. Truth be known, we often have less say-so in the uniform we are wearing due to these decisions being made by "them". (You know, "they"...those who say things and make decisions for us based on uniformity.) Which is, after all, why *they* call it a uniform.

Let us pretend for the moment that you do not have a uniform. Fine. Clothe yourself in colors that match your environment, or at least the dominant single color. If you live in a jungle, the easy choice would be green. That would be a tan color if you live in a desert, and white if you're in a snow tundra, and so on. The good news is that your Load Bearing Equipment will break up much of these solid colored "uniforms" by casting shadows. If you wish to add to this, say to break up the solid colors of your limbs, simply wrap friction tape or 100 mph tape around your arms and legs. This not only breaks up the color scheme, but also secures baggy clothing from noisy flapping about and getting caught on things. Only, don't wrap the tape so tightly that your fingers turn blue and your feet shrink.

As mentioned earlier, working gloves are a great idea for camouflaging your hands. Even in hot climates, you should wear gloves with the fingers cut out. Gloves have the added benefit of protecting you from most of the scratches, cuts and bug bites you would otherwise accrue on your hands. Hair is another easily recognized human

feature in nature. I have no scientific explanation for this; I merely state it as fact. If you accept this, then by all means cover your head. Use a hat or bandana of an appropriate color to conceal your hair. Or don't. Be seen and suffer the consequences!

Cover your gear. LBE, bandoleers, canteens and rucks all need to be hidden as well. Tape all metal rings, snaps and closures. This will make them quiet as well as reduce the shine. There are a great many forms of plastic vegetation that can be found in craft shops, or you can tear off 30 cm x 30 cm pieces of artillery netting, or strips of colored burlap. In lieu of these fantastic camouflage materials, you can always use the real thing, vegetation from your surroundings. The down side of the real thing is that it is difficult to fasten to your gear, and even when you do, it wilts and dies quickly.

Rifles can be covered with an old pair of socks of an appropriate color. Simply cut out the toes and run the length of the sock over the fore stock of your rifle. It will not be necessary to cut the toes out of the sock that will cover your butt stock. Trim the length of the socks as needed and secure the ends with tape. Be certain the rifle can still function! (Especially the charging handles.)

Remember, camouflage is an art form—the importance of which is often overlooked with the advent of more sophisticated optics. Creativity should be encouraged, but as in all things, use moderation. There IS such a thing as too much camouflage.

Individual Skill #2

HAND & ARM SIGNALS

While we think of battlefield communications in terms of radio procedure and professional jargon, much of the communication is conducted by waving one's hands about in a spastic series of gestures. This form of communication is known as arm & hand signals.


Such signals are used, typically on patrol and the like, when noise discipline must be maintained. Arm & hand signals are also used over large distances, with most signals being easily recognized as far as a quarter mile (400 m). Finally, over the chaotic roar of battle, arm & hand signals can still be understood. The mistake many leaders make is the belief that after contact is made, arm & hand signals are still the preferred method of communication. Not true. After all, the enemy knows where you are. You have made contact. The best communication at this point involves the use of your voice. You'll need to command your troops quickly and assertively. You do not want your troops watching your stylish delivery of arm & hand signals as much as you need them to be watching their sectors of fire!

Signals can be given with either the left or right hand, with a few notable exceptions. Also, with the exception of the rally point signal, all hand and arm signals are passed back to the next member of the patrol immediately! This is true even if you know that the next troop has already seen the signal.

What follows are the 28 standard hand and arm signals. Your team will come up with others that will carry unique meaning to its members.

“I Am Ready/Are You Ready?”


Also known as the “Yoo-hoo!” This signal is used to get the attention of another party or to let another party know that you are ready to move, communicate, assault, etc.



This signal is given by extending your arm above your head and waving it slightly back and forth—just like you do when you see a buddy in the parking lot of the shopping mall.

“I Understand”

Meaning that the troop understood and will comply with the last command, or that he has completed the task and is ready for the next command. This signal is often simply called the “thumbs up”.



This signal is given by making a fist with the thumb pointed upward. A variation of this hand signal is to point the thumb down, which indicated that the situation is “not good”.

"I Do Not Understand"


Meaning that the troop does not understand the last message, or cannot comply with the last command. Sometimes called the "wave off".



Formally, this signal is given by shielding your entire face with both hands, palms facing out. Of course, this is ridiculous because you cannot hold your weapon in your hand since, like several other hand and arm signals, it requires the use of both hands! A common variation of this signal is to use only one hand, palm facing out, and wave it left and right to the side of your midsection. Thus, known as the "wave off".

“Cease Fire/All Clear”

Meaning the firing line must stop shooting *now*!



This signal is given by placing a hand in front of your face, palm out, then wave up and down in front of your face

“Move Out”


Meaning that all members of the patrol should begin movement forward.



This signal is given by raising an arm straight up into the air and letting it fall forward. Often, the arm is only raised up from the elbow and dropped forward. This is due largely to the weight of the LBE and rucksack that seems to constantly pinch and fatigue the shoulders. The signal looks about the same in either case.

“Stop”


Meaning the patrol will come to a halt, but you may continue to move to protective cover. *Do not* confuse this with the hand signal “freeze!” With the “stop” signal, there is no known threat to the patrol.



Give this signal by simply push a flattened palm toward the intended receiver, as if you were politely refusing a caramel-covered snail. If you enjoy the taste of caramel-covered snails...well, there is something very wrong with you.

“Freeze!”

Meaning, “DON’T MOVE.” Don’t step forward, speak, or even turn your head to look for cover. This signal indicates that danger is very close; such as an enemy patrol passing by, or that land mines have been spotted. Do not over use this signal. This signal should not be used when you simply want the patrol to stop.



This signal is given by making a quick fist, palm outward. Do not wave the fist about, simply hold your hand level and continue to make it until the intended receiver(s) has understood.

“Get Down”

Meaning that you should lower your profile closer to the ground so that you cannot be seen.



Give this signal by pushing a flattened palm toward the ground. Fairly basic stuff.

“Get Up”


Meaning you should raise your profile and be prepared to move.



Give this signal by pushing a flattened palm toward the sky.

“Increase Your Interval”


Meaning there needs to be greater space between individuals in the formation... or between formations. This signal is often given when a patrol is passing from heavy vegetation to lighter vegetation, or onto a road.



Formally, this signal is given by placing two hands with palms facing outward, then pushing them apart to increase the space between the hands. An acceptable variation of this signal, due to carrying a weapon, is simply to place one hand against the side of the rifle and pull them apart in the same manner.

“Decrease Your Interval”

Meaning the space between troops needs to be tightened up. This signal is often given as a patrol enters heavier vegetation, or just before passing an obstacle, or before overwhelming an enemy position.



Formally given by pushing two flattened palms together over your head. An acceptable variation is to push one flattened palm to the side of your rifle—assuming you have one.

“Column File Formation”

Meaning that the patrol will form a single line formation, in a follow-the-leader fashion. This is also called the “Ranger file” or “column of ducks”.



This signal is given by raising an arm straight up in the air, then making a backward circle as if you were doing the backstroke with one arm. You'll feel silly at first, but everyone gets this one. It's the exact *opposite* of the signal “move out”.

“Wedge Formation”

Meaning the patrol should assume the inverted “V” formation within their fireteams and prepare to attack.



Give this signal by raising straightened arms up slightly from your hips so that your arms form the shape of an upside-down “V”. This can be done with rifle in hand.

“On Line Formation”


Meaning the entire element should come on line to my immediate left and right. Often given just prior to overwhelming an enemy position, or when making a hasty defensive line.



Give this signal by raising straightened arms up level with your shoulders like you are walking a suspended tight rope. This can also be done with rifle in hand.

“Danger Area”

Meaning that immediately in front of the point man is a dangerous area—typically indicating some type of open or linear clearing.



Give this signal by using a flattened hand back and forth across the neck in a cutting fashion. Again, with all the weight of your gear, this requires much less effort than earlier versions of this signal.

“Patch to the Road”


Meaning that the patrol will cross a linear danger area using the “patch-to-the-road” method, and all troops in the patrol should *close up the intervals* between members to shoulder-to-shoulder.



This signal is given by patting the unit patch twice, rapidly. The patch is located on your upper LEFT arm...just in case you were confused. Be certain that the troop behind you sees this signal. In short, turn your left shoulder towards the intended receiver of this signal.

“Pass Up the Pace Count”


Meaning to pass up information to the patrol leader regarding the calculated distance (meters) that the patrol has traveled.



This signal is given by patting either leg two times just below the knee so that the receiver can see. The information is given by whispering into the ear of the troop in front of you (night) or simply by a show of fingers for every 100 meters walked (daylight).

“Pass Up the Head Count”


Meaning to pass up information regarding a physical count of the members in the patrol. This is done for accountability and security.



This signal is given by patting the *very top* of your head two times. Do not confuse this with patting your forehead—which means something entirely different! The information is given by whispering *your* number into the ear of the troop in front of you (night) or a simple show of your number using fingers (daylight).

“Patrol Leader Forward”


Meaning the designated patrol leader should move up the formation.



Give this signal by patting two times on your *forehead* softly, like several quick salutes from the center of your forehead. Variations of this include tapping your mid-chest several times for the squad or element leader, or your groin several times for a fireteam leader.

“Security Team Forward”


Meaning the designated Security Team should move up the formation.



This signal is given by pointing your index and middle fingers just under your eyes. Be careful not to poke yourself in the eyes. It is very painful and there is no need to get that close to your eyes. We all get the meaning.

“Rally On Me”


Meaning the entire patrol must come to my position and form a tight circular security.



Give this signal by raising a straightened arm directly above your head and with fingers stiffened, make short circles as if you were trying to draw a hole in the sky.

"Rally Point"

Meaning that this is the location (big tree, big stone, fence, meadow) that the patrol will rally if necessary in the near future. Given after every major terrain feature or 300 meters.




Give this signal by making a short circle directly above your head and then drop your arm dramatically and point to the exact location of the designated rally position.

Note: This is one of those few hand & arm signals that will NOT be passed back down the formation immediately. Only as each troop passes the rally point will they pass this signal back. They MUST get a confirming nod of the head from the receiver to be certain that the message will be passed along in turn.

“Double Time”


Meaning members of the patrol must increase their speed to a slow run. More commonly, this means that members of the patrol must keep up with the pace of the patrol leader.



This signal is given by raising a fist up in the air, with elbow bent, then pulling down in sharp, rapid succession. If it looks like you are pulling the whistle cord of a train or large truck, then you are doing it right.

“Quick Time”

Meaning the patrol should slow down to a walking pace. Almost always given at the end of a period of running.



This signal is given by extending an arm straight out from the shoulder and then waving the hand up and down, palm facing downward.

“Prepare for Action!”

Meaning to expect enemy contact in this (given) direction very soon. Often given when suspicious voices or troop movement is heard.




Give this signal by quickly punching a fist several times in the direction you believe the enemy is coming.

Note: This is NOT an order to begin firing! The source of the noise or movement has not been confirmed in this case. If it had been, the “Enemy in sight” signal would be given.

“Enemy in Sight”


Meaning I have visual contact with the enemy. This signal is ONLY for confirmed visual contact with the enemy.



This signal is given by making a fist with the thumb pointing down and the index finger pointed forward. The hand signal is first shown to members of the patrol, then thrust in the direction of the enemy. An acceptable variation is to raise your rifle above your head—magazine pointed skyward—and point the muzzle toward the enemy. Of course, this is an idiotic maneuver and should only be done when passing this information over a very long distance.

“(Numbers)”


Meaning “1, 2, 3”; or “50, 100, 200” and so on. Since “1” looks the same as “100”, it is the hand signal after the number that determines whether the sender means “1” or “100”. For instance “2” plus a signal for “tank” does not mean “200 tanks”! It means “2 tanks”. Similarly, “1” plus the signal for “meters” would indicate “100 meters”, and not “1 meter”.



This signal is given by simply indicating “1, 2, 3, 4, or 5” as you were counting on your fingers. The only unique signal is for “50” which is given by holding your hand vertically and flattening the fingers horizontally. This is sometimes called the “half full” signal. It is convenient for giving distances of approximately 50 meters, or for those distances obviously between any 100 meter mark.

"Meters"

Meaning distance.



This signal is given by bumping two fists together, one on top of the other. This can even be done while holding a rifle. Your support hand simply bumps up against your firing hand. Remember that when giving meters it is not necessary to be scientifically accurate. Typically you will round off to the nearest 50 for distances under 200 meters. Beyond that you should just round to the nearest 100. It's just an estimate...we all get the point.

Lessons Learned

Get into the habit of passing hand & arm signals back *immediately*—with the exception of the 'Rally Point' signal. Do this regardless of who issued the hand & arm signal! This habit of passing signals up and down the formation has a double benefit. First, it tells the individual sending the message that his message was understood...at least by someone in the patrol. Second, if the intended recipient of the message was looking away and did not receive the hand & arm signal, the fact that every other member in the patrol is now repeating it significantly increases the probability that the intended recipient *will* see another patrol member repeating the message.

Let's say for sake of argument that the other lesson learned through hand & arm signals is that each member of the patrol should periodically look backwards or forwards. Do this at least two or three times per minute. This makes sure you'll receive and pass the hand & arm signals. It is very important that everyone remains informed.

Individual Skill #3

INFANTRY MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

If ever there were a phrase that sounded as if you were being let in on the secrets of the inner sanctity of combat soldiers, this is it. Infantry Movement Techniques, more covertly IMTs, are nothing more than common sense methods of moving from one covered position to the next while under direct suppressive fire from the enemy. Sorry if that disappoints you.

The goal of the IMT is to minimize your exposure to the enemy's view, and therefore minimize the amount of fire that is directed toward you. When applied, the untrained eye may mistakenly conclude that IMTs are adhered to only in the sloppiest forms. That's one view. Another view is that experienced troops move quickly from one technique to the other so that their movement seems to be an improvised, compromised collection of these techniques. Sloppy as this often looks, IMTs are practical and must suit the soldier.

The Low Crawl

Used when suppressive fires are grazing at knee level.



The 'Low Crawl'

Courtesy of One Shepherd

This technique requires the troop to lie prone on his belly and push or pull himself forward using his arms and legs. Absolutely the filthiest form of movement as all of the body must maintain contact with the ground. Troops should not raise their head to see what is going on around them, nor should they raise their limbs to help push off! If it is raining, be prepared to have mud caked into your ears.

The High Crawl


Used when suppressive fires are at or above maximum grazing level (waist high).



This technique similarly requires the troop to lay prone on his belly and move forward by pushing and pulling with his arms and legs. As most of the body is in contact with the ground, you may have guessed that this method is equally messy. However, when using the high crawl, a troop may keep his head up to monitor the battlefield.

The Modified Crawl (or “Spider Crawl”)

Used when suppressive fires are above grazing level (chest high).



This technique allows the troop to come up on his hands and knees. Even when cradling a rifle in one arm, this method is much quicker than the other two crawls.

The Rush

Used when suppressive fires are sparse or sporadic.

The 'Rush'—when you're absolutely certain they're not aiming at *YOU!*



Courtesy of One Shepherd

This technique allows the troop to come up on his feet and rush quickly to the next covered position. Obviously the quickest of the methods, the rush follows this simple regiment:

- Look for your destination, the closest available covered position.
- Rush forward in an upright sprint.
- Run only as long as it takes to say, "I'm up—they see me—I'm down."

Upon getting to your destination, roll to the left or right of this covered obstacle to confuse enemy riflemen from pinpointing your position. If you continually come up from the same position where you fell to the ground, the enemy will simply orient their weapons where you fall and wait for you to pop up again.

Buddy Team IMT

It should come to you as no surprise that on a battlefield, two are better than one. Two-man teams working together are much more efficient at moving forward, regardless of which technique is chosen for their movement. Using the same IMTs as previously mentioned, one troop provides suppressive fire while the other troop moves forward.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

'Fire and maneuver' is the building block for the assault.

This technique requires some coordination within the buddy team as to where they're maneuvering, and as to which IMT they will use:

- The lead troop takes up a position that allows him to view potential positions forward of the terrain to be traveled.
- The trailing troop calls forward, "Cover me!" to signal he is ready.
- The lead troop calls back to his buddy, "Set!" to signal he is in position.
- The trailing troop begins movement, selecting the IMT to be used.
- The lead troop fires for suppression when necessary.
- Once the trailing troop moves beyond the lead troop, he will take up a position that allows him to view potential positions forward of the terrain to be traveled.

This cycle continues until the buddy team reaches their destination. On large battlefields, rests and water breaks will have to be factored in.

Now, if two men are more effective than one in an effort to maneuver upon and overwhelm an enemy position...then fireteams or entire squads moving in coordinated bounds across a battlefield would be quite impressive indeed! Ah yes, that is how building blocks work. We start from the very small and build a grand design. Just remember to keep it simple, and that everyone should be working with the same goals.

Bound by Fire-team

When a squad moves across an objective while under fire, it will deploy its fire-teams in much the same way as the buddy team. One fire-team sets a base of fire to suppress the enemy positions with sustained, aimed fire. The other fire-team moves forward using the appropriate IMT and the most concealed route available. Once the bounding fire-team reaches a position that allows the team members to place effective suppressing fires, this fire-team becomes the base of fire and the rear fire-team begins to bound forward.

This leapfrog procession continues until the squad has successfully crossed and secured the far side of the objective...or until the squad is so near to the enemy fighting positions that an mad charge into the enemy line is coordinated and ordered by the squad leader. There are three dangerous tendencies that troops fall into while conducting this task:

- Muzzle creep.
- Funneling.
- Glancing back.

Muzzle creep means that as the troops IMT forward—whether in buddy teams or as a fire-team—they become slipshod as to where their weapons are pointing. The intensity of actions on the objective, and in particular a ‘hot’ objective with outgoing and incoming fire requires a great deal of discipline in muzzle control. It is the individual’s responsibility to be certain that his weapon is *always* pointing in the suspected direction of the enemy!

Funneling is a term that refers to the phenomenon of troops massing together in middle of the objective. Troops aren’t stupid. They can see who the bad guys are and have a clear understanding of the threat to themselves and their buddies. When crossing an objective, the troops will mass together at the points of interest on the objective. They do this to be certain that the threat is eliminated and to get information from their buddies. However, this means other areas just to the sides and rear of the objective are not secured. And that’s dangerous. So, it is the responsibility of the fire-team leader to assign each member of the team a sector to move across the objective, and to enforce this practice. Remember that each troop should be assigned a position in the online sweep as a matter of SOP. That way he always knows who will be on his right, and who will be on his left.

Glancing back refers to the habit of troops looking back over their shoulder at the team bounding up behind them. It is generally a healthy habit for a troop to glance back over his shoulder while patrolling. This ensures that information can be passed up the column as well as down the column.

However, when setting a base of fire, the bounding element is relying solely on the over-watch element to suppress the enemy. This cannot be done effectively if the members of the over-watch element are looking back over their shoulders to see how the bounding element is doing and to see what's taking them so long. This habit must be broken by a combined effort of the fire-team leaders and squad leader to ensure effective, suppressive fires are placed on the objective.

Summary

Other than for demonstrative purposes or practice, IMTs should *not* be utilized with strict regard to form. IMTs should suit your needs as you maneuver around in a particularly hostile situation. The goal is not to exhaust you, contrary to the numerous drill sergeants who employ these techniques as a form of punitive exercise. Instead, you should be ready to mix and match these techniques as you and your buddy team, fireteam, or squad move toward and away from enemy fires in the least exhausting, yet safest method. Don't get lazy! That could prove fatal.

Individual Skill #4

FIGHTING POSITIONS

A skill with another misleading title. Fighting positions do not, as you may have thought, deal with the proper stances of hand-to-hand combat. There will be nothing as glamorous as disarming a knife-wielding opponent in this chapter. Instead, we will discuss holes.

Admittedly a mundane subject, but much more applicable to the modern battlefield than all of that macho hand-to-hand nonsense. You see, holes in the ground—uh, fighting positions that is, offer a great deal of protection from the projectiles which seem to be constantly flying about the field of battle. Because while in a hole your body will be almost entirely lower than the surface of the ground, the only way the enemy could shoot the covered part of your body would be to fire through some sizable amounts of earth!

Notable exceptions to this rule include the heavy machineguns—which can shoot through 10 to 15 feet of packed earth, clay, and stones (3 to 5 m), and the rocket grenades—which penetrate only a fraction as much as machineguns, but still do a nasty job on fighting positions. All other small arms, up to the medium machinegun category, do not have the capability to punch through enough earth to injure troops who are manning their fighting positions. In fact, the advancing enemy is faced with the near impossible task of shooting you and your buddy right in the head in order to neutralize your fighting position.


Of course, realizing that your enemy's task is to shoot you and your buddy in the head would give any sane person reason to pause before sticking out his head, shoulders and arms which are necessary to expose in order to return fire. Just remember that the advancing enemy has to expose his entire body, while you only expose a small portion of yours. Or, in simple terms, running about exposed to enemy view and fire is the worst possible place to be on a battlefield. On the other hand, hunkered down in a hole and shooting at the unfortunate souls running amuck is the best possible place to be on the battlefield. That is why soldiers habitually dig holes all over God's creation.

What follows are several examples of common, two-man fighting positions. When they are used, and how to create them is discussed.

THE BARRICADE

This is the simplest form of fighting position, and offers only protection to the troop's immediate front. Most commonly formed with sandbags. You may improvise


with stones or fresh cut logs of at least eight inches (20 cm) thick, then reinforce these materials with earth and sod. The barricade must be a minimum of 20 inches (50 cm) thick at the top and no less than 24 inches (60 cm) at the base—or simply two sandbags thick.



It will also be necessary to camouflage the barricade so that it is not immediately noticeable from 35 m forward of the position. To do this, place six to eight inch cuts of grass sod over the front, top and sides of the barricade. If you are not in a grassy environment, use the appropriate amount of leaves, sticks, snow or sand. Be certain that you gather this camouflage material from **BEHIND** your position!

THE HASTY FIGHTING POSITION

Also called "the shell scrape" by British forces, this fighting position is for temporary use only. It is designed to lower the body of a troop laying prone to just below the surface of the earth. The troop's body should not be observable from 35 m in front of the position.



- Locate a two-man position with a sizable obstacle to the front (such as a tree).
- The dimensions of the position should be approximately half a rifle wide, one foot (30 cm) deep, and as long as the length of that particular man.
- The position should form a "V" shape when viewed from above, with both men's feet meeting. This allows them to kick each other to an alert status.

THE ADVANCED FIGHTING POSITION


Without parapets (large mounds of dug up earth), this position lowers the silhouette of the fighting position to the level of the ground's surface. This makes for a position that is not only almost impossible to detect, but is also virtually impervious to rocket attack. This is because a rocket needs something akin to a wall to slam into and detonate. This position offers no protruding obstacles, so rockets fly right overhead... unless they are fired from a plunging position such as from attack helicopters. Hmm, bummer. But what are you gonna do?

- Locate a position that is approximately level or higher than the enemy's expected approach.
- The dimensions of the position are one rifle length long, three rifles wide, and armpit deep to each particular man. This means one end of the position may be deeper than the other due to differences in each troop's height.
- As the position is dug, all earth must be carried via plastic sheet to behind the fighting line.

This is so no fresh dirt can be observed by the enemy.

- To the middle front and middle back of the position, dig a platform one rifle length wide and 20 inches (50 cm) deep. This platform will support the overhead cover.
- Lay in the overhead cover at least 18 inches thick, using a combination of fresh cut logs, a rain sheet and sandbags. Use six inches of grass sod or appropriate materials to camouflage the overhead cover. This will compress down soon.
- The position should look like two square holes in the earth when viewed from above.

This same position may be created with parapets to the sides and back. The obvious disadvantage to this type of position is that it will be much more difficult to camouflage—and that it is more vulnerable to rocket attack.



However there is an advantage to this type of position, and that is that it offers more protection and less exposure for the riflemen who are shooting out of it. For this reason, the advanced fighting position *with* parapets is decidedly more desirable for a built-up defense in which combined arms such as tank or artillery support are used. After all, if a tank is conducting direct fires from its hull-down position right behind you, you'll be thankful that the parapet is saving you from a muzzle blast that is strong enough to rip your limbs off!

Individual Skill #5

LAND NAVIGATION

First let me say that this chapter will cover only the most basic instruction on land navigation. Land navigation is a fundamental individual skill. A basic introduction has now been added to this manual. To do justice to such a perishable skill, you should learn land navigation in depth and continue to use it at least periodically.

THE MAP

Let's begin with the map, also called a topographic or a quadrangle. That is because in truth, there are many types of maps. Certainly you've recognized the difference in detail between a road atlas and a tour map. Well, topographical maps give us the detail information we need to move about with a compass. These maps are illustrated as if you were flying over in an airplane looking down at the representation of the terrain.

The Colors

The most eye-catching aspect of a map is its dazzling array of colors. There are five major colors and three minor ones. We'll begin with the colors, since it will be necessary to know these in order to understand the rest of the map.

5 Major Colors

Green denotes formidable vegetation such as forests. This is usually reliable.

Blue denotes bodies of water. Very reliable, but small bodies of water are seasonal.

Black denotes man-made features. Buildings come and go in time. Roads just multiply.

Red denotes major highways and roads. Very reliable.

Brown denotes the relief of the ground as it goes up or down in altitude. Very reliable.

3 Minor Colors

White denotes open terrain, areas of minimal vegetation. Unreliable due to growth.

Purple denotes townships and built up areas with sizable populations. Also reliable.

Yellow denotes restricted areas. No means No! Very reliable.

White

A great deal of your map probably looks white. This is no accident. White represents the least amount of vegetation. Theoretically, white areas on the map are open terrain with nothing more than grassy fields in them. Of course, it is probably important to mention that small trees, say less than 20 ft (6 m) in height, are not recorded on a map as wooded area. Couple that interesting tidbit with the fact that most topographical maps are only updated every 30 years, and you realize that you could be walking in a veritable forest despite the fact that your position on the map happens to be white! Now that I've scared you, you should know that this is less often true than not. But don't try to pinpoint your position using a tree line. White areas are not the most reliable.

Green

This is a much more reliable color. Green represents vegetation of say 20 ft (6 m) or more. That means forest. This is easy to remember, but once again consider that upgrades to your map may not have included the recent logging, expanding of suburbs, or fires that may have turned that green forest into something quite different. Don't worry, green means forest more often than white means open field.

Blue

Blue means water. Now remember that a blue stream on your map may be intermittent, meaning it is seasonal. Dry seasons drying up small streams and ponds. Rainy seasons swell streams and ponds that may not even be marked on your map! Just keep in mind that water rolls down hill. In the low lands you may expect water during rainy season. Okay?

Black

Man-made objects are marked in black. This includes all buildings, such as homes, schools (little black boxes with a pennant), churches (little black boxes with a cross), and every type of road or bridge imaginable. As with all things man-made, recall the proverb "the best laid plans of mice and men". The buildings, railroads and such may not be there any more. Roads, however, are almost always there. In fact, you'll often find more roads than are actually shown on the map.

Brown

Now this is a very important color with very little changes through time. Brown lines, more commonly called contour lines, run all through your map—unless you're in the middle of Kansas. These lines show the increase or decrease in the elevation of the terrain. You can find the exact increments between brown lines by looking at the map's legend. Many maps have increments of either 20 or 25 feet, others include 10 or even 50 meter increments. So, if you were in a lowland open field and came upon a sharply rising hill of 45 feet, and your map is marked in 20 ft intervals, you would see that the

map indicates two closely spaced brown lines up from your current level. If none of that makes any sense to you, don't panic. We will cover this more in depth later.

The last word on colors should include the three *minor colors*. All of these are very reliable references for navigation purposes. Their meaning is very clear. **Red** is used to mark major roads and highways. Taxes keep up these highways, so if the map says it's there, it's there! **Purple** is used to shade over built up areas of considerable populations, such as towns and cities. Unless you are using a very old map, the towns are where they should be. **Yellow** is used to mark restricted areas. These are places you should not enter for any one of a variety of reasons. Because someone wants to keep you out, you can bet the area is well marked on both the map and the ground.

The Terrain Features

We should get oriented with the terms and physical features of the terrain, because as you'll soon find out, a cliff looks quite a bit more threatening from the view at the bottom than it does from the view in an airplane! Like colors, there are five major and three minor terrain features.

5 Major Terrain Features

Hilltop high ground, with ground falling away in all four directions.

Saddle two hilltops, very close together, with a common low ground between them.

Ridge high ground in one direction, low ground descending in three directions.

Valley high ground in two opposite directions, low ground in one or two directions.

Depression low ground, with high ground rising in all four directions.

3 Minor Terrain Features


Spur a small ridge-like formation descending away from the ridge.

Draw a small valley-like formation between two spurs.

Cliff high ground falling suddenly and sharply to low ground.


Hilltop

As you stand on a hilltop, you will see ground falling in all four directions. On a map, when the brown contour lines circle around a *single* smaller circle, this indicates a hill. The smallest circle, loosely in the center, is the hilltop. If the other circling contour lines are relatively close to one another, then this is a steep hill. If, on the other hand, the contour lines are relatively far apart, this is a slow sloping hill. In either case, note that there is no water (blue color) on a hilltop. Well, that stands to reason since water runs down hill!



Saddle

As you stand in the center of a saddle, you will see ground rising sharply in two opposite directions, and ground falling sharply in two opposite directions. On a map, when the contour lines circle around *two* smaller circles, this indicates a saddle. Again, the smallest circles indicate two hilltops, which are very close together with a common lower ground between them.



This ridge is more of a plateau. Note the elevation numbers decrease as the contour line moves away from the hill at right center (7493).



The light circle indicates a saddle. Note the two hilltops share a common elevation.

Ridge


As you stand on a ridge, you will see ground falling sharply in two directions, slowly falling ground in one direction, and high ground in the opposite direction. On a map, when a series of contour lines move away from hilltops in long patterns, this indicates a ridge or ridgeline. A ridgeline is the high ground running away from the top of a hill. It will gradually lose altitude, although there may be several hilltops along its descent. These ridgelines are represented

as having relatively far spaced contour lines pointing away from the hilltop, while having relatively closely spaced contour lines on the sides of the ridge. This is because the ridgeline falls more gradually away from the hilltop than the steep falling sides of the ridge. Note that water almost never appears on a ridge.

Valley

As you stand in a valley, you will see rising ground in two or three directions, with low ground in at least one direction. On a map, when a series of contour lines move in long parallel patterns between high ground such as hilltops or ridges, this indicates a valley. On the map it is difficult to tell whether you are looking at a ridge or valley. A simple indicator is the presence of water. If a stream or river is flowing through these parallel contour lines, then it is almost certainly a valley. If no water is present, locate an index contour line for the elevation number—these are the dark contour lines that include an elevation number. If the lines are going up in elevation on either side, then the ground in between is a valley.

The light circle indicates the valley. Note the broken lines for an intermittent stream. Valleys typically have water in them, and on the map, water is almost always a low land indicator.



A cliff is circled. Note the lines have all come together next to the train track. Rivers often cause cliffs.

Cliff

You know what a cliff looks like! High ground falls suddenly and sharply to the low ground. On a map, when two or more contour lines actually touch to form one line, this indicates a cliff. Remembering that there are typically 20 to 25 feet between contour lines, two of these lines touching indicate an instant decrease in that altitude. The more lines that are touching each other, the higher the cliff. Can water be present? Well

yes, though it is indeed rare. Water running off of a cliff is called a waterfall. You knew that, right?

Spur


A spur looks like a small ridge. On the map, you will notice many smaller ridge-like formations running away from the ridgeline. These are spurs. Spurs are typically no more than 30 feet (10 m) wide at their highest points.




The light circle indicates a spur. Spurs are high ground that drops away from a ridge. They are usually only large enough to fit a squad on line.

Draw

A draw looks like a small valley—with high ground in three directions. On the map, you will notice small valley-like formations between spurs. These are draws. A draw may sometimes contain intermittent streams. This is usually only true if it is the rainy season. Draws are typically no more than 50 feet (15 m) wide at their lowest point.



The depressions are indicated in the light circle. The background signifies a strip mine.



Draws, like the one seen here circled, are low ground between spurs. Activity in the draw can usually be monitored from one side or the other.

Depression

As you stand in a depression, you will see sharply rising ground in all four directions. On the map, when a contour line forms a circle with inward "teeth" or tick marks, this indicates a depression. Depressions can form almost anywhere, even on hilltops, and usually contain water. Even if the map does not indicate water, a depression will likely have water

in the rainy seasons. Some depressions are actually encircled by cliffs. Use caution when approaching these at night.

The Legend

A great deal of information about the map can be found in its legend, which is commonly located at the bottom right corner and bottom center of the margin. For our purposes, we will be concerned only with the contour interval, the measuring graph and the declination diagram.

Contour Interval

Elevation is represented by each contour line. The interval, an established difference in elevation between lines, will be a smaller interval on maps with relatively flat terrain and a larger interval on maps with mountainous terrain. The legend will indicate the interval between any two brown contour lines. Note that there will be a darker brown contour line. This is called the index contour line, which shows at regular occurrences and includes an elevation number.

Contour line a line of a constant elevation, showing high and low points on the surface.
Index contour line a boldly printed contour line with an elevation reference number.
Contour interval a difference of elevation represented by each contour line.

When contour lines draw closely together, this indicates steep terrain. When the contour lines are spaced with large distances between them, this indicates gradually sloped terrain. Generally, the gradual slope is easier ground to navigate than the steep slope.


Measuring Graph

It will be necessary to know the distance you will be required to navigate. To help you with this, the legend includes a measuring graph. At the bottom center of the map's margin, you will see three bars stacked upon each other. These bars indicate miles, kilometers and nautical miles. We won't bother with the nautical miles since we are not in a boat or helicopter.

One half of each bar is solid, while the other half is marked in black and white increments. The miles bar for example is broken into increments of a quarter mile (one quarter, one half, three quarters) until it concludes at one mile, which is equal to its other half. So the entire bar is two miles long. In a similar manner, the kilometer bar is two kilometers long, with one kilometer being broken up into 100 meter increments. Notice that there is common ground between the two bars. A quarter mile is equal to 400 meters. One half mile is equal to 800 meters, and so on.

To get a rough estimate of how far you'll be walking, simply draw a line on a separate piece of paper between your start point and your end point. Then measure this line on the graph. That's it! Just keep in mind that this is only an estimate. If you are on relatively flat terrain, this estimate will be almost dead-on. However, if you are crossing steep terrain...well the distance can vary significantly.

Imagine you plotted a mile long, straight course. Now imagine that your course takes you over a mountain. Well, mountains are roughly the shape of a triangle. Since you plotted the course on a flat map, you have measured only the bottom side of that triangle. Your course will take you up one side of the triangle—uh, mountain—and down the other side. You will actually walk two sides of the triangle! And we all know that two sides of a triangle will equal a greater distance than a single side of a triangle. So when estimating distance over steep terrain, guess a longer distance to compensate for the up and down.



Declination Diagram

Now we must discuss the matter of the variations of north. "Is there more than one North on the compass?" you ask. Well, no. But the map is quite another matter. In the declination diagram at the bottom of the map, you will find a magnetic North, a grid North, and a true North. For our purposes, you needn't concern yourself with true North. It has something to do with the stars and really is north, but it means about squat when calculating direction on a map. Besides, the other two variations will give you enough of a headache.

Grid North deals with the edge of your map. All maps are oriented north, meaning the top of the page is grid North. For some bizarre reason, this is not actually north. I could bore you with analogies of peeling a banana right now, but since I really didn't understand it much myself, suffice it to say that since maps are flat and the world isn't—grid North is a bogus reference. On the other hand, it is pretty close to north and would do for rough estimates.

Magnetic North deals with a magnetic pull to the north. Unfortunately, a large mineral deposit in the Hudson Bay is responsible for this magnetic pull, so magnetic North is just as bogus as grid North. So the north you see on your compass isn't really north at all. But, you know, it's good enough to navigate with.

If you're feeling frustrated right now, I understand. But trust me, using these two variations of north, you can learn to navigate with such precision that you will split a fence post at a thousand meters! Honest.

Conversion

If you want to see how the azimuth (direction) on your compass looks on the map, you will have to convert the magnetic azimuth to grid. Likewise, if you'd like to know what magnetic bearing (...yet another word for direction) to take from your plotted azimuth on the map, you will have to convert from grid azimuth to magnetic. Confused? We're going to move pretty quickly through this, so pop an aspirin and keep reading.

Really it's very simple, and if you accept that then things will come to you more quickly. Converting from **grid to magnetic** (map to compass) means either adding or subtracting the angle in the declination diagram. The angle is always given to you in an exact number. For example, let's say the angle is 4° (four degrees). The line in the declination diagram that points directly towards the top of the map is always grid North. In the declination diagram, if magnetic North is pointing to the right of grid North (as it does for most of North America), you must ADD that angle:

$$\text{Grid azimuth} + 4^{\circ} = \text{magnetic azimuth.}$$

In the declination diagram, if magnetic North is pointing to the left of grid North (as it does for most of Europe), you must SUBTRACT that angle:

$$\text{Grid azimuth} - 4^{\circ} = \text{magnetic azimuth.}$$

Converting from **magnetic to grid** (compass to map) means doing just the opposite. In North America, magnetic North usually points to the right of grid North. To convert from magnetic to grid, you must SUBTRACT that same angle:

$$\text{Magnetic azimuth} - 4^{\circ} = \text{grid azimuth.}$$

In Europe, magnetic North usually points to the left of grid North. Again, to convert from magnetic to grid, you must ADD that same angle:

$$\text{Magnetic azimuth} + 4^{\circ} = \text{grid azimuth.}$$

Please remember that we used 4° as an example only. The actual angle varies depending on the angle of your location as it relates to the Hudson Bay and grid North. Not that it would be important to remember where the Hudson Bay is located—because the angle is given to you inside the declination diagram. Again, don't make this harder than it is. Keep it simple.

Plotting a Course

The tools you will need to plot a course are a fine point pencil, a protractor, and a map. You will also need to know two other pieces of information—where your starting point (SP) is located on the map, and where your objective (OBJ) is on the map.

Plot

Using your fine point pencil, make a small dot on the map to represent your SP. Again, make a small dot on the map at the location of your OBJ. Now, using the straight edge of your protractor, lightly draw a line connecting the two dots. Be sure to draw the line out far enough so that it is equal in length to the protractor, even if this line goes well beyond your OBJ on the map.

Position the protractor so that the center rests over the SP, and orient the protractor so that 0° points to the top of the map (thus aligning with grid North). You will notice that the line you drew emerges from under the protractor at a specific number along its edge. That is your grid azimuth! Pretty easy, huh?

Measure

If you'd like to know the distance you will travel between your SP and your OBJ, simply mark the line between them on a piece of paper (or use the tick marks on your protractor). Then measure this line on the measuring graph at the bottom center of the map.

Convert

Check the diagram at the bottom of your map for the declination angle. Once you have that number, add it to the grid azimuth if magnetic North points to the right in the diagram, or subtract it from the grid azimuth if magnetic North points to the left in the diagram. Now you know what azimuth to set on your compass. Pat yourself on the back, you have just plotted a course!

Back Azimuth

Now that you can go forward, try going backward. Let's plot a back azimuth—a return course from your OBJ to your original SP. First, recall that there are exactly 360° on a compass. Next, if your magnetic azimuth is LESS than 180, ADD 180° to your magnetic azimuth to find your back azimuth. Example:

Magnetic azimuth of 145° + 180° = a back azimuth of 325°.

If your original magnetic azimuth is MORE than 180, SUBTRACT 180° from your magnetic azimuth to find your back azimuth. Example:

Magnetic azimuth of 270° - 180° = a back azimuth of 90°.


Now, whatever your magnetic back azimuth is, subtract the declination angle if magnetic North points to the right of grid North...or add the declination angle if magnetic North points to the left of grid North. The number you come up with is your back azimuth for purposes of plotting on the map. Of course this is just a simple exercise, because you had already plotted your course on the map. Remember?

To check your work, place the center of the protractor over the OBJ and orient 0° to the top of the page. You will notice that the line you drew will emerge from the protractor at specific number along its edge. That back azimuth should equal the back azimuth you just converted from magnetic to grid. How'd you do?

If you've got this down, then you can repeat these steps over and over until you've plotted out the entire map. It seems you're ready to move on to the compass.

THE COMPASS

For our purposes, let's refer to military style lensatic compasses. There are simply too many different types of compasses, and while all have their advantages, the military lensatic compass is ideal for land navigation on foot. This compass is marked in two systems, mils and degrees.



Familiarization

The degrees make up the inside ring of numbers (usually red in color). There are 360 degrees on a compass, and here they are marked in five degree increments while being numbered in 20 degree increments. The mils make up the outside ring of numbers (usually black in color). There are 6400 mils on a compass, and here they are marked in 20 mil increments while being numbered in 200 mil increments. Mils are a more exact measurement...which is good if you are shooting artillery, but unnecessary if you are navigating on foot. So we shall stick to degrees. Notice that the inside disc—the one that contains the rings of numbers and large green arrow—rotates. That is because this is a magnetic compass. Yep, its north-seeking arrow is drawn toward the large mineral deposit in the Hudson Bay above Canada. And that is close enough to the North Pole for government work. Right?

You may also notice that the bezel ring rotates those two funny looking yellow lines on the surface of the glass. You will use the longer one for a quick reference marker.

Finally, please notice that when you flatten the eyepiece to the glass surface, the floating disc no longer moves freely. That is by design. The eyepiece is metal and the disc is magnetic. This should also tell you not to keep anything metallic around the immediate area of the compass while in use. The barrel of your rifle, for instance, can pull the north-seeking arrow off course.


Plotting a course

To plot means to plan, or more exactly to take a bearing over the distance of terrain you intend to cross. You've already learned to plot a course on a map. Now we will focus on plotting a course with your compass. You must aim a compass at a given landmark on the horizon in order to get a reading. To do this, there are two generally accepted methods to hold and view the compass.

Cheek to Hand

Fold the compass cover upward so that it is in roughly a 90-degree angle from the compass face. Then fold the eyepiece so that it is about a 60-degree angle from the compass face. Slip the thumb of your shooting hand into the brass ring and make a fist. Now, if you bring your fist up to the cheek below your dominant eye, you have assumed the correct position.


Notice that there is a slight vertical cut in the eyepiece. This lines up fairly well with the vertical wire that has been centered inside the square compass cover window. Pretty cool, huh? Again, that is by design. If you were to line that center wire up with a landmark, such as a tree or the window of a house within say 200 meters, you would notice that by looking down through the round eyepiece window you will be able to read the red degree markings. Guess what? You've just taken a navigational bearing.



Center Mass

Often, it is not necessary to split a tree in half to get an accurate reading. A much faster—though a bit less accurate—method involves taking a reading from the hip. Open the compass cover until it is flat in line with the compass face. Open the eyepiece all the way (90 degrees upward). Using the bezel ring, line up the yellow quick reference line on the face of the compass with the centered wire in the square window of the compass cover. Now, using this quick reference line and center wire as a finger, point the compass in the direction of the landmark. Holding it steady, carefully read the red number immediately under the quick reference line. Yep, that is your navigational bearing.

If you want to check the accuracy of the center mass method, simply choose another landmark. Take a bearing using the center mass method, then take another bearing using the more accurate cheek to hand method. If you are off by five percent (18 degrees) or less, then this method will be fine for quarter mile plots (400 meters). At that distance, you would be no more than 20 meters off to the left or right of the landmark. But you should know unless you are navigating across flat open terrain or from mountain



top to mountain top, you will rarely plot distances of 400 meters. In heavy vegetation, you often only plot distances of several meters at a time.

Quick Bearing

The number of degrees you read from the 12 o'clock position on the compass face is your bearing. You can mark this for quick reference by moving the bezel ring and setting the quick reference line (that long yellow line on the glass surface). To do this, take your reading again. Steady your hand so that the bearing (the number you have just read) remains at the twelve o'clock position of your compass face. The twelve o'clock position is place on the compass face that the center wire points to. Then adjust the bezel ring until the yellow quick reference line meets the green north-seeking arrow.

Remember that the north-seeking arrow moves freely, but the reference line is set into the glass surface of the compass face. By lining up the north-seeking arrow and the quick reference line, you will notice that your bearing comes up at the twelve o'clock position. Now the center wire points in the direction of your plotted bearing.

CAUTION: do not follow the north-seeking arrow and quick reference line! They point north. The center wire points in the direction of your bearing.

NAVIGATION

This section includes the considerations of physically crossing the terrain while trying to stay on your plotted course. There are two generally recognized methods of doing this, "dead reckoning" and "terrain association". In truth, a good navigator will use a combination of both, but I will address them separately.

Dead Reckoning

Dead reckoning means methodically taking bearings from landmark to landmark along your plotted azimuth. It involves either the center mass or cheek to hand method of reading your compass. It also involves an accurate count of the distance you've traveled. To keep this count, you'll need to know the length of your pace—your pace count.

Pace Count

You will need to go to an established range that is marked to 100 meters. Some great examples would be a golf driving range marked at 110 yards—which is 100 meters, or a football field (goal post to goal post). Otherwise, mark off 100 meters across a field. Then start walking at a normal step.

Unless you really like repetitive counting, it is a good idea to only count the steps of your left foot. This cuts the number you must count in half! Anyway, count off the paces over the 100-meter field at least twice. Add them together and divide by two. This gives you your average pace count at 100 meters.

Though the pace count differs from one person to the next, typically a six foot man will have an average pace count of anywhere from 55 to 65 paces. If you are much higher than this number, be certain you are only counting your left foot! If you are much lower than this number, try wearing a blindfold (be sure the ground is clear of obstacles that you could trip over and break your neck). A blindfold makes us more aware of where we place our step. It typically shortens the length of your pace which should increase the number of your pace count.

Counting Pace

Sounds redundant, doesn't it? Counting your pace simply means that you must gather an accurate guesstimate of the distance you have traveled. It's easy. Say your pace count is 65. That means every 65 left steps marks 100 meters you have traveled. You should mark off each 100 meters traveled in some manner. Don't rely on your memory or fingers! Once the shooting starts, your fingers will adjust to your weapon system and loose count. Your memory will do a brain-fart and simply forget all of the recent data while it tries to comprehend the next few steps you need to take to survive.

The best method to keep a pace count is to buy or make pace beads. This is simply a shoelace that has been fitted with at least ten tightly fitted beads. You push a bead up for every 100 meters traveled. Once all the beads are in the up position (1000 meters), you then push the beads back down until you've reached your next destination, or you run out of beads and half to start pushing beads up again. Now you have to keep track of how many kilometers you have moved, but you can incorporate that into your pace beads if you are a smart cookie.

Other, more primitive systems of counting pace include using pebbles or twigs and rotating them from your back pant pocket to your front pant pocket. Or simply tie a knot in a shoestring that hangs loosely from your uniform. Yeah, that works, too.

Obstacles

Anything that keeps you from walking directly to your designated landmark is an obstacle. That may be a group of thorn bushes, a cliff, a lake or even a large open field...danger area, remember? So how do you get around these while dead reckoning? Glad you asked.

With small obstacles, such as the annoying thorn bushes or large deadfall, simply go to the side of it while keeping your eye on your landmark. One bit of advice is to alternate going to the left or right. This keeps you from "drifting" off course. And do yourself a favor by not trying to keep track of which obstacle was bigger than the other. Just go left, then right. It will all equal out in the end.

For larger obstacles, such as the lake or large open danger area, shoot an azimuth to a landmark on the far side of the obstacle that is closely in line with your plotted course. Make an estimate on the range it is from you and add that to your current pace count. Now you are free to safely maneuver around the obstacle until you get to that landmark. Once at the landmark on the opposite side of the obstacle, pick up your bearing and pace count and continue! Cool, huh?

Sometimes we run into very large obstacles that we can't see across, such as a marshy area or large cliff. In these cases we use a "box method". That means you will have to guess as to whether the terrain to the left or right is more easily traveled (big hint—use your map).

1. You will take a 90 degree turn either left or right and keep a second pace count so that you know how far you've walked in order to avoid this obstacle. **DO NOT** add this pace count to your original plotted course.
2. Once you are clear of the obstacle, take an **opposite** 90-degree turn to get back on your plotted azimuth. Add this pace count to your original plotted course.
3. Once you are certain you have cleared the obstacle—because obstacles have more

than one side—take the **same** 90-degree turn and count back the distance of your secondary pace count. Again, do not add this to your original pace count.

4. Now you should be on the opposite side of that large obstacle. You may have noticed you used a “box” to get around it. Pick up your original azimuth and continue on with your original pace count.

That is all there is to dead reckoning. You simply move from point to point along your plotted course using landmarks that can be viewed along your azimuth. Once you have covered the correct distance, you begin looking for your objective.

Realize that you have probably drifted a bit left or right. This is more likely to be true if you are traveling across large distances, say in excess of a couple miles (several kilometers). To find your objective, place your partner at your final spot and begin moving in circles around him. Use ten-meter circles in heavy vegetation, or 50-meter circles in open terrain. Continue to spiral outward until you’ve located your objective.

Terrain Association

The truth is that you can actually navigate across terrain without a compass... though I wouldn’t advise it. Still, a skilled navigator with a map can find his way around by identifying north, following terrain, and keeping at least a vague idea of the distance he has covered.

First, you’ll have to locate your position on the map. There are numerous way to do this. Personally, I look for the most prominent tower I can see and then try to find it on the map. Estimate your distance and direction from the tower and locate the terrain feature you are standing on. Ta-da! You’ve just located yourself on the map. Variations of this include the use of major highways. Yeah, that works too.

Finding Direction

You’ll need to get your bearing. That is, you’ll need to determine where north is on the ground, and then orient your map. Now, if you have a compass, this is obviously simple. Otherwise, you will need to get creative.

Using the sun, remember that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. So, in the early part of the day, keeping the sun to your right faces you in a northward direction. In the later part of the day, keeping the sun to your left faces you in a northward direction. In either case, it is very simple to determine all four major directions by making 90-degree facing movements, as well as the four minor ones (north-east, south-east, south-west, and north-west) by cutting these facing movements to approximately half.

Mid-day use of the sun is a bit more tricky. Since it is overhead, it will be hard to determine north, or even east or west for that matter. So try this:

Place a stick into the ground and mark the spot where the shadow ends with your LEFT foot (or mark it with something else if you can remember that your left foot goes there). You'll have to stand around for about 20 minutes and then check the shadow again. Mark the end of the current shadow with your RIGHT foot. Guess what? You're facing north.

At night you'll have to use the North Star (located in the big dipper). It is not actually the lowest star on the horizon, but it is the only star in the sky that doesn't "move" through our night sky. Don't ask me too much about all this because it is invariably raining when it's my turn to navigate at night...in which case you'd damned well better find a compass!

Moving Across Terrain

Since we've already discussed the five major and three minor terrain features, I won't bother going over them again. I'm certain you've already run around your neighborhood correctly identifying the characteristics of numerous terrain features. Well, good for you. You see, once you can recognize a terrain feature by its characteristics (ridges, for example, have land falling sharply down in two opposite directions, falling slowly in one direction and rising in the other direction) then you are certain to recognize them as you pass over them on foot.

The theory behind navigating by terrain association is that, as you move across each terrain feature, you are able to check the approximate distance traveled (pace count) and your general direction (bearing—since you're not using an actual azimuth) as it relates to your map. This method also utilizes ample amounts of man-made features as well, even though this is regarded as a "no-no" by navigational purists. Meaning that as you pass over or near a road, building, bridge, or tower you locate that on the map to check your bearing and pace count, just as you would if it were a cliff, saddle, or hilltop.

Terrain association, though invaluable, is a much less precise skill. In truth, it is much more of an art than science. It requires the ability to mentally represent spatial relationships as you move across terrain. Typically, we develop this skill while using dead-reckoning navigational techniques. And when these two navigational techniques are combined with accurate map reading skills, the results are consistently impressive regardless of the environment. It takes practice.

Lessons Learned

I hadn't originally planned to include any lessons learned in the individual skill section, but this story is a little too rich, and a little too personal. I've decided it should be included.

On a summer's night in 1986, a small 12-man patrol from the 1/17th Buffalo Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division moved out of a patrol base toward a likely ambush position the recon team had designated earlier in the day. This was the Korean demilitarized zone, or DMZ, which remains infamous for being the most heavily guarded and hotly contested border in the world.

The U.S. and South Korean R.O.K. armies' mission is to locate and kill armed insurgents from the 7th Special Forces of the North Korean People's Army. And with that in mind, the Buffalo Soldiers moved into the night.

Sometime before the patrol was due in position, the PL stopped the patrol's very young and very inexperienced point-man (ahem...yours truly) to ask if he were on the proper azimuth. The 19-year-old private explained that the compass was performing poorly, and that he would simply move over this ridgeline and take up a good azimuth once he had reached the tree line on the opposite side of the ridge. With that, the patrol continued, blindly led by a nincompoop.

Somewhere in the darkness, the point-man lost his unfailing sense of direction and began to move in a north-eastern direction, instead of the east azimuth he was supposed to be on. This slight flaw was soon revealed when the drag-man observed what he thought to be an anti-personnel landmine, half exposed in the moonlight filtering down through the heavy vegetation of trees. A request to turn on a red lens flashlight moved up the column of the patrol. Yep. The point-man's "unfailing" sense of direction had walked the entire patrol squarely into a minefield!

The Buffalo Soldiers never did make it to the ambush site that night. They spent the next four hours on their bellies, crawling in line behind the point-man, who was forced to slowly probe his way up the ridgeline to a dirt road where the patrol waited for extraction the next morning. (I found two more 'Bouncing Betty' type landmines—one lying on its side, the other nipples up. That is a very disconcerting sensation in middle of the night! I can tell you that! And I imagine it's not too fun in the day either.)

Lessons learned? Note: I say this with the utmost sincerity—*trust your equipment!* If you insist on arguing with a compass, just know that you will always be on the losing side.

In my defense, I'd like to say that walking through a minefield was a wake up call for me. I soon became an expert at land navigation. That is partly due to my sense of duty...and perhaps equally due to the fact that my squad leader assigned me to the permanent post of point-man. (I had no idea they could do that.) The entire platoon referred to me as "the idiot" for a while, but everyone concluded that I had good karma and I was stuck with the point for the remainder of our three-month mission on the DMZ. My platoon followed faithfully behind me...at a relatively safe distance, of course.

Individual Skill #6

COMMUNICATIONS

"Shoot, move and communicate" are the basic infantry skills. In coordinating even the smallest two-man team, communication is paramount. Communication systems must be used in tandem for mutual support. What follows are the procedural considerations of tactical communication.

This section will cover electronic transmitting devices, namely *field telephones* incorporating wire communications, and *radios*. These two devices are by no means the only systems of tactical communication!

There are numerous communicative systems. These break down into visual, auditory, oral, and electronic systems. The earlier section on hand & arm signals is one example of a visual communication system, but visual communication also includes the use of signal flags, lights, or pyrotechnic flares and smoke. Auditory communication systems include whistles, sirens, gongs or bells. Oral communications involve the use of voice and messengers, often referred to as "runners". Each system has its advantages and disadvantages, depending on the needs of the mission. Because of this, ALL communication systems should be backed up by at least one other system, in case the primary system fails.

FIELD PHONES

Field phones make use of wire to communicate. In this way they are more secure than radios because they do not transmit radio waves, which are easy to intercept. As a general rule of thumb, if your wire is secure, then your transmission is secure. Of course, your team will have to physically lay the wire from one position to the next, and you are limited in mobility by the length of that wire. These are the obvious disadvantages of a field telephone. Less obvious is that the wire can be damaged by weather, vehicles, and the enemy. There must be considerable care when securing and laying the wire.

Phone Variations

Because they are more secure than radio devices, field phones are an excellent choice for defensive positions. Many types of field phones are commercially available through military surplus, and most function very well, with ranges over 10 kilometers. The US-manufactured TA-312 is an excellent field phone (although a bit heavy) that runs off two D-cell batteries and a hand crank. There are many NATO variations of this field phone which are available commercially.

Perhaps the most versatile field phone is the TA-1. It is much lighter, at only 3.5 pounds (1.6 kg), has a range of up to 16 kilometers, and uses no batteries. It includes an

indigenous hand-squeezed generator that powers all transmissions. The ringer can be adjusted in sound all the way down to the silent mode, which activates a luminous dial alert for incoming calls. This field phone is available commercially.

Laying & Securing Wire

The wire should be laid in reverse order, starting at the end point and running to the beginning point. This allows the operator at the beginning point the option of either rolling up the wire at the end of its use, or cutting the wire to make a quick withdraw while preserving the remainder of the wire on the spool.

The wire must be tied to a ground stake at its end point, leaving enough loose running wire to maneuver the phone to its necessary positions. Then the wire spool is unrolled through each of the other user stations until reaching the beginning point. Be certain there is plenty of slack in the wire tension, as this slack allows ease of future maintenance. The wire must be tied to a ground stake at the beginning point, and the remainder of the spool is left there.

One technique of laying wire requires that the wire is secured to a stake or tree every so many meters. This is advisable for long-term static positions, but less feasible for a position that will require the wire to be gathered quickly.

Once the wire is laid and secured, the beginning and end stations, as well as other user stations, can separate and splice the wire to attach their field phones. This system allows multiple user stations. It is called a "hot loop". Of course without a switchboard, if a station generates a call to another station, all of the stations on the hot loop receive that call alert and can take part in the communication.

Since field phones are so much more secure than radios, there are no hard-and-fast rules to procedural language. Each station will transmit their messages in the shortest, most direct manner...though commonly radio procedures tend to be used.

Radio Transmission

Two-way radios are the most convenient means of communication, and are indispensable on combat patrols! Their immediacy, mobility and range is unmatched by any other system of communication. The down side is that radios are also easily monitored by the enemy.

A great deal of time and money has been spent on trying to maximize radio frequencies in an attempt to counter monitoring abilities. But, the most effective counter to monitoring is the creation of code. A code book is known more formally as "Counter Encrypting Operations & Intelligence"...or CEO&I for short.

A CEO&I allows all pertinent codes to be collected in one written work. This work includes the codes to encrypt and decipher messages and numbers, establish frequencies, recognize other friendly units using the radio, challenge users we do not recognize, and establish passwords to recognize these friendly units when we come face-to-face with them. In short, a CEO&I allows us to communicate in a manner that only people with the same CEO&I will understand us.

CEO&I Creation and Use

Creating your own CEO&I is surprisingly simple. Using a note card, all necessary information is printed and copied. These cards are then laminated for protection from the environment. The CEO&I is distributed to each radio operator (RTO). The RTO fastens the CEO&I to his arm, or around his neck with a cord, or inside the top of his headgear.

The CEO&I contains critical information that must never fall into the hands of the enemy. If the CEO&I is compromised, a new CEO&I should be issued within a six-hour time frame. A CEO&I should never be used longer than a 24-hour period. Then it is collected up, and a new CEO&I is issued to the RTO.

What follows is an example of a homemade CEO&I. Printed front and back on a single piece of paper, it fits nicely in your patrol hat or taped to the inside of your forearm. You may copy this format and tailor it to your own needs.

(Front)

CALL SIGN			SITREP	
Company Commander	FOX	98	Moving _____	DOG
1 st Platoon Leader	ZULU	25	Halted _____	COW
1 st Squad Leader	"	4	In ORP _____	SHEEP
Alpha Team Leader	"	" MIKE	At OBJ _____	CAT
Bravo Team Leader	"	" TANGO	Enemy Spotted _____	GOAT
2 nd Squad Leader	"	7	Compromised _____	HAMSTER
3 rd Squad Leader	"	2	Have Casualties _____	PIG
2 nd Platoon Leader	BRAVO	87	Mission Complete _____	HORSE
3 rd Platoon Leader	ROMEO	40		
E X H A U S T I O N			Challenge: RED	Password: SMILE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0			Running Password: BUDWEISER	
AUTHENTICATION TABLE			PASSWORDS	

(Back)

ORDERS		RESOURCES	
Move _____	EAGLE	Ammunition _____	ELEPHANT
Halt _____	HOUND	Batteries _____	DEER
Attack _____	QUAIL	Water _____	BEAR
Withdraw _____	PIDGEON	Food _____	SNAKE
Continue Mission _____	GRIZZLY	Reinforcements _____	RABBIT
Rendezvous _____	WEASLE	More Time _____	WOLF
At/To "___" _____	SNAPPER	I Request "___" _____	FROG
Until/NLT "___" _____	HAWK		
Yes (Granted) _____	TURTLE	What's Your SitRep? _____	BADGER
No (Denied) _____	CHICKEN	What's Your Location? _____	EEL
ANSWERS		QUESTIONS	

Call signs:

Although you may adjust the call sign portion of the CEO&I to fit your own needs, this pattern is fairly comprehensive for a company-sized infantry unit. At first glance you will recognize only nine call signs, but in fact there are 31 call signs on this card for an entire company of 80-140 troops. That breaks down into ten call signs for the three platoons, each with 25-40 troops; three call signs for each squad of 7-12 troops; and one call sign for each fireteam of 3-5 troops.

One of the most difficult things to remember is that the numbers and letters of these call signs are selected at **random!** That means they really don't mean anything, per se. The highest ranking commander does not start at "one" or "A" because these numbers intentionally have no meaning. If they did have meaning, the enemy would quickly compromise your code. So each new CEO&I must randomly alter everyone's call sign.

Here is how it breaks down. On this card, the *company commander's* call sign is F98...or "Fox Nine-Eight". Any RTO that works for the commander would use this call sign. If another calling station wanted to speak directly to the commander, they would ask for the "Fox nine-eight Actual". The term "Actual" means the actual person for which this call sign was designated.

Similarly, a *platoon leader's* call sign will include a letter followed by two numbers. The first letter is one that designates their platoon. The following two numbers are his/her personal identification. So, the 1st platoon leader's call sign is the "Z" designator for this platoon and "25" for his personal identification..."Zulu Two-Five". The 2nd platoon leader's call sign is the "B" designator for that platoon, followed by "87" for his personal ID number..."Bravo Eight-Seven". Are you getting this?

Squad leaders use the same letter designator that their platoon leader uses, plus a single number for their personal identification. For example, the 1st squad leader of 1st platoon would use the "Z" and his personal ID number of "4"...so, "Zulu Four". "Zulu Seven" would be the 2nd squad leader of 1st platoon, and "Zulu Two" would indicate the 3rd squad leader--all in 1st platoon.

Fireteam leaders use the same platoon designated number AND their squad leader's number, but they have a letter designator added to the end of the call sign. So, the alpha fireteam leader of 1st platoon would use the "Z", and since he was from 1st squad he would use the number "4". Finally, the personal ID letter "M" would be attached to his/her call sign...so, "Zulu Four Mike". The bravo fireteam leader of this same squad and same platoon would be called..."Zulu Four Tango".

Now let's conduct a little test. What would be the call sign of the bravo fireteam leader of 2nd squad, 3rd platoon? (You will have to look because it is almost impossible to memorize this pattern without a great deal of practice.) Did you come up with "Romeo Seven Tango"? Okay. What is the call sign for the 3rd squad leader of 2nd platoon? Yep, "Bravo Two". And what if I wanted to speak directly to the 3rd platoon leader, instead of his RTO? The answer is "Romeo Four-Zero Actual".

Again, remember that these numbers and letters are selected at random. They don't have any real meaning of their own. Think of it like a number on a football jersey. Does the number "01" indicate that this player is the quarterback of the team? No. So, "Alpha One Alpha" may not be the alpha fireteam leader of 1st squad, 1st platoon. If that is your system, the enemy will figure this out pretty quickly and your code will be compromised.

Encryption of messages:

This is a lot of fun and the system is pretty straight forward. The code words--also called brevity codes--are randomly chosen and are all related in some fashion. On this CEO&I we used animals, but we could have just as easily used types of cars, major European cities, parts of the body, brand names of wristwatches--whatever! The important thing is not to try and assign meaning. For example, I wouldn't want to use the word "Tiger" for the order to attack, and the word "Chicken" to withdraw. These words have too much connotative meaning, so we must try and be random about assigning brevity codes.

For example, a commander or platoon leader may want to ask a patrol about their sitrep (situation report). The commander would simply identify himself using his call sign, and after making contact send his question:

Commander: "Romeo Two Tango, this is Fox Nine-Eight, over."

Patrol: "This is Romeo Two Tango, over."

Commander: "Romeo Two Tango, I send Badger, over."

Patrol: "Roger, Fox Nine-Eight, I copy Badger. Wait one, over."

"Fox Nine-Eight, this is Romeo Two Tango, I send Sheep, over."

Commander: "Roger, Romeo Two Tango, I copy Sheep, out."

As complicated as this sounds, it's actually quite simple. The commander called up the patrol and identified himself. Once the patrol responded, the commander asked, "What's your sitrep?" The patrol responded by saying, "Yeah, I understand your question...but wait a minute so I can encrypt my message." Then the patrol called again to say, "We are in the ORP." The commander said, "Okay, I understand. Goodbye."

A patrol can also make different requests of its commander, such as, "I request water." This would simply be stated like:

"Romeo Four-Zero this is Romeo Two, I send Frog Bear, over."

Or, if the patrol is requesting permission to attack an enemy patrol, it would sound like:

"Romeo Four-Zero this is Romeo Two, I send Goat period. Frog Quail period. Over."

The word "period" is used to denote that there are two sentences in the encrypted message. If you are sending only one sentence, there is no need to use the word "period".

The possible combinations obviously greatly limit the content of your messages. However, your messages can still contain a considerable amount of information. Be sure to allow the receiving party plenty of time to write down your message by using the "message follows" warning. And be prepared to repeat your encrypted message if necessary.

Encryption of numbers:

Numbers can also be encrypted, and this is where the messages can get really complicated. Of course, they also are more meaningful messages that include times, grid locations, and numbers of troops, equipment or casualties.

To encrypt numbers you must refer to the section of the CEO&I marked "Authentication". This includes the digits 1 through 0 matched up to the letters of a ten-character word.

Notice that no letters in the word are repeated. That means, for example, that there is not two of the letter "a". Of course, you do not have to use an actual word, but using a word makes it easier for the RTO to remember the authentication table. You just have to think up different ten-letter words, like "Exhaustion" or "Blackhorse" when you create new CEO&I.

Example: E X H A U S T I O N
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

This isn't rocket science. Simply state the letter that corresponds with the number you want to encrypt. The number 400 is encrypted on our CEO&I as "*Alpha November November*". The time 15:30 is encrypted as "*Echo Uniform Hotel November*". Get it?

The message "Rendezvous at 14:00 Hours", using the CEO&I from above would sound like:

"I send '*Weasel Snapper Echo Alpha November November*', over."

This relatively short message takes quite a bit of encryption. You can see why

you might want to warn the receiver to get a pen and paper to write on. To do this, use the "message follows" statement.

Sender: "Romeo Two, this is Romeo Four-Zero, over."
Receiver: "This is Romeo Two, over."
Sender: "Romeo Two, message follows, over."
Receiver: "Roger Romeo Four-Zero, wait one, over."
"Romeo Four-Zero, this is Romeo Two, send message, over."

Again, this allowed the receiver of the message time to get his pen and paper out of his pocket. The receiver then calls back the sending station and says, "Yeah, what do you want to say?" And at that point, the sending station can send their encrypted message.

Authentication:

The authentication table is also used to determine whether or not a caller is actually an enemy counter-intelligence operator. Remember that radio waves can be monitored. It is just as easy for the enemy to use an existing call sign and start giving orders or making requests. For example, when a caller whose voice you do not recognize requests your patrol to rendezvous with them at a road junction, you may be concerned that it could be an ambush. Perhaps you're called by a station with a call sign that you do recognize, or ordered your patrol to do something that does not make sense. In these cases, you can demand that the calling station authenticates his possession of the proper CEO&I.

To do this, simply begin with either a letter OR a number--it does not matter which. The authenticating station must reply with both the letter AND the number to the immediate left of the number or letter you just stated. So, using the "Exhaustion" code listed on the sample CEO&I, it sounds something like this:

You: "Last calling station, this is Romeo Two, over."
Call Station: "Romeo Two, this is Yankee Nine-Nine, over."
You: "Yankee Nine-Nine, authenticate '*Tango*', over."
Call Station: "This is Yankee Nine-Nine, I authenticate '*Sierra Six*', over."

You gave the calling station an authentication start point of "T" on your authentication table. You could have said any letter, or even a number. But the important thing is that the calling station must then authenticate by moving to the immediate left of your letter or number and reading the letter and its corresponding number back to you. So, the answer "Sierra Six" is correct on our authentication table.

In this case, Yankee Nine-Nine is a legitimate calling station. The reason that you do not have his/her call sign is because Yankee Nine-Nine is not in your infantry unit. He/she may be in another company, or may be some kind of support unit. But each unit's

CEO&I should have the same information, except for the call signs, so Yankee Nine-Nine is holding your team's CEO&I and should be considered "friendly".

What would have happened if you had given the authentication start point of "Echo"? Well, there is no character to the left of "E" on this particular CEO&I, so the calling station would have had to move all the way backwards to the end of the table. The correct response would have been "November Zero". Get it?

But why authenticate with both the number AND letter? Because the enemy is listening and may start to put the code together. If they have only part of the code, then they will be less likely to authenticate the proper letter and number combinations. The obvious problem is that every time a calling station properly authenticates, they disclose 10% of the authentication table. This is why you should ask others to authenticate ONLY when you do not recognize their voice or call sign, or when the calling station's behavior is irrational or nonsensical. But you will change the CEO&I at least every 24 hours, so the enemy will have little time to break your code.

Realize also that you can change the procedures of your CEO&I. For instance, you may authenticate to the right instead of the left. Or you may get really fancy and only authenticate with letters by counting them two characters back to the left. Any of these procedures are okay, as long as everyone is on the same sheet of music...so to speak.

Passwords:

The CEO&I also include passwords. Passwords are NOT used over the radio, but are intended for use "face to face". Furthermore, passwords and running passwords are not used forward of the FFL (Forward Friendly Line). Forward of the FFL, each patrol will create their own indigenous number combination to recognize each other, as well as their own unique running password. In this way, the passwords cannot be compromised and used by the enemy to penetrate our lines.

Passwords, then, are used on and behind the FFL. When a person or group of people are physically approaching your position, you will stop them using your voice at a distance from you that is appropriate to overwhelm them with firepower. You will then give the challenge, and the approaching person must give the correct password. Do not shout the challenge and password! This should be done with some discretion. It sounds like this:

You:	"Halt. Who are you?"
Person:	"I'm Jones from first platoon."
You:	"Red." (The challenge.)
Person:	"Smile." (The password.)
You:	"Okay, come over here slowly."

If you physically recognize the person, either by sight or sound, you do NOT need to challenge them. Which is why you should ask who they are in the first place. Once you are happy that they are "friendly" you should let them pass through and count them. If they don't give the password correctly, try to detain them. They may run off, but unless otherwise ordered, we only shoot them if they try to attack or push through our position.

The 'running password' is also included on the CEO&I. It is handled very differently, and typically it is used only after the shooting has begun. Running passwords are used when a friendly unit is being chased by the enemy. The pointman will yell out the running password as he approaches your position. This lets you know he is "friendly".

Sometimes the pointman will yell out the running password followed by a number, such as "Budweiser Five!" This tells you there are five people in his patrol or group. After you have counted five people running past your position, you should fire upon any other people running towards your position. Running passwords are used *under fire* or under the threat of fire and forward of the FFL, as when a patrol has just departed or is preparing to re-enter the FFL.

Procedural language

Radio communication carries with it an established language procedure. These procedural phrases have distinct meanings, and the use of these phrases shortens the time it takes to transmit. It also reduces confusion of communication traffic, meaning when to speak, when a response is expected, and when the transmission ends. All troops should become familiar with these procedural phrases, beginning with the phonetic alphabet.

The Phonetic Alphabet:

Alpha	Bravo	Charlie	Delta
Echo	Fox	Golf	Hotel
India	Juliet	Kilo	Lima
Mike	November	Oscar	Papa
Quebec	Romeo	Sierra	Tango
Uniform	Victor	Whiskey	Xray
Yankee	Zulu		

Common Phrases:

"Over."--"This is the end of my transmission and I am waiting for your response."

"Out."--"This is the end of my transmission and no response is required."

"This is..."--"I am..."

"Roger."--"I understand."

"Wilco."--"I will comply."

"Negative."--"No."
"Affirmative."--"Yes."
"Be advised..."--"You should be aware that..."
"Break."--"I will take a pause and transmit in a few seconds."
"Wait one."--"I will take a pause and transmit in one minute."
"Wait out."--"I will take a pause and transmit in five minutes, or as soon as possible."
"Message follows."--"I will send a message on my NEXT transmission."
"Send message."--"I am prepared to receive your message."
"I send..."--"Everything that follows this statement is the message..."
"How copy."--"Did you successfully receive the message?"
"I copy..."--"I received the following message..."
"Correction..."--"An error was made and the correct message is..."
"Say again."--"Repeat your last message."
"I say again..."--"I am repeating my last message..."
"Repeat."--"Fire that exact same *fire mission* again."
"Commo check."--"I am requesting a transmission back to my station."
"Negative contact."--"I have received no transmission."
"Last calling station..."--"I am addressing the last transmitter of unknown identity..."
"Authenticate..."--"Reference the code book to verify your identity using..."

There is no need to make radio communication difficult or complex. Keep your transmissions short and to the point. Do not try to "talk around" the subject or insert improvised code. This will only confuse matters. Radio communication is never secure, so if you have vital information that cannot be encrypted, try another means of communication. If time is the main factor, send the message over the radio. Be direct and quick.

Section II

LEADERSHIP SKILL LEVEL

Leader Skill #1

TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

"If you are a block ahead of the parade ... you're leading it. If you are two blocks ahead of the parade, you aren't even in it."—Dr. Lawrence Kratz

As a leader you must have vision. But you have to share that vision in order to allow other people to help achieve those goals. What follows in this lesson is a process known as troop leading procedures (TLP). The process is not so much a number of tasks that must be checked off in sequential order. In fact, it may not entirely take place in the order given. Rather, it is a guide that leaders often refer to as they make plans and prepare for the mission. Get used to it. Bookmark this page! Chant these nine steps until you repeat them in your sleep!

[1] Receive the Mission

Somewhere, somehow, someone is going to issue your team an order to run off and slay dragons. Certainly initiative should be encouraged, but it is unlikely that you—as a “direct leader” of a combat unit—will decide foreign policy and act upon your own initiative in deciding which mission you will undertake. So, we wait for an order to come in the form of a Warning Order, OpOrder, or Frag-O. That's life.

Take notes and ask questions, such as:

- Where will the mission take place?
- How will we get there?
- How much time is allotted?
- What support do we have on this mission?
- Where are the locations and direction of movement of other friendly units in the area?
- With whom should I coordinate?
- Do we really have to do this? (Okay, I'm kidding. You never get to ask this.)

[2] Issue a Warning Order

Immediately after receiving a mission, you must turn around and issue a warning order to your team. Don't wait. Don't mull the mission over in your head while you sip on a latte at your favorite coffee shop. (They only do that in the movies, anyway.)

Step right up and tell your team *the mission*, *the time* of the OpOrder, and *the place* of the OpOrder. Those are the only three requirements of a warning order. Can there be more? Sure! And in fact, you might give two or more warning orders as you receive more information. There's nothing wrong with that. But give the troops the

minimum, at least. This will allow them to prepare mentally for the mission, as well as prepare specialty equipment. It also gives them an idea of how much time they will have for preparation.

[3] Make a Tentative Plan

Now a leader has to make some decisions. He analyzes the mission using the information available (intelligence reports, weather reports, maps, etc.) and METT-T(C)(C) and OCOKA considerations. The leader compares alternative courses of action, and decides on a plan. This tentative plan is not etched in stone. However, it gives significant focus to the recon team who will move forward and calculate the feasibility of the tentative plan.

Often it helps to begin at the end point, and then plan backwards. Well you know, it just stands to reason that if you're not certain when to start, or when to be in your ORP, or when to execute the mission, all of this will come to light if you just look at when you have to be finished!

So, you have to be finished with an attack by 16:00 hours? Okay, well. A platoon-sized attack can take some time. Better give it a half hour. Execution of the attack begins at 15:30. That means you need to be in your release point NLT 15:15. Which means you'll have to return from the leader's recon by 14:45 to finalize plans. Including the time it takes to conduct the leader's recon (30 to 45 minutes), you'd better be in the ORP at 14:00 hours. The ORP is positioned 500 meters out from the FFL, so you'd better allow the platoon half an hour to get there--including security halts. That means you'll need to depart the FFL at 13:30 hours, which means you'll need to be in your holding position behind the FFL at 13:15 to link up with your guide. If you must link up with the guide at 13:15, you'd better move toward the holding area at 13:00. Which means you must finish the OpOrder, the rehearsals, and the final inspection NLT 13:00 hours. The preparation of equipment and final inspection can take a half hour, so the OpOrder better finish at 12:30 to allow for this. Hmmm, a platoon-sized OpOrder and rehearsals...better begin the OpOrder at 11:30 hours.

Now read that whole paragraph backwards, and you'll see that you've just created your own schedule for your mission...which is the first step.

1. A plan and coordination must be complete and everyone fed lunch by 11:30 hours
2. The OpOrder and rehearsals begin at 11:30 hours and finish at 12:30.
3. Equipment must be prepared and inspected for movement by 13:00.
4. Move to the FFL holding area at 13:00.
5. Link up with the FFL guide at 13:15.
6. Depart the FFL at 13:30.

7. Occupy the ORP NLT 14:00.
8. Conduct recon of the objective and return to the ORP NLT 14:45.
9. Depart ORP at 15:00.
10. Pass through the release point NLT 15:15.
11. Be in position NLT 15:30.
12. Initiate the attack at 15:30 hours!

Of course, this is just an example. But it illustrates how backward planning works.

This is very “grown-up” stuff. Such secrets are shared at the inner sanctum of the health clubs, golf courses, and beer parties. Or so I’m told.

[4] Start Movement

This never made any sense to me. But I suppose that since movement could occur anywhere from step two through step nine—and regularly *does*, that listing it as step four makes as much sense as anywhere else. Just realize that movement can happen at any time in the process.

And by movement, we generally refer to moving your team up to an AA where you can finalize your plans and rehearse. Of course, if this is the case, you will have to conduct a pre-combat inspection PRIOR TO MOVEMENT. Just so you know.

[5] Conduct Reconnaissance

The recon is an on-going process as well. For instance, the tentative plan involves the minimum form of a leader’s recon—the map. Well then, we can guess that as the recon team returns with pertinent information, it might slightly or significantly alter the tentative plan. Heck, it might even cancel the mission entirely!

So recons are very important to the TLP. We recon using maps and/or sand tables; a “fly-over” the terrain in aircraft or high-level vantage point; or by foot patrols. I guess now days we could add to that list the satellite and un-manned aircraft imaging. And I’d loan you mine, but...(ahem) you know, I’m low on batteries.

[6] Complete the Plan

The leader must coordinate with all supporting units, higher command, and the friendly forces to the left, right and rear of his team. (Anything less might result in fratricide!) It is this coordination and the information obtained from the recon that gives the leader the necessary provisions to complete the plan.

With the plan in hand (or mind) the OpOrder is developed. Now remember, it is *not* necessary for the leader to develop the entire OpOrder alone. He may task out

any of the five paragraphs to subordinate leaders *except* the execution paragraph! The leader must create and develop the execution paragraph, which includes actions on the objective.

[7] Issue an Operations Order

Using sketches, a sand table, or better yet—overlooking the actual terrain of the objective, the leader will issue a complete OpOrder to his troops. Again, the only paragraph that the leader is obligated to issue is the execution paragraph. The subordinate leaders who developed the information may state the other paragraphs.

[8] Rehearse!

Rehearse! Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse! No one intentionally makes a stupid plan. Rehearsals show the leader where the potential problems are in his plan.

Every bit as important as this is the fact that rehearsals allow everyone to see the bigger picture of the operation, and exactly how their contributions fit into the scheme of maneuver. If I had a nickel for every soldier that said, "I'd never do it this way in the *real thing*" while practicing poor habits in the rehearsal...well, I'd have a lot of nickels.

You will conduct yourself in the "real thing" just as you conducted yourself in the rehearsal. I promise you it's true. It's a simple fact of life. Under extreme stress, your mind has a brain-fart and suddenly the only thing your muscles remember are exactly what you practiced in rehearsals. So, if you're not going to stand up, or light a cigarette, or yell for your buddy in the "real thing"...then don't do it in the rehearsal, either.

[9] Supervise the Process

This is another step that is oddly placed because a leader is constantly supervising the TLP. The best plans will fail if not supervised by competent leaders. A pre-combat inspection is perhaps the single most important supervisory requirement. For more information on the pre-combat inspection...read the next lesson!

Lessons Learned

In the summer of 2003, retired Marine sergeant Jose Matos was assigned to CMATT, a small contingent tasked with training the New Iraqi Army near the Iraqi-Iranian border just northeast of Baghdad. The culmination of training for Iraq's 1st Infantry Battalion would include a 3-day field training exercise in the scalding temperatures of the desert.

Two days out from the exercise, Matos observed the issuing of an OpOrder to the Iraqi battalion commander. It was a 'full blown' OpOrder, encompassing every aspect of the 5 paragraphs, and the order took several hours to complete. The Iraqi lieutenant colonel and several of his closest staff took careful notes and asked pertinent questions.

Clearly they understood the scope and intent of the mission. It was now the colonel's turn to issue a warning order and then OpOrder to his company commanders.

The entire first day of preparation went by—complete with a leader's recon of the AO, but no OpOrder was issued. Indeed, a warning order had yet to be issued. Then the second day of preparation went by, with not one but two different times set for the OpOrder. Both time schedules were cancelled, and again, an entire day went by without an OpOrder or even a warning order issued. The battalion was due to wake at 4 am in order to begin movement at 7 am the next morning!

Still, no one but the battalion commander and his tight circle of staff had any idea what the 3-day mission would entail. When asked what equipment to draw, the directive from the battalion command was "everything".

At 6 am on the morning of the first day of the exercise, the Iraqi colonel pulled together his company commanders, and behind closed doors issued them what amounted to a warning order. They would need that much just to know what direction they would march their troops!

As the battalion deployed to the field, the Iraqi colonel again summoned his company commanders, and by late morning on the first day of the exercise, he finally issued an OpOrder. And by the school standards, the order was issued fairly well. Obviously, the colonel hadn't been dragging his feet due to incompetence. He understood how to issue a warning order and OpOrder.

What was supposed to happen next was that each of the company commanders were to issue warning orders and OpOrders to their platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, who would then in turn issue warning orders and OpOrders to their platoons. Instead, each of the company commanders held the information to themselves for the remainder of the 3-day field training exercise. The results were damn near catastrophic!

The supply mix-up alone resulted in lost food and water. Dozens and dozens of the battalion's troops were med-evaced for dehydration. By the end of the training mission, not a single objective was taken, no sub-task entirely accomplished, and only two of the four line companies ever issued an OpOrder to their platoon leaders—the 3rd Company issuing the OpOrder post hoc, just two hours prior to the end of the training!


Not a single platoon in the entire battalion was ever told why they were sitting in middle of an open desert at temperatures of 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Their missions remained a complete mystery to them.

Lessons learned? As if it isn't obvious—this is a clear-cut case study of how

never to conduct TLP! It turns out that the Arab culture husbands information as a matter of habit. The Iraqi colonel felt that he was valuable to the battalion only as long as he had information that others did not. So he insisted that since he was the commander, and understood the mission completely, he needed only to share enough information with his subordinate commanders to enable them to move their troops. If he gave away more information than necessary, he saw that as usurping his power and authority! Each subordinate leader followed suit. The entire CMATT task force learned something new from that experience, and would spend the next year trying to reverse this mindset.

Leader Skill#2

PRE-COMBAT INSPECTION



Courtesy of One Shepherd

Okay, calm down. No, this is not that kind of inspection. You're not going to wear fashionable white gloves and shiny medals. Nor will you get to line the troops up at attention and bellow things like, "Deep down in your mustard seed, Kool-Aid pumping heart—what do you really want to be?!"

The answer, of course, is "Expert Infantry!" But you still don't get to yell and spit and make evil faces. Leave that for the drill sergeants at Fort Benning's School of the Infantry.

Instead, let's focus on a checklist that will ensure we are able to complete our mission successfully and with as few casualties as possible. No, it's not as cool as playing "drill sergeant" but in the end it's much more pertinent to our task at hand.

The pre-combat inspection must be conducted prior to movement!

COMMUNICATION & EQUIPMENT

Every infantry unit must be able to shoot, move and communicate. That's the three basic infantry skills. So let's be certain that our communication equipment is working.

- Check that extra batteries, antenna, mic, and basic radio kit are present.
- Check that the radio is set to the proper channel and/or frequency.
- Check the CEO&I and ensure that each troop knows the call signs and code.
- Enter the radio network.
- Conduct a communications check with higher command and sub-elements.
- Be certain that all field phones are serviceable, clean and in water-tight containers.

WEAPONS & ASSIGNED EQUIPMENT

Each weapon will have been assigned to the appropriate personnel and it will have been fired for a confirmed zero. Shooting is also one of the three basic skills. So we must take care of our weapons.

- Check that each weapon system is serviceable, clean and zeroed.
- Ammunition is serviceable and a proper amount is present for each weapon.
- Lubrication is present, as well as field cleaning kits.
- Optical devices (day and night) are appropriately assigned and serviceable.
- Check that extra batteries are carried for optical devices.

TROOPS

The soldiers must be inspected for what they are expected to carry and to know. This will differ greatly depending on their assignment and role in the team.

- Check that the troop is wearing the proper uniform and camouflage.
- Water canteens and/or bladders will be full and the troop will be hydrated.
- Check that first aid kits are present and complete.
- Check that ID tags are worn, as well as special medical tags (allergies).
- Check that all specialty equipment is carried in either the LBE or rucksack.

- Have the troop back-brief the warning order or commanders intent as appropriate.
- Check that the troop is aware of expected conditions of light, weather, and terrain.

LEADERS

The leaders inspect each other for all of the same information as they would a member of their team, but with a couple of added safeguards.

- Check for the presence and appropriateness of each map, compass, GPS.
- Check for C4I equipment and considerations (radios, frequencies, CEO&I).

Summary

Believe it or not, all it takes is for one member of your team to forget his parka on a cool, rainy day and the mission ends almost as soon as it begins. A man with hypothermia is going to require a med-evac, and there goes your stealth and element of surprise! We ask the troops about the expected weather, light and terrain conditions to jog their minds a bit—to get them thinking about the equipment they packed as it pertains to these conditions. Each member of the team—regardless of their position must understand that if they are incapacitated, if they cannot carry their own weight, they become deadweight for the team. Pre-combat inspections minimize the likeliness of this possibility.

Lessons Learned

Former Marine sergeant Bradley Pierron was part of the 1/4th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division in 1975. In March of that year, Pierron found himself and fellow Marines aboard the USS Debuke, headed for South Vietnam on a mission to rescue American and allied personnel from the North Vietnamese Army offensive throughout the nation.

As they neared their departure time, the Marines hurriedly prepared their weapons and equipment. As any fighter will tell you, there comes a point in time that you have to load your magazines. The Marines did this with deliberate fervor. One attentive squad leader went from Marine to Marine, conducting a pre-combat inspection. Taking a magazine from one of his Marines he peered into it to be certain it had the recommended load. To his horror the squad leader saw the magazine was loaded with blanks!

In fact, *all* of that Marine's magazines were loaded with blanks! Was it a joke? Had the Marine realized what he had done? The answer is probably not. It's difficult to know if the stress of the impending combat had simply caused the Marine not to notice that he was loading ammunition from a case clearly marked as "Blank Ammunition".

Or—and I suspect this is more likely the case—that since most of his training was conducted with blanks, his mind simply didn't register at the conscious or sub-conscious level that this task any different than previous training tasks.

In any case, the squad leader was sharp enough to ask how many magazines the Marine had loaded. "Thirty" came the answer. Quickly the squad leader moved through the platoon, identified and collected up each of the thirty magazines. Only when the case of blank ammunition was tossed overboard into the South China Sea, did the platoon empty each and every magazine. Peirron and his fellow Marines re-loaded each magazine with live rounds.

Lessons learned? As if it isn't obvious enough...the enemy are neither significantly deterred nor properly impressed with the marksman who uses blank ammunition in middle of a 'two-way' firing range. This pre-combat inspection avoided a possible catastrophe on the field of battle.

Leader Skill #3

WARNING ORDERS & OPERATIONS ORDERS

No mission is too large or too small for a well thought out plan. Fifty percent of the battle is fought in the planning. Would you go into battle with only half of your troops carrying weapons? Of course not. Well then, you'll need a plan! The Operation Order (OpOrder) is the tool you will use to be certain you have covered all of the necessary contingencies. But, there are two other types of orders that need to be covered first.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

A patrol leader conducts the 'back brief' portion of the OpOrder prior to departing the FFL.

THE WARNING ORDER

A Warning Order is issued by the commander to his element leaders. It's a rather informal "heads up" kind of warning. At a minimum, it should contain a mission statement, the time of the OpOrder, and the place of the OpOrder. This is done so that the subordinate leaders can consult with each other for necessary equipment and relay the mission to their troops. Team members like to be kept informed. It helps morale and keeps them mentally focused on the upcoming tasks.

Mission statements simply explain the task at hand. An ambush patrol, a reconnoiter, a deliberate defense, or establishing a patrol base are all good examples of missions that might be assigned to a unit. Keep this warning very simple. Experienced troops will understand what is being asked of them.

The time and place of the OpOrder...well, that's just good common sense. Why throw a party if no one knows when or where to go, right?

THE FRAGMENTATION ORDER

Another common mission order is the Fragmentation Order, often called a 'Frag-O'. Actually, this is just an amendment to the established OpOrder. It can only be issued after the OpOrder has been issued, but I mention it at this point because it is a good idea to keep in mind that all plans are tentative. "The best made plans of mice and men are soon laid to waste" so to speak.

Often, small fragments of the OpOrder are changed while the order is being carried out. These adjustments may occur immediately after the OpOrder has been issued, or they may be implemented well into the mission. Is it frustrating—even infuriating? Oh yeah. Just keep in mind that the OpFor have minds of their own. As they put their plans into effect, the face of the battlefield changes. And so must your plans.

THE OPORDER

The commander must issue the OpOrder. Ideally, he/she does this from a vantage point that allows all element leaders to view the battlefield and route of attack. In a defense, the commander issues the OpOrder on top of the terrain to be defended. Of course, rarely is any of this possible. Instead, a map, a sand table, or even a drawing of the terrain can be used to help explain the order.

The most essential part of issuing an order is to make certain everyone understands it! There are a couple of techniques to be certain that everyone is "on the same sheet of music". First, is to Keep It Simple, Stupid (KISS). Complexity will only confuse team members, unless you have a highly skilled team that is also highly familiar with each other. Second, include a back-brief at the end of the OpOrder to check member's comprehension of the plan. Third, always include rehearsal time for combat missions!

What follows is a format that the order should follow. OpOrders must be given in a language that the troops can understand. To help you remember the five paragraphs of this format, use this mnemonic device:

Service...

Men...

Eat...

Shit...

Constantly!

So it's crude. For better or worse, that is why you will remember it. But what does it mean?

Situation

Mission

Execution

Service & Support

Command & Signal

Let's break these paragraphs down and take a closer look at what should be covered in each of the five paragraphs.

Situation—paragraph one

This includes the situation of friendly units, the situation of the OpFor, and the terrain and weather report. Information regarding the OpFor must include the enemy's known locations; their strengths and weaknesses; and their activity.

Information regarding friendly units must include the mission of the next higher unit. (That refers to the larger element to which your team is attached.) This typically covers any friendly units that are operating to the left, right or rear of your team. Also include all information regarding attached resources—who they are and the effective time of their attachment and detachment.

Information regarding terrain and the weather includes a description of the terrain to be covered, the temperature and precipitation forecast, and the exact times of dusk and dawn.

Mission—paragraph two

The mission statement uses the "5 Ws" (Who, What, When, Where, and Why) to adequately cover this paragraph. "How" is covered in the Execution paragraph. This statement includes a clear, concise explanation of the commander's intent.

The commander's intent is comprised of two very important statements. (1) A broad statement of the larger goal that the mission is intended to accomplish. (2) The "end state". The end state is a quick description of how the situation should look when those goals are met.

So, instead of simply saying, "We will attack and secure the bridge"...the commander's intent might state, "Through aggressive operations we will secure the

bridge and the surrounding terrain so that logistical traffic can travel safely through our sector."

In this manner, the commander's intent is careful *not* to tell the unit commander exactly how to accomplish his goals. This is because on the dynamic and quickly changing battlefield, the resources required to complete the task may not be available. But with a clearly stated commander's intent, the leader and subordinate leaders have considerable lateral movement to accomplish the task using other means.

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they'll surprise you with their ingenuity." — George S. Patton

Execution—paragraph three

While the other paragraphs can be developed and even issued by other members of the patrol...*the Execution paragraph must be issued by the commander!*

Concept of the operation

This is the scheme of maneuver and the fire support plan. Discussed at great length is how the commander wants the unit to accomplish the mission.

Time Hacks must be clearly stated. This includes not only the time of departure from the Starting Point, but also the time the patrol should be passing each phase or phase line of the mission. The completion of the mission must be stated in a No Later Than time. Give a brief sequence of events in time hacks, such as:

"We will assemble at our holding point inside of our patrol base at 07:30 for final inspection. We will depart our patrol base at our SP time of 07:45. We enter our listening halt by 08:00 and hold for 15 minutes. We begin movement toward phase line Red at 08:15 and will occupy the ORP no later than 09:00. We begin actions on the objective no later than 10:00 hours."

Coordinating instructions

Assign an order of march by element or individuals within your element. Describe in detail the responsibility of each element during movement:

"Bravo fireteam will lead with Jones on point and Bravo leader Moore just behind him. Alpha fireteam will be in trail with Alpha leader Smith pulling up the drag. I (patrol leader) will be located in between the two fireteams with my radioman Wilson directly behind me."

Assign any specialty teams that will be required by this mission. Often, members belong to more than one specialty team, so you must be careful to coordinate these teams. Rehearsals will make any mis-coordination apparent. Consider such teams as security teams, support teams, assault teams, recon teams, POW search teams, first aid teams, demolition teams and grab teams. Each team must be assigned the time and place of their duties.

When considering the occupation of the ORP, you must give the pointman a reference so that he can stop the patrol in a security halt prior to over-taking the ORP. If a leader's recon forward of the security halt will be required, you must assign members who will accompany you on the recon. Or you may opt to take the ORP by force. Either way, the exact method must be explained and rehearsed.

Actions in the ORP include security and final preparations for all equipment too dangerous or burdensome to carry in a prepared mode—such as claymores, rocket launchers, NVDs, and wire breaching platforms. If a leader's recon forward of the ORP is to be conducted, a detailed 5-point contingency plan will be left with the senior ranking leader staying behind in the ORP. This contingency plan includes who is going, where they are going, when they will return, what to do if they do not return, and what both the recon party and the team in the ORP will do in the event that either of them come under fire.

Actions on the OBJ include the coordination of the security team, support team, assault team and any specialty teams. This coordination reflects the needs of the mission. [METT-T(C) and O.C.C.O.K.A.] A final defensive line must be designated on the far side of the OBJ. Reconsolidation must be thoroughly rehearsed, as should any withdrawal from the OBJ.

Again, rehearsals will give everyone a reference as to where the other teams and individuals are in the scheme of maneuver, and rehearsals allow your team to practice getting on and off the OBJ in a timely manner.

Service & support—paragraph four

Explain all pertinent services that will be made available before, during and after the mission. This list may include drawing munitions, water, batteries, meals, or special equipment (ie. optics, radios, wire cutters, marking devices, etc.).

List all supporting units such as transportation, medical evacuations, fire support, and maintenance or logistical support. Give their locations, radio frequencies and call signs.

Command & signal—paragraph five

The patrol's entire chain of command must be stated so that each member understands to whom they are answerable. This also establishes who is next in command should the leader become a casualty.

A detailed explanation is necessary for all CEO&I information of the patrol. This will include the call signs of each element of the patrol, brevity codes for radio use, sign & countersign, the running password, and all other coordination signals such as far and near recognition, and lift & shift fire signals.

Rehearsals—paragraph six?

Okay, so this isn't actually one of the five paragraphs. But it should be! It can't be stressed enough that rehearsals allow everyone to see the bigger picture. It lets them see the scheme of maneuver and register in their memory exactly who is on their left and right.

I had a drama teacher back in my high school days that used to bark out at us when we were goofing off at rehearsals, "You will conduct yourselves on production night the same way you are rehearsing now!" She had one of those irritating voices that did not exactly instill a sense of awe. Instead we sat backstage laughing at her for thinking we were such idiots that we would actually conduct ourselves in this manner in front of a public crowd of 500 people. You can imagine how horrified I was then when on production night, my fellow students ran around literally bumping into each other and causing all sorts of chaos. That grumpy old drama teacher was right!

After all my years of military service and simulating these tactical situations, I can still hear my drama teacher's irritating voice bellowing out the importance of rehearsals. She was right. Rehearsals make the difference between success and failure. Enough said.

Summary

The Ranger Handbook says an OpOrder with rehearsals should take about three hours—and this doesn't even include the time needed for a decent recon! Should you be expected to issue a three-hour OpOrder? Probably not. Most missions for a squad-sized team, or about 10 men, require 30 minutes. That's a 10-minute order, a 10-minute back brief and a 10-minute rehearsal.

The most important consideration of any OpOrder is that the troops understand the *commander's intent* and the *time hacks*. Without this focus, all planning is fruitless.

Lessons Learned

Retired sergeant, Tom Cecora, of the U.S. Army's combat engineers relays an interesting story from his tour in Germany. Apparently, a young female lieutenant decided to inspect the engineer barracks one Saturday morning. With the platoon sergeant in tow, the lieutenant proceeded with her inspection. Upon entering the third floor hallway, she came face-to-face with a young male soldier standing completely naked and smoking a cigarette.

"Sergeant! Please tell this soldier to put some clothes on," the flustered lieutenant demanded of the platoon sergeant.

"Yes, Ma'am," the sergeant responded. "Troop, put some clothes on!" To which the soldier walked back into his room. No more than a few seconds had passed when the soldier returned to the hallway to continue smoking his cigarette...completely naked except for a pair of white tube socks.

"These are clothes," he stated matter-of-factly.

"Yes they are! Carry on troop!" bellowed the sergeant—much to the dismay of the young lieutenant.

Lesson learned? The commander's intent gives not only the broader goal of the mission...but a description of the end state as well.

Leader Skill #4

AFTER ACTION REVIEW

One of the most crucial leadership skills—and often the most overlooked—is the AAR or After Action Review. This is a tool that allows the leader to explore the causes of the gap between the plan and the performance. The leader then determines which battle drills the team still needs to practice.

The AAR is more than a debriefing. A debrief simply states what is known about the product/outcome and the process. The AAR is an exploratory exercise whereby the effort is to try to get the team members to reach these conclusions on their own—to internalize the solution to the problem, as well as the AAR process itself.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

Within the safety of the AA, the patrol leader conducts an AAR after a mission.

THE AAR MODEL

The essence of the AAR can be broken down into four relatively simple steps or areas of consideration.

- The Plan
- The Performance.
- The Issues.
- The Fix.

The Plan

More commonly called “What Was Supposed To Happen” (*WWSTH*) is nothing more or less than a restatement of the OpOrder in its most basic form. That individual who issued the plan—the PL—gives this information, of course. The PL will stand in front of the team and quickly restate the commander’s intent and the scheme of maneuver.

Remember that this is *WWSTH*...and not “what I think *might* have happened” or “what I really *wished* had happened”. There should be no conjecture or grandstanding at this point! It’s simply a restatement of the plan.

The Performance

This step also goes by a more common expression known as “What Really Happened” (*WRH*). This part of the AAR is told by the doer’s...those team members who were on the ground and taking part in the action. Leaders are generally discouraged from speaking during this phase.

We don’t want egos on the line and taking up time arguing or finger pointing, and yet, we have to get to a realistic measure of our performance. This can be a painful, even embarrassing process. But the thing to remember is that people don’t make stupid plans. If the plan was stupid—well, we generally catch that back in the planning phase. So why didn’t the mission go off just as we planned it? Or did it? That is what we are looking for in *WRH*—the gap between the plan and the actual performance.

The Issues

Once we’ve established the gap between the plan and the performance, we set out to identify the reasons for the discrepancy. In truth, we usually stumble across and identify the issues during the *WRH* phase. However, it will be necessary to restate these issues so that everyone can see the big picture. This responsibility typically falls to the observer-controller during training, but may be executed by the PL in lieu of an observer.

The Fix

The last step of the AAR is to identify—by name—who will be responsible for correcting the deficiencies that contributed to the gap between the plan and the performance. Do not make the mistake of assuming that all of the responsibility will fall to the PL. Sub-team leaders and even experienced team members can lead training or

take responsibility for equipment operation. Of course, the PL will usually assign these tasks accordingly.

MODERATING

People tell stories for many reasons. One reason people tell a story is to assess a practice, or policy. They tell stories of success and failure regarding practices as they have been previously implemented. Well, that is what an AAR really is. It's a series of stories that evaluate the policies and practices unique to that given mission and those sets of circumstances.

In an AAR, regardless of who actually conducts the AAR, the leader's role is to listen to the story, evaluate the mission, and plan for future training and missions. Depending on the culture of the team, this may be difficult for some leaders to sit through. People often invest their egos as leaders, and when it comes to finger pointing, the leader is often the most visible and easiest to blame. None-the-less, when both team and leader internalize the AAR process, this group-exploration is perhaps the most powerful tool for the development of the team's skills!

Ideally, the AAR is conducted by an outside source or by the commander. You will need to use a representation of the terrain that was covered in the mission. This can be a sand table, a map, or even video and photographs of the mission. The point is to get everyone thinking on the same sheet of music in terms of where and when.

Key to managing a decent AAR is to moderate the flow of communication. You wouldn't want to control it so much that people don't participate, or hesitate to give what might be a valuable insight. On the other hand, many troops see the AAR as a chest thumping exercise and drone on incessantly about "who killed whom". (Snore.)

The moderator must persuade the troops to hold off on the war stories until later, when everyone has a beer in them. This is no easy task when you consider the material at hand. The troops will be fresh from the fight. If the mission went well, you can bet there will be a great deal of bragging. If the mission did not go as well as it could have, there will likely be finger pointing even before the AAR begins. These explosive moments of temper or praise may be justified, but that is not the objective of the AAR.

Be sure to include everyone's perspective. It is customary to begin with the element leaders, for they typically have the best vantage points. However, it is important to ask even the basic rifleman about his/her experience because often the crucial moment between success or failure is witnessed not by some high-ranking commander, but by a common foot soldier.

Breaking It Down

It is a good idea to begin an AAR by asking each of the element leaders what mission they were tasked to do, and to let them answer in their own words. A good leader will listen to the clarity of focus from each of these subordinate leaders for their grasp of the mission as a whole, and the understanding of their element's role in the mission.

Command & Signal

Afterwards, it is a good idea to go all the way back to the initial preparations. Every mission begins with preparation. Did the commander and element leaders feel they received enough time and information to prepare? Was an OpOrder given with time for rehearsals? Was a back brief conducted to be certain all members of the mission understood their roles, the execution, and the communication of any coordinated efforts?

Service & Support

There are also numerous service & support issues that can weigh heavily on the mission. Was the equipment working, such as radios, compasses or GPS, night vision devices and weapon systems? Was priority gear such as marking systems, signaling systems, or smoke canisters made available? Were the troops well rested and fed? Was water adequately planned into the mission?

Execution

The initial movement is a good place to start within the execution of the mission. Did the patrol hit their start time? How about the time hacks for phase lines or reaching their ORP? If not, this may explain any "accordion" effect in the time frames or the physical movement of the formation.

Actions in the ORP must be addressed. Was a leader's recon forward of the ORP necessary? Were the plans finalized in the ORP, and if so, did the leaders feel confident that the members of their element understood these plans? Often, when plans are changed in the ORP the lines of communication tend to have gaps. Only with clearly delineated responsibilities and element integrity can these communication barriers be overcome.

Actions on the OBJ include all considerations from the release point (that magical place on the map where the commander relinquishes all control to his subordinate leaders) up to the point of reconsolidation. The considerations are too numerous to note in this space, but mostly fall within each element's ability to "shoot, move, and communicate". More exactly, this refers to the ability of each element to engage the OpFor within their sectors of fire, to move toward and across the OBJ, and to coordinate these efforts with friendly elements to their flanks and rear. AARs spend most of their time focusing on the action on the OBJ, and with good reason. It is on the objective that all of our efforts are either realized in success or lost in defeat.

Wrapping It Up

At this point in the AAR, it is time to draw to a close. It is a good idea to allow some venting—whether negative or positive—because everyone wants his “day in court”, so to speak. By this I mean that troops will volunteer to suppress their impulse to lay blame or give praise long enough for the AAR to be fruitful. Also, they may be intelligent enough to know that they should listen to the other side (or sides) of the story before they go about making accusations. These troops will only do so if they have reason to believe that they will eventually be able to voice their opinions and concerns. So, even though a moderator may lose some control of the flow of information, it is a good idea to invite everyone to speak his mind at the *end* of the AAR.

There is a little technique that I have found works. It is the “nut shelling” technique that requires everyone to make a concise statement on the exercise...though under tactical constraints, there is usually little time for such niceties. To begin this, simply single out the most vocal member of the group and ask him/her what they think needs to be the focus of future training (or more simply, what was the most significant thing to go wrong with the mission). Then ask the next troop what was one thing they saw that was well executed or coordinated. Move around the group, alternating these two simple questions back and forth. Listen closely for consensus on these areas. A neat variation of this technique is to make those troops most vocal about negative issues give a positive observation of the mission, and to ask the most positive troops to give a negative observation of the mission.

Summary

The AAR is a tool to improve team morale and performance. The point of the AAR is to draw conclusions on the training and mission support needs of your element. Otherwise, this is just a big waste of time. Ideally, commanders take notes, but at a minimum they are expected to walk away from the AAR understanding the sentiment of the team. This should not be taken lightly. Such needs and concerns should be addressed as soon as possible. Of the most importance are those resources that a commander can begin to give his troops immediately, such as more detailed OpOrders and coordination between elements. The AAR helps you gather the information necessary to meet these needs.

Lessons Learned

The following story is relayed through retired Marine officer Dallas Morris during his work with CMATT, the task force to train the New Iraqi Army in 2003. And in fact, the observation didn't take place inside an AAR so much as it took place during the exercise in which observer/controllers (O/C) took notes for the AAR.

Our effort was to train the first eight battalions of infantry, combat support (CS), and combat service & support (CSS). The instructors also served as O/Cs (observer/controllers) to mentor the leaders while they took part in field training exercises.

On one such occasion, a long-running, dry waddi—a culvert of varying size due to wind and water erosion—was identified as the battalion's left limit of movement. To reinforce this limit, it was explained in the OpOrder that this waddi represented a fast moving river.

Retired Lt. General George Crocker served as the commandant of the entire Iraqi training program at that point in time, and by default was probably the senior most uniformed person in the entire Iraqi military complex. As was common, the general would come out and observe the training maneuvers of the new battalions. So he was rather curious when he saw one company commander pause his unit beside the waddi, then proceed into the waddi with his troops in trail.

General Crocker walked over the company commander and asked him politely if he realized he was leading his troops through a 'river'. The young officer was obviously embarrassed by the whole affair, but admitted that he did know the waddi was supposed to be a river and claimed that is why he took pause before crossing it right in plain view of the commandant.

General Crocker inquired a bit further, not wanting to embarrass the officer but seeking the break in communication. The company commander finally insisted that the battalion commander had instructed him to lead his men to the far side of the river in order to surprise the enemy. When the company commander protested that he had no provisions to cross a fast moving river, his objection was dismissed and the battalion commander insisted the young officer follow his instructions!

Well, okay. General Crocker decided the battalion commander must have misinterpreted the permissiveness of the fictitious boundary. He sent the company on its way and backtracked to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). There he met the battalion commander and asked the lieutenant colonel in charge about his understanding of the river to his left boundary. Yes, the colonel had understood that the 'river' was not passable.

"Wait a minute," General Crocker said, collecting his composure. Then in his most mentoring voice he asked the Iraqi colonel, "Then why did you send a company of troops across a river they could not possibly have forded without the proper equipment?"

The colonel looked across the open desert at the company well beyond the battalion's left limit. There was no denying it. Everyone in the TOC had heard the battalion commander demand this order. Everyone had heard the battalion commander admonish the subordinate officer for questioning his order. Even the general knew exactly what had happened, and it was now time to come clean and admit that he was

'game playing' the scenario. He was cheating in order to 'win' so that his performance would look good on record...even though it would be an empty victory.

The Iraqi colonel looked General Crocker right in the eye and spoke. "I did not tell him to cross the river. I don't know why that company is out there," the colonel lied. "But I'll go get them immediately."

The TOC went absolutely silent. A few of the staff uncomfortably shuffled about. What could General Crocker do? The battalion commander was lying...and in fact, the colonel knew that General Crocker was well *aware* that he was lying! General Crocker just laughed, presumably at the colonel's complete lack of integrity. The battalion commander jumped into his SUV and pulled the company back into the boundaries of the waddi.

Lesson learned? When the AAR process is presented to those leaders who are new to it, their human nature will resist it. No one wants to be wrong. It's embarrassing—even if it presents a learning opportunity. When you cross cultural boundaries and social norms, getting this process to work is like pulling teeth! Expect resistance. But in time, if the process is internalized, it is one of the most effective tools for self-discovery and learning.

Section III

TACTICAL BATTLE DRILLS:

PATROLING METHODS

Tactical Battle Drill #1

DEPART AND REENTER THE FFL

This is a wonderful battle drill on which to begin your patrolling skills. It is, admittedly, a bit complex, but once you get the hang of it everything else will go more smoothly. I promise. This task essentially consists of two parts, (1) coordinating the time and place of your departure, and (2) coordinating the time, place and signals of your return to friendly lines. *You must coordinate your patrol with the FFU commander!*

Use this flow chart for planning a patrol:

1. Move to the AA.
2. Coordinate and link with the FFU guide.
3. Pass lines and halt past the FEBA.
4. Complete the mission.
5. Return to the FEBA.
6. Signal far & near recognition to the FFU.
7. Link with the FFU Guide and Count in the Patrol Members.
8. Debrief your patrol at the AA.

I admit, it's a bit difficult to memorize another long list. But if you copy it on a card (or carry this incredibly insightful book) and follow this list, it will soon become second nature. Really.

Let's break it down into two parts, departing the FFL and reentering the FFL. We will go into more detail and the list will make sense once you begin to conceptualize the mission.

DEPARTING THE FFL

Move to the AA

At some point in the TLP process of the mission, your team will move forward and take up a 360° security position just behind the FFL. This security position is called the Assembly Area (AA). Here the final planning, rehearsals, and coordination with the FFU commander takes place. [For methods of occupying an AA, see TBD #6 "Establish an ORP".]

Coordinate and Link with the FFU Guide

Now that you know your schedule, you must coordinate the *time and place* of your departure and reentry with the FFU commander. To coordinate your departure, *you* will choose an appropriate time. The *FFU commander* will choose the appropriate place



Courtesy of One Shepherd

The patrol leader must coordinate with the FFU and supporting units.

along his front line. He will also assign a guide to lead your patrol through the wire and mine obstacles to the immediate front of his line. You must meet your guide and establish a time limit for which the guide will wait for your patrol on the far side of the obstacles. This will allow your guide to lead you back in through the obstacles if your patrol comes under immediate attack and needs to fall back through the FFL!

You must also coordinate with the FFU commander a time and place of reentry. You must designate a *far recognition signal*, such as a certain color of flare, or a whistle, or even just to contact each other via radio. Also coordinate a *near recognition signal*. Remember, the challenge and password are NEVER used forward of the FFL—so don't expect to be challenged with this combination. You must create your own challenge and passwords, such as a number combination that equals an agreed upon sum.

The FFU commander should personally link you with your guide. Restate your time and place of departure and reentry to the guide. Restate the far and near recognition signals. Then walk the guide to your patrol and introduce him to the point-man and drag-man. This allows the guide to recognize the proper beginning and ending of your patrol as he counts you out of the FFL.

Pass the Line and Halt Past the FEBA

At the assigned time, the guide will lead your patrol through the wire and mine obstacles at the immediate front. After passing these obstacles, your patrol enters the FEBA, or "No Man's Land". The guide will wait a designated amount of time for your patrol to complete its security halt on the far side of the FEBA then he will reenter the FFL.

Once you are certain your patrol is on the far side of the FEBA, and you have adequate concealment, bring your patrol to a security halt. In this first security halt, you will have every member of your patrol sit comfortably and remove his or her hats. Making no noise, your patrol must listen to the sounds around them for about five minutes. This lets their eyes and ears adjust to the new environment.

Complete the Mission

When you are comfortable that your patrol is safe and has adjusted to the noise, sights, and smells around them, you will pick your patrol up and continue towards your ORP. Whatever your mission is, you will complete it. And then you will begin making your way back to the FFL...usually by a route different than the one you came in on.

It might be worth mentioning here that depending on the nature of your mission, your patrol might not return to the FFL...in which case such coordination won't be necessary. But given that exception, you must always plan if in doubt. Better safe than sorry, right?

REENTERING THE FFL

Return to the FEBA

Your patrol will return to the FEBA via the route prescribed in the OpOrder. Of course it is preferable that your patrol uses a different route than the route used to move your patrol to the ORP. This cuts down on the likeliness of the enemy ambushing your patrol as it moves back to the FEBA.

Also, it is a good idea to "dog leg" into your destination. This means you should take at least two different azimuths to get to your destination. Again, this decreases the likeliness of ambush because you will change directions before the enemy can properly set up an ambush along your route.

Signal Far & Near Recognition Signal to the FFU

Once you are in range of your designated far recognition signal, you will make contact with the FFU. You do not need to halt your patrol, or even require a response to

this signal, unless such concerns were well coordinated before hand. Just give the signal and continue moving toward the designated place of reentry.

Halt your patrol a safe distance out (on the far side of the FEBA—away from the FFL). Take a security member and leave a five-point contingency plan with your halted patrol. Then move with the security member across the FEBA to the designated place of reentry. Give the near recognition signal to the guide. Once you have linked up with the guide, leave your security member with the guide and return to your patrol.

Link with the FFU Guide and Count in the Patrol Members

Pick your patrol up and **lead them** across the FEBA. Again, link up with the guide. Tell the guide how many members you have in your patrol.

Now, stand beside the guide and physically count your patrol in through the FFL, making sure to say each troop's name as you count them. This lets the guide know that you recognize each member of your patrol and that no enemy has slipped through the FFL!

Debrief the Patrol Back in the AA

Move your patrol back to the holding area behind the FFL. You will be debriefed either by your commander or the FFU commander, depending on a "need to know basis".

Summary

Ta-Da! You've just completed the planning of your first patrol. There is a lot to it. Ultimately, to depart and reenter the FFL requires nothing more than coordinating (1) the time and place of your departure, and (2) the time, place and signals of your return. But as you can see, these two seemingly simple requirements involve a complete understanding of the mission schedule—and therefore the planning and implementation of the patrol. You will use this information in a very similar manner to coordinate patrols departing and reentering a patrol base, as well.

Use this chapter as a checklist, and keep using it until this list becomes second nature!

Lessons Learned

In the early months of 1967, a platoon from the 1st Air Cavalry Division departed a defensive perimeter on patrol. The platoon used the same straight path of advance that had been used by a patrol the previous day, without conducting a listening halt or any other security halt to determine the level of threat. They used no R&S teams to the rear to see if the patrol was being followed. They simply bee-lined for their objective—a two-hour walk away!

Their route would have the patrol cross two large danger areas. When the patrol reached the first clearing, they sent a far-side security team to clear the tree line across a 125 meter wide clearing. The security team walked into a well-prepared ambush by the NVA.

Lessons learned? Coordinate with the FFL (defensive perimeter in this case) so that you alter your departure and re-entry points. Never use the same route twice! Dogleg your route so that enemy observers will not be able to predict your path. And use security halts and R&S teams to determine the level of threat in your immediate area!

Tactical Battle Drill #2

TRAVELING METHODS

In this tactical battle drill we will discuss how to move a patrol from point A to point B. These techniques would be better described as “methods of security while traveling”, but that’s a mouthful. The first two techniques are used primarily for walking a patrol down a road or path. The third technique, or method, is more intended for open or semi-open terrain and would rarely ever be used along a road.



Courtesy of One Shepherd


A patrol moves out using the traveling technique in staggered column.

THE 'TRAVELING' TECHNIQUE

This method is used only when traveling behind the FEBA, when enemy contact is *unlikely*. It offers the minimal amount of security.

The patrol is kept together as one entity for ease of command & control. Each member of the patrol is spaced five meters apart. When the road is large enough for two lines to form, the members


must be staggered so that each member of the patrol is actually ten meters between the troop in front or behind. (This still allows five meters between the troops staggered to the opposite sides of the road.)



This method allows for relatively quick movement. The patrol can be dispersed left and right in the event of air attack or indirect fire. And this technique permits enough distance between troops to deter the effectiveness of mass-casualty producing weapons, while allowing enough of a concentration for a decent assault-through in the event of a near ambush.

THE 'TRAVELING OVER-WATCH' TECHNIQUE

This method is also used only when traveling in relative security behind the FEBA, when enemy contact is *likely*. It offers a moderate amount of security.




The patrol is separated into two or more elements. There is still five meters between troops and the troops are staggered when the road is wide enough to allow for two lines. The physical difference between this method and the traveling technique is that a distance of at least 20 meters is maintained between elements.

This method allows for relatively quick movement, and it has all of the advantages of the traveling technique in regard to its ability to disperse or overwhelm a near ambush. And while such a technique does compromise the flow of communication, this fact is offset by the flexibility of the patrol to react to far ambushes and the added security against mass-casualty producing weapons.

THE 'BOUNDING OVERWATCH' TECHNIQUE

This method is used when traveling anywhere, either behind or forward of the FEBA, when enemy contact is *expected*. It offers the greatest amount of security of the moving techniques.



The patrol is separated into exactly two elements. The forward element will halt at a position that offers the best observation of the terrain in front of the patrol. This element becomes the "over-watch" position, and it must offer some cover or concealment.

The trail element (behind the forward element) then bounds forward, either slightly left or right of the over-watch position. This bounding element uses a route that:

- Offers the most concealment.
- Does not mask the fires of the over-watch position.
- Does not exceed the range for supportive fire of the over-watch position.

Once the bounding element has successfully passed through the terrain, they take up a position that offers the best observation of the terrain in front of them. The bounding element now becomes the over-watch position and the old over-watch becomes the bounding element.

This process is repeated until the patrol reaches its objective, or the security situation improves. Movement is very slow and quiet (contrary to the notion of a "quick bound"). Only if the patrol comes under fire does the bounding over-watch method become quick and violent. Supportive fires will be adjusted by the over-watch position, and the bound element will either attack or withdraw based on the decision of the patrol leader.

Summary

The trick here is employing the appropriate technique to the present level of danger. Remember, contact with the OpFor is either *unlikely*, *likely*, or *expected*. If you were to decide that you're element would move using only the highest level of security, the 'bounding over-watch', you'd find that your troops soon became fatigued and your movement forward was greatly slowed. Conversely, consistently using the least amount of security in order to capitalize on speed will eventually result in a disastrous clash with the OpFor. Choose the appropriate technique for the given situation, and be sure to strictly enforce the intervals between troops and elements.

Lessons Learned

A One Shepherd patrol set out after nightfall to raid a bridge complex held by the OpFor. Northwest Missouri summer nights can be particularly dark, heavily vegetated, and sing with a racket of background noise from every imaginable insect known to man. And the PL intended to use this in his favor.

The route the patrol took was rather risky, partly following a gravel road, partly following a medium sized creek. But the patrol moved carefully, cautiously through the dark. Security halts were made often. And the PL allowed plenty of time during his march to send R&S teams forward to investigate choke points and suspicious looking areas prior to exposing his entire patrol to them.

Turning off the gravel road, the patrol crossed a small patch of woods then came to a creek. Again the patrol followed a well-worn footpath skirting the creek until they came to the edge of an enormous farming field, 150 meters wide by 800 meters long. A crew-served weapons team was set up here to cover the raiding party's withdraw from

the objective, 400 meters down the field to the right. The rest of the patrol moved toward the front of the bridge complex in single file, literally holding the web gear of the man in front of him.

When they came to their position across the 150 meters of open field, the patrol stopped. Running parallel with the creek, 30 meters in front of the bridge complex was a train track. The patrol was in position with plenty of time to spare, so the PL rested his troops online just inside the trees and waited for a train. He calculated that the OpFor would have certainly put an OP/LP out in front of the train tracks, but that would be all he would have to face in crossing the open field.

In a short matter of time, a cargo train loaded with coal clanked down the tracks, it's whistle screaming at the intersection of gravel road, bridge and railroad crossing. The train blocked the view of the open field temporarily, and the entire patrol dashed across online. Just as important, the train muffled the rushing thuds of the patrol as it charged headlong across the open field. When the train finally had passed, the raiding party was in position. The OpFor was caught completely by surprise.

Lessons learned? First and foremost, the PL allowed plenty of time for his movement! He rushed *only* when it was in his favor to do so. This slow, methodical movement characterized the rest of the patrol.

Secondly, the PL was not afraid to use high-speed avenues of approach. Though generally speaking, these avenues are traps for ambushes, the patrol moved carefully, checking out each danger area anticipated by the previous recon. With the proper use of flanking and frontal R&S teams, a patrol might utilize such high-speed avenues in order to keep the noise and exhaustion of the troops at a minimum. Remember, tactics are a common sense solution to a battlefield problem. If it works...it ain't stupid.

Third, the PL allowed his patrol to make ample use of the ambient noise. The nighttime breeze in the treetops, the rhythmic chatter of the insects—these things muffled the movement of the patrol along the beaten paths. The thundering sounds of the train allowed the entire patrol to rush across the harden ground of an unused farming field.

Remember. Don't rush until it's in your interest to do so! Plan your route carefully and recon it when possible. Use R&S teams when appropriate. And camouflage may come in the form of indigenous *noises*—wind, rain, insects, trains, highway traffic, helicopters, low flying aircraft, an industrial plant, or a babbling brook. Use this to your advantage.

Tactical Battle Drill #3


ATTACK FORMATIONS

Well now...that's more like it! Here's a chapter that gives you crucial information you can put to work immediately. Usually I would require that you demonstrate the infantryman's super-secret handshake at this point, but we will forego such formalities.

These formations are just that, formations in the traditional sense of armed combat. They are designed to allow the maximum use of your patrol's weaponry, while limiting the patrol's exposure to the enemy. The beauty of each of these formations is their simplicity. Every troop in the formation will know where his or her sector of fire is, simply by where they are positioned in the formation. Command and control of attack formations can be a challenge, but when implemented correctly, these formations allow for adequate flow of communication.

THE COLUMN FILE

This formation is constructed by having each troop follow in single file behind the pointman. Yes, this formation is nothing more than a line of troops, one behind the other.



The pointman's sector of fire is the 120-degree field of view to his front. The second man in line must monitor a 90-degree sector of fire to the left of the formation. The third man in the line must monitor a 90-degree sector of fire to the right of the formation, and so on. The sectors of fire are staggered left and right for every member of the patrol except the dragman. The dragman's sector of fire is the 120° field of view to the rear of the formation.

The column file has many advantages.

- This formation allows for ease of communication, which flows up and down the file, through each member of the patrol.
- The column file also provides an ease of movement, which allows the patrol a high degree of stealth and a minimal amount of exhaustion.
- There are few breaks in contact with the column file, and when they do occur it is quickly noticed.

The disadvantages of the column file formation are that it is vulnerable to ambush from its flanks, and that it does not allow for the patrol's weapon systems to be deployed forward. Since every troop is behind another, the only man who can shoot forward without injuring another member of the patrol is the pointman. Of course, this is a poor deployment of the patrol's weaponry in an attack.

Variation: the jungle file

The jungle file is nothing more than a formation made up of two or more column files. The members of each file must be able to *keep eye contact* with the next file at all times! When implementing this formation, you will quickly realize that communication becomes very challenging. A patrol leader will have his hands full just ensuring there is no break in contact. Nor will the jungle file vastly improve the forward deployment of the patrol's weapon systems.

However, the jungle file is much more difficult to ambush from the flanks. And it moves much quicker than other formations which are too greatly spread out. For these reasons, the jungle file formation is desirable when:

- Passing through heavily vegetated terrain where an ambush is likely.
- Leading a quick, short attack through heavy vegetation to bring your weapons to bear against the enemy's flank.

THE WEDGE

This formation is constructed by offsetting each troop to the left and right of the pointman. This forms a wide, inverted "V" that is excellent for frontal assault.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

The wedge attack formation is to be used with follow up elements. Rear security is not a priority.

The pointman's sector of fire is, again, the 120-degree field of view to his front. The next two members in the formation, behind the pointman's position and offset to the left and right, monitor a 90-degree sector of fire that begins directly forward and covers their immediate left or right, respectively. This is also true for the last troop(s) in the formation, being offset one more time to the left or right of the troops in front of them. There is no rear sector of fire because this attack formation was designed to be followed by subsequent fireteams using the same formation.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

The diamond or 'modified wedge' formation is used when elements attack independently.

This formation also has noteworthy advantages.

- Control of forward movement is relatively easy due to each of the patrol's fireteams following one another.
- This formation is significantly more difficult to ambush than the previously mentioned formations, from any direction!
- Most importantly, the entire arsenal of the fireteam may be brought to bear on targets directly forward of the formation.

The disadvantages of the wedge formation are that it does not allow for an ease of communication among its members, and that it thoroughly exhausts the members of the patrol if it is used for long periods of time. And god forbid, you attempt to change direction—which creates great physical discomfort for the troops on the flanks who will have to run through the vegetation to catch up with the turn. Sometimes these troops don't get the word that the formation is turning and—Whammy! You have a break in contact.

Variation: the diamond

The diamond formation is an interesting alternative to the wedge. If there are four members of the fire team, simply place the fourth troop, last in line, directly behind the pointman. If there are five members of the fireteam, place the fireteam leader in the very middle of the formation...also in line with the point and dragman. Be warned that this formation will not allow a maximum deployment of the fireteam's weaponry against targets forward of the patrol. However, it still allows an acceptable percentage of the weapons to be brought to bear against an enemy force in front of the formation.

The trade-off is that with the diamond formation, the fireteam may move with more speed, change directions with more ease, and provide 360-degree security for itself. For these reasons, the diamond formation is desirable when:

- A fireteam is patrolling on its own, away from any immediate assistance and needs to provide its own security.
- When a larger patrol realizes it may need to keep its fireteams in the wedge formation for long periods of time...then the diamond formation is preferable.

Summary

Though one tactical situation can be dramatically different than the next, the general belief is that it is better to use the attack formation that allows optimal command and control to maneuver to within striking distance of the enemy. Then, the patrol should change to an attack formation that offers the greatest security and makes maximum use of the patrol's firepower.

For example, patrols commonly use the column file to cross large distances. This is because communication flows better in this formation, thus breaks in contact occur less frequently, and the patrol is less fatigued. When danger seems imminent or upon

closing with an enemy position, changing to the wedge will produce much more effective results.

For my money, the jungle file is used primarily for penetrating a strong enemy line...and only when there is adequate suppressive fire from a supporting element. The advantage to the jungle file in this situation is that as your patrol penetrates the enemy line, they are on line to attack both left and right with absolutely no repositioning.

Finally, as stated previously, the diamond is good for a fireteam patrolling alone or at the end of a longer formation of wedges. This is also true for situations where a large patrol must push forward in a "modified wedge" (a.k.a. diamond formation) for long periods of time. This formation is much less exhausting to the troops than a regular wedge...trust me on this point.

Lessons Learned

In the afternoon heat of the Virginia summer of 1993, a platoon from C Company, 1/314th Battalion of the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade moved assertively against a supposed fortified position of the OpFor. The pace was brisk, but well composed. The platoon's long, snaking formation was headed by alpha fireteam of the 1st squad. Alpha fireteam was the only element that was formed into a diamond-shaped modified wedge... the rest of the thirty-man patrol following tightly behind in column file formation.

The PL followed just behind alpha in the lead, and when Lieutenant Thomas was certain that he was at his release point, he dispatched the 2nd squad to the forward left flank. No sooner had 2nd dispatched than it radioed back it was held up by a dirt road that ran straight into the OpFor's defensive perimeter. The 2nd squad leader could see a three-man team working on a fighting position—indicating that this was a machinegun emplacement. The PL gave 2nd the order to set up their own crew-served machinegun in as a base of fire for the impending assault.

The 3rd squad was still making its way forward in a careful manner when the enemy line opened fire on 2nd squad. Both 1st and 2nd squads returned fire immediately, with 1st squad coming online and almost tying in with 2nd squad's position. Now 3rd squad, trailing back in the woods was at a run to deploy their weapon systems into the fight.

The squad leader kept his squad in single file and led the troops up a shallow draw that ran straight in the direction of the enemy defense. As the 3rd squad leader came online with 1st squad, he hollered at the top of his lungs his intention to keep his forward momentum and cause a break in the enemy line. The bravo fireteam leader of 1st squad registered his approval with a thumbs-up signal over the deafening roar of rifles, machineguns, and grenade simulators. And with that, 3rd squad charged forward at the far

right of the platoon's skirmish line, in a most improbably attack formation—the column file!

The squad emerged from the tree line just as the shallow draw gave way to a flat, open, grassy field. But at this time it was too late for the OpFor to respond...the 3rd squad had maneuvered quickly in between two of the OpFor's position. The squad leader dropped the first two men in line onto their bellies firing at the enemy position to the right. He ordered them in a loud, commanding voice to stay put and suppress that fighting position. He then turned to the rest of his squad just coming out of the treeline and yelled calmly at them, motioning with his hands "prepare for action left!" An instant later he gave the signal "move out!" The squad assaulted online against the side of the enemy position on the left, catching the OpFor quite surprised.

The squad leader quickly realized that his assaulting force had little cover in this grassy field, and so continued he continued his attack sweeping left, along the entire front of the 1st and 2nd squads. These squads watched in awe as the 3rd squad simply ran through open field in broad daylight from position to position, knocking each out without losing a single troop! At the last position in front of 2nd squad, this haphazard band attacked and overwhelmed the 3-man machinegun position in just such a manner—online, orderly, and aggressive.

A 50-meter front had been knocked out of the OpFor's defensive perimeter. The 1st and 2nd squads rushed online into the void, with elements of the 3rd squad suppressing the positions to their immediate left and right. The OpFor's command post was positioned 80 meters back from the platoon, in a small but lush oasis of trees. The platoon laid two machineguns onto this target, held their line and called for the rest of their company to move forward and compromise the breach. The OpFor was now faced with a worsening situation, and the defense simply imploded.

In an odd twist of fate, the only casualties suffered by the attacking force was Lieutenant Thomas and the 2nd squad leader, both having been hit in the opening fires of the battle. Otherwise, the 30-man platoon had managed to attack a force of 120 men, inflicting a dozen casualties on the enemy, and completely routing their defense!

Lessons learned? The choice of attack formation depends more upon the relative amount of fire being received and the use of micro-terrain. Specifically, in this case the squad leader made the unlikely choice to attack in column file. This formation allowed his squad to make the best use of the shallow draw, and had the added benefit of placing his squad on the battlefield in precisely a formation to attack the enemy's flank. Once in the open, the squad's momentum was kept up largely because there were no other options.

"I was too weak to defend, so I attacked."—General Robert E. Lee

Tactical Battle Drill #4

CROSSING DANGER AREAS

Remember all those cool black & white war movies where the column of soldiers just rushes across the dirt road one at a time right through the jungle? Yeah well, that's cool and all, but it's not quite accurate. The truth is that roads, paths, creeks and open fields present fantastic opportunities for ambush and sniping missions. These natural and man-made obstacles allow for fairly long sectors of fire because they are relatively clear. For that same reason, they also entice lazy troops to patrol right through them. Yep. Pretty predictable and very dangerous. That's why we call these danger areas. They fall into two categories, linear and open.

LINEAR DANGER AREAS

The most common linear danger areas include the road or trail and some type of creek or river's edge. However they do come in other forms, such as anything that has a tendency to channel a patrol's movement, such as fences, walls and alleys. These obstacles provide the OpFor with opportunity to ambush our patrols, and that's bad news no matter how you look at it.

There will be some decisions that need to be made quickly. Better still, if you realize that you will be crossing linear danger areas (ie. you conducted a leader's recon by at least looking at a map) then you should make the crossing of such danger areas part of the OpOrder. In each instance of a danger area, the point man will have to halt the patrol and give the arm & hand signal for the danger area. The PL then makes a decision as to which crossing method to implement.

Patch to the Road Method

Using this method, a nine-man squad should be able to cross the danger area in nine seconds or less. *Speed is also a form of security.* This method also allows the column formation to be maintained, which means greater control and communication for the PL.

Sequence of Events

After halting the patrol and signaling a danger area, the entire patrol closes the intervals between members to shoulder-to-shoulder. The patrol members must actually touch each other. This is done even during daylight hours. This will allow a very fast pace when crossing, and prevent a break in contact. Breaks in contact are particularly problematic on night patrols.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

The Patch-to-the-Road method uses speed and stealth as its primary security.

The point man then steps up to the danger area only as far as he needs to look left and right. If the road is clear of OpFor and other movement, the point man takes a position so that he can view down the road to his right. In this position, his unit patch (on the upper part of his left arm sleeve) will be facing toward the middle of the road. Thus, the method is called "patch to the road".

Immediately the next member of the patrol takes up a position beside the point man facing right and says quietly but firmly, "Go." The point man rushes across the danger area, takes up a good position to view down the opposite direction of the road to the left. At this point, both team members have their unit arm patches facing toward the middle of the road. The second member has just replaced the point man's over-watch, and so he points his weapon to the right. Let's be clear on this. The second man RELIEVES the point man...he DOES NOT point in the opposite direction!

Now think about it. This pattern will continue. Each member of the patrol will relieve the member in front of them, saying a quiet but firm, "Go." If any member has a unit patch facing away from the middle of the road, then that member is facing the wrong direction!

So where is the security? Good question, glad you asked. The security is in the fact that:

1. The point man made sure the danger area was initially clear of OpFor.

2. The near patrol member keeps an over-watch down the right side of the road.
3. The far patrol member keeps an over-watch down the left side of the road.
4. The entire squad-sized patrol crossed the danger area in under ten seconds.

The only two members not to have a security over-watch in both directions are the point man (first patrol member) and the drag man (last patrol member). However, in the point man's case, he just looked left and right a half-second before he was relieved and ran across the danger area. So at least he knows what was there. In the drag man's case—okay, admittedly he didn't get a chance to look both directions. But every member of his patrol did in the preceding eight seconds. So, in effect, they cleared the danger area for the drag man.

The potential danger here is that people become distracted from the mundane task of over-watching their sector. This is especially true if some snag holds up the process and they are forced to stand over-watch down the road for more than their allotted one second. I wish this were a joke, but it's not.

It takes considerable discipline (and lots of rehearsals) to keep troops facing down a linear danger area, partially exposing themselves and generally feeling vulnerable when there is a hold-up such as another member tripping while running across the road, or getting caught on a fence wire, or dropping an unsecured piece of equipment and then doubling back to retrieve it. What generally happens at that point is that one or both of the over-watching team becomes agitated and turns to look to see what's going on in middle of the road instead of maintaining a vigilant over-watch of their sector of the danger area. And that's a real problem because that is invariably the moment when the OpFor happens to peer down the road and begins shooting at your patrol.

Ideally, if the OpFor does show up when your patrol is crossing a danger area, your patrol will fire first! Or if there is on-coming traffic, the patrol member who realizes this will shout to the other patrol members to hide momentarily. This signals to every member of your patrol that no one else should attempt to cross the danger area. So it is imperative that this method be rehearsed until all members realize that they are to keep a vigilant over-watch of their sector down the danger area until:

1. They are relieved by the next patrol member...
2. They are told to stop the over-watch and hide from on-coming traffic...
3. Or the patrol becomes engaged in a firefight.

Contingency Plan

Of course, what happens if there is a break in contact due to traffic or contact with the OpFor? Another fine question. The answer is that each patrol must establish in the OpOrder a method of re-establishing contact under just such circumstances. For

instance, it may be established early on that if the patrol becomes separated all members will rendezvous at the last designated en-route rally point (ERP).

The members on the near side of the danger area simply fall back to the last ERP. For the members of the patrol on the far side of the danger area, it gets a bit more complicated. Obviously, they don't want to simply charge back across the danger area. That would be dangerously stupid. Instead, they will have to continue moving forward just a bit to avoid contact with the OpFor, then cut sharply left or right for several hundred meters and move back toward the danger area. They will have to find a location to safely recross the danger area. Then these members move back to the last ERP to link up with the remainder of the patrol. Of course, the PL will have to re-evaluate his planned route then continue the mission.

OPEN DANGER AREAS


The open danger area is the one we want to avoid at all costs. This type of danger area covers just about anything not covered in the linear classification. Large open fields, small meadows, depressions and areas around large bodies of water, burnt off impact areas, airstrips and even parking lots are some examples of open danger areas. The good news about these nasty obstacles is that, typically, these areas are so large that we can easily see them on a map. So we can anticipate their presence and plot the patrol's route around them. The bad news is that sometimes, just sometimes, we can't avoid them. At those times, we'll have to go right through the danger area.

The Heart-Shaped Method

If the patrol has to pass through a large, open danger area then you're going to want to do this with the most security your patrol can muster. This method takes time, typically three to five minutes even for a squad-sized patrol. It also has a tendency to scramble the order of march and requires a great deal of communicative effort by the PL. But if rehearsed thoroughly, these considerations can be set right again.

Sequence of Events

The point man brings the patrol to a halt and signals he has come upon a danger area. The PL comes forward to view the danger area. He will physically place a two-man security team approximately 20-50 meters down to the right, depending on the terrain and the team's ability to view the danger area and the far side of the danger area. The PL returns to the main body and repeats this process with another two-man security team placed to the left of the patrol.



Once the left and right security teams are in position and able to view the danger area and far side of the danger area, the PL will send a third, far-side security team across the danger area, in line with the patrol's route. This team will cross the danger area as the situation dictates—perhaps at a run, perhaps at a crawl, or anything in between.

Concealed on the far side of the danger area, the security team comes to a listening halt to determine whether or not any OpFor are in the immediate area. If so, they will carefully make their way back to the patrol and inform the PL of the situation. If, on the other hand, the area looks and sounds safe, the security team will ensure this by clearing an area just large enough for the entire patrol to fit. They do this by walking at approximately a 45-degree angle from their listening halt to a designated distance into the tree line, careful to keep eye contact when possible. Once they have walked that designated distance, they turn towards each other and walk until they meet, then move back toward their original listening halt position. When looking at the path from a bird's eye perspective, it looks as though the security team has cut a heart-shaped path into the tree line. And that's why this technique has earned the name "heart-shaped method".

Of course, what should be obvious but sometimes isn't, is the fact that all of this caution, listening, and moving about in a heart-shaped path is supposed to be sure the area is safe from any OpFor. Once the far-side security team is certain of this and reassembled at their listening halt position, they make contact with the PL either through the use of hand & arm signal or radio to give the "okay" sign. This lets the PL know the far side has been secured and that the far-side security is also monitoring the danger area.

At this point, the PL will send the remainder of the patrol, minus the left and right security teams, across the field in the same path the far-side security team established earlier. The left and right security teams monitor the danger area while this happens. And when the remainder of the patrol is safely on the far side of the danger area, the PL will signal by hand or by radio for the left and right security teams to cross the danger area.

To do this, the left and right security teams must converge back on their original path, then cross the danger area using the same path as everyone else. They will be the final element of the patrol to reach the far side. For this reason, the left and right security teams are often positioned as the last four men in the order of march, while the far-side security team is typically positioned in the very beginning of the order of march. In this manner, when the patrol is finally linked up on the far side of the danger area, the point man simply continues patrolling on azimuth.

Contingency Plan

Like the linear danger area, one possible solution to being compromised in the middle of crossing the danger area is just to establish the SOP of a rendezvous of all patrol members back at the last ERP. However, because of the size and open fields of fire that are often associated with open danger areas, simply running away isn't always a good idea. It leaves elements of the patrol still in the danger area very exposed, and without support that element will likely be destroyed. That is why there is such care taken placing the left, right and far-side security teams.

A more plausible contingency plan, depending on the scope of the mission and the logistics of the patrol, would be to stay and fight at least long enough to cover the exposed element's retreat. Another possible contingency would be to try to overwhelm the OpFor with suppressive fire and maneuver the patrol against the OpFor position. If the OpFor is a larger force, then this may not be possible. However, at a minimum, the patrol should provide covering fire for any patrol members caught in the danger area while using smoke canisters to screen their withdraw. The effort to limit the OpFor's vision is a solid tactic. If at all possible, the crossing of open danger areas should be conducted under periods of limited visibility, such as during a rainstorm or under the cover of darkness. However, remember that limiting the OpFor's vision also means limiting the vision of the patrol's security teams.

The Bypass Method

The previously mentioned methods, patch to the road and the heart-shaped, are all fine and well. But what if it is simply too dangerous to cross an open danger area? After all, we don't want to unnecessarily expose the patrol to OpFor observation or fire. That could bring the mission to a quick end...especially if it is a lightly armed recon patrol that isn't suppose to make contact in the first place!

In these cases, it's best to use the bypass. The bypass takes the greatest amount of time, but offers the greatest degree of stealth.

Sequence of Events

After halting the patrol and signaling a danger area, the point man and the PL confirm an azimuth on a prominent terrain feature or prominent feature such as a rise or dip in the terrain, an overly tall tree, or a large boulder on the far side of the danger area. They estimate the distance to this designated feature using the visual techniques or the map, and add that to their present pace count.

Then completely ignoring the pace count, the patrol simply follows the point man as he skirts the danger area, keeping safely inside the tree line until the patrol gets to that designated feature on the far side of the danger area. The order of march, the intervals between members and the formation do not change unless directed by the PL. Upon arriving at the designated far side feature, the point man simply takes up the original azimuth and continues on route. The pace count is then resumed.

Contingency Plan

But what about those rare occasions in which the open area is so incredibly large that the patrol cannot even see the far side of the danger area? Well, one option is to treat such circumstances not so much as a "danger area", but instead as a "significant thinning of vegetation". In such cases, conventional wisdom tells us to open the intervals between patrol members and assume an attack formation, such as the wedge, and continue moving on azimuth through the "thinning vegetation".

Okay, that's one answer. But for a small recon patrol, this answer doesn't work very well. The contingency plan here might call for the "**box method**" which is a type of navigation technique that is closely related to the bypass. This method employs dead reckoning skills as well as doing some plus and minus math in your head with the pace count, but it's really not that complex once you've tried it a couple of times. For complete details, see the box method in the Navigation-Obstacles section of Individual Skill #5 of this manual.

Summary

The fact is that each danger area is a bit unique and the manner in which we overcome each obstacle will be determined by the PL. The situation on the ground can change dramatically from what we see on a map. For instance, a simple linear danger area on the map might actually turn out to be a massively open danger area once the patrol gets up front and personal with the terrain. In that case, the patch to the road method wouldn't be the wisest way to cross. Similarly, open danger areas on the map may actually be so overgrown that they present only slight danger areas that can be overcome with an aggressive patch to the road method, or may present no danger area at all!

In addition to each danger area being unique, so are the requirements of different missions. A patrol engaged in a deliberate attack would handle a danger area very differently from a recon patrol. And even within recon patrols, a patrol on an area recon might be much more timid with danger areas than would a patrol on a zone recon. The important thing for a PL to do is to anticipate these danger areas, even if they don't show on the map, and then to establish a solid SOP for handling both types of danger areas for every type of patrol the team might be tasked.

Lessons Learned

In the early summer of 1989, a platoon of troops from the 101st Air Assault Division's Rakkassan regiment moved quietly through the dense woods of Tennessee. They had been patrolling for two days and, not having met the OpFor, were spoiling for a fight.

About midday, the patrol came to one of many roads and paths that crisscrossed their AO. This one was larger than most, though still just a dirt road. The 'patch to the road' hand signal was given and the patrol bunched together in order to cross the road with as much speed as they could muster. One after another, they took their turn pointing their weapons down the road, dashing across, then pointing down the opposite side before being relieved by the next man. In this manner, almost all of the 1st squad had crossed in a matter of perhaps a half dozen seconds—when 'bang!' A shot reported.

It was a single, well-placed shot, too. The troop aiming down the road had been hit squarely, his laser engagement harness emitting a long beep, indicating that the shot was fatal. The entire patrol of three squads went to their bellies in an instant, and waited for the crescendo of fire that is typical with a near ambush. But nothing happened.

Three seconds passed, then five. Still nothing. The 2nd squad leader sat up and estimated the direction and distance. The shot was off to the left, at 9 o'clock...about 40 meters. He bellowed his estimation for all to hear. The 1st squad leader—on the far side of the dirt road—quickly confirmed the estimate.

With a hunch that the patrol had engaged a sniper, the 2nd squad leader yelled for the 1st squad to face left and move against the OpFor until they came into contact. The 2nd and 3rd squads would do the same on the near side of the road until they came online with the OpFor. It was a game of 'find them and fix them' and it had to be achieved in just seconds!

The 1st squad moved at a run through the heavily wooded terrain. Likewise, the 2nd and 3rd squads formed a loose online formation and moved with surprising speed across the 40-or-so meters—not knowing which side of the road the enemy was on.

It was the 1st squad who saw the OpFor first. A camouflaged sniper was leaping down from a tree that leaned out well above the dirt road. His spotter, already on the ground, spun on his heels in time to call a warning that the 1st squad was on top of them. With a hap-hazard burst of fire from the spotter's carbine toward 1st squad, the sniper team darted to the edge of the dirt road then saw elements of the 2nd squad already firing wildly into their direction from just across the road. Again the sniper team spun around and took off at a dead run in an oblique from the oncoming platoon. The spotter was killed almost instantly in a hail of fire. The sniper managed to run no more than 20 meters before he realized he was being enveloped. He lay down by a thick tree to return fire, but was fatally shot before he could squeeze the trigger.

Lessons learned? A quick estimation of the situation and effective communication saved the day. The patrol reacted aggressively, understanding that they were in the midst of what might technically be called a 'far ambush'. The patrol found the enemy. They closed the distance to fix the enemy. And they simply overwhelmed them with massed firepower. It was a drill they had prepared for time and time again until it was second nature—and yet...they had never practice it, or even *imagined* it done with a linear danger area between the maneuvering elements! They used what they knew, and improvised from there.

In the AAR, the sniper team commented that out of the 3 Battalion, 187th Rakkassan's 27 line squads, this patrol was the only one to effectively maneuver against—and destroy—the sniper team. Yet to the patrol members, the destruction of the sniper team seemed so certain that many of the troops were incredulous that a trained and experienced scout sniper team would commit what seemed to the patrol members to be an act of "suicide"!

Good rehearsals often make the execution of the actual mission seem...well, simple. Don't let that fool you into thinking you don't need the rehearsals and drill.

Tactical Battle Drill #5

REACT TO AMBUSH

Here is a battle drill that each team must practice until it becomes second nature. The only problem with practicing it is that everyone gets into that mind set, "Okay, here comes the ambush." Which is all fine and well for those occasions when you actually suspect the enemy might be attempting such a maneuver, but such awareness occurs less often than we'd like to think. None-the-less, these drills should be practiced until every team member knows how the other team members will react.

Believe it or not, of all the different types of ambush that can be thrust upon a patrol, the military contention is that all of these ambush variations can be broken into just two classifications...near and far. Okay, hard to argue with that logic. So let's take a closer look at how we should react to both near and far ambushes.

THE NEAR AMBUSH

The near ambush is described as a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or momentarily halted target, which is within rushing distance (approximately 35 meters). Since such attacks do not require that ground is seized and held, an assault across the killing zone is optional. Keeping this in mind, sniper fire received within rushing distance would also be considered a near ambush.

Due to the close proximity of the near ambushing team to its intended targets, being in the kill zone is a dangerous place to be! The best rule is simply never to walk into a near ambush. If you find yourself in this unfortunate position, the only chance for survival is for your patrol's reaction to be instantaneous. To achieve this, you will have to rehearse this drill until the team's reaction is second nature.

Physical dynamics

Remember that the ambush team (in this case the enemy) is in a static position. They have carefully planned their sectors of fire so as not to shoot each other. Now, this may seem so obvious that it is something of an overstatement. On the contrary, I will illustrate later why that can work in your favor, so for the moment, remember that the enemy does not want to shoot members of their own patrol.

Your patrol, on the other hand, is in a dynamic position as you move into the kill zone. Moving targets prove to be difficult to kill because they readily pass from one sector of fire to the next. If this sounds a bit trivial, it may surprise you to find that a well executed near ambush has only an average of 15 seconds to coordinate its initial volley of fire. It's awfully hard to hit multiple, moving targets under such time restraints.

If then, each member of the ambush team is assigned sectors of fire, what does he do if a target inside the kill zone moves out of his assigned sector of fire? The answer to this perplexing question is that the member of the ambush team will either:


- Continue to fire only at targets inside his sector of fire and ignore all other targets.
- Stop firing because there are no targets in his sector of fire.
- Disregard his sector of fire and fire upon the target even after it leaves his sector.

None of these options are very desirable, and frankly the most commonly selected option is the last—which is also the worst case for the ambush team!

You see, if the ambush team continues to fire upon you while you rush into their line, that means they are placing deadly suppressive fire against members of their own team as well! As you may imagine, this is not conducive to morale or tactical performance. If they do not fire upon you as you leave their kill zone, you are free to fire upon them. It's a lose-lose situation for the ambush team.

On the other hand, if you try to run away from the ambushing team, your back is turned to them. As you move away from the kill zone, you enter the beaten zone, which is even deadlier. Furthermore, a well-planned ambush will utilize natural or man-made obstacles to slow your escape when you enter the beaten zone. These obstacles will either expose you to enemy fire, or simply explode with such a force as to end your escape. Not a pretty picture, no matter how you look at it.

The best way out of a near ambush is through the enemy line!



Crazy as that sounds. It is a very unnatural thing to do because everything within you will tell you to turn and run away. So, it must be practiced until it becomes second nature.

WRONG! Patrol member #2 is lying inside the kill zone and has become suppressed.

WRONG! Patrol member #4 is running away into the dangerous 'beaten zone'.

CORRECT! Patrol members #1, 3, and 5 are aggressively moving out of the kill zone.

Sequence of events

[1] At the very moment any member of the patrol determines his patrol is in an ambush's kill zone, he screams at the top of his lungs, "Near ambush—left!" (or right or forward, as the case may be). Too often, this moment is only realized just after the initial shot is fired from the ambush team, but no matter. The drill is still the same.

[2] Every member of the patrol turns and rushes in the direction called out, or simply toward the nearest amount of noise if they did not hear the direction. This must be done without hesitation! Do not lie down. Do not ask questions. Do not fumble around with hand grenades. If you try to do any of these things, you will remain inside the kill zone, you will isolate yourself from your patrol, and you will soon be killed!

[3] Upon entering the enemy line, all members fire left and right to disrupt and kill the enemy. This leaves the enemy ambush team with the choice to fall back or stay and be overwhelmed.

[4] Only now can you take cover and try to communicate with your patrol members. Members of your patrol who are NOT in the kill zone must flank to engage the enemy line.

The effort here is first to get you out of the kill zone, and second to break the enemy line. The ambush is a tenacious and volatile place to be. Only with extreme violence can your patrol disrupt and repel the enemy ambush team. Being inside the kill zone is a regrettable situation and you should expect to have casualties inflicted upon your patrol, but that does not mean you cannot survive an ambush. You must use the ambush team's need for organization against them. Your patrol must react violently and immediately.

THE FAR AMBUSH

The far ambush is described as a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a moving or momentarily halted target from a distance too far to be rushed across (more than 35 meters). Rarely are assaults across the kill zone conducted in a far ambush. For example, sniper missions are typically conducted at distances significantly greater than 35 meters. They are treated in the same manner as the far ambush. After all, a sniper team is nothing more than a small, two-man far ambush.

The kill zone of the far ambush is a critically dangerous place, even if it doesn't present the same threat of being immediately overwhelmed that is unique to the near ambush. A well-rehearsed SOP will determine the success or failure of the patrol caught in a far ambush.

Physical dynamics


The far ambush is conducted at greater distances in order to:

- Allow a small ambush team to fire upon a larger patrol or convoy.
- Avoid the risk of detection that is inherent in near ambushes.
- Allow enough time and distance to escape if the targeted patrol maneuvers into an attack.

This means that the patrol that enters a far ambush often has the advantage of being larger than the ambush team and may not be entirely positioned within the kill zone, or may have considerably more time to react.

The best way out of a far ambush is the way you came in!

When you consider the options, this method of escaping the kill zone is the most practical and will reduce the number of casualties inflicted upon your patrol.



Sequence of events

The enemy ambush patrol is rarely seen in a far ambush. Unfortunately, this means that the first indication that your patrol has entered a far ambush is that you are being shot at.

[1] At the sound of the first shot, all members of the patrol should fall to the ground and get a fix on the enemy's position.

[2] Everyone then shouts the enemy's position back to the patrol leader using the clock method and distance (example: "Ambush! Enemy at 3 o'clock, 100 meters!").

[3] The patrol will lay down a base of fire until all of the troops have escaped the kill zone. Ideally this is done by using a low, defiladed route (such as a ravine) and/or smoke canisters to conceal the troops' withdraw. Often, troops will simply run out of the kill zone.

[4] The patrol leader then decides the next course of action—to attack the ambush team or simply to move around the kill zone and bypass the ambush.

Summary

Since the beginning of modern tactics (arguably the 1940s) there has been an on-going debate regarding whether a patrol should react to ambush by assaulting through the enemy lines, or assault by fire only, or withdraw. You won't find the final words in these pages.

The truth is that there are so many variables that—like any other TBD—there should be more than one drill in a patrol's arsenal of options. In fact, there should probably be half a dozen different drills for the patrol's reaction to ambush—at a minimum! It seems to me the main two questions are:

1. Has the patrol come into the kill zone and/or under fire yet?
2. How close is the enemy ambush? (Special consideration given to terrain.)

By near ambush, we tend to think of hand grenade range...perhaps 30 to 50 meters. But in the jungle, for instance, that is regarded as a *far* ambush! Likewise, over open dessert 75 meters may just as well be included in the near ambush, because of our ability to quickly traverse that terrain. What I'm saying is this—if you find yourself in a kill zone and you can quickly get into the enemy's line, then you should. If you cannot do it quickly, your team will unnecessarily be laid to waist in front of the enemy gunners. So don't do it.

In fully half of all ambushes, the point-man sees, hears, or is otherwise alerted to the enemy presence before the patrol enters the kill zone. In these cases, the point-man must signal the PL of the impending ambush. The PL assesses the situation, quickly makes a choice among the patrol's repertoire of immediate reaction drills, and communicates his intentions to the entire patrol using hand & arm signals. The patrol may, for example, simply sneak away. Or it may assault the position much like the drills in a movement-to-contact attack. In this case it is just about ridiculous to think that the PL would issue an order to assault through the enemy line! But there are times when the patrol might find this necessary. And the argument that the patrol will instantly recognize these moments and move as a single entity without command or coordination is non-sense! Only the most experienced patrols would instantly recognize they were in a hand-to-hand slugfest for survival. So immediate reaction drills are very necessary. In fact, for communicating such a complex maneuver in such a short period of time, immediate action drills are probably the *only* option.

Getting out of a deadly kill zone is the first consideration. For a near ambush, you must move *through the OpFor's* line...if the patrol is actually in the kill zone. Understand that when properly executed, a squad-sized ambush team will fire into their kill zone for only as much time as it takes them to empty a couple of magazines—15 seconds. If you lie down in the kill zone, fumble around with hand grenades, and then wait for those grenades to explode...well, there went your 15 seconds to react. You'll become isolated if you lie down. You won't be able to see your teammates or communicate with them. You won't attempt to gain the initiative because you'd have to go it alone. And if you're lucky enough to survive the initial volley of fire unscathed, guess what comes after those first 15 seconds? The assault team! There is no choice when you stop to think about it. You have to move through the OpFor's positions, and you have to do this immediately.

In stark contrast is the far ambush. In the far ambush the enemy wants to keep a safe distance from your patrol...probably because you outnumber them. First, seek cover. Second, get a fix on the OpFor position. Third, communicate your intentions to the entire patrol. If your patrol maneuvers quickly and decisively, you will be able to engage the ambush team as they withdraw in their escape routes and turn the table on them. But your patrol must coordinate quickly.

You can minimize your casualties by establishing well-rehearsed SOPs. Rehearsals will also increase your team's reaction time both in getting out of the kill zone and also in moving against the ambush team. I have never seen a "one size fits all" solution. It's best to have multiple options in your bag of tricks. Practice them all—diligently!

Lessons Learned

During the 2003 Ramadan Campaign of the Iraqi War, the Fedayeen significantly increased the number of attacks on the Coalition Forces throughout the theater. These

attacks came mostly in the form of ambush on motor vehicle convoys and short-range mortaring of Coalition defensive perimeters. Standard Operating Procedures for an ambush on convoys dictated that Coalition troops were supposed to drive through the kill zone at a high rate of speed...and for the most part this proved effective in avoiding an effective use of the IED (improvised explosive device) favored by the Fedayeen guerillas.

Our little task force, dubbed CMATT, was not immune to this campaign, and indeed we had our fair share of ambushes against our convoys running in and out of the 'Sunni Triangle'. In early November, one of our logistic convoys was hit on a long stretch of highway just outside the town of Baquba. The force of the IED was such that it not only tore off the front bumper and wheel well of the Humvee, but spun the vehicle around as it zoomed down the road at 50 mph. The vehicle came to rest facing backward down the highway, stopping the remaining two vehicles.

Having no choice now but to dismount, the troops dismounted and secured the immediate area while several others rushed to aid the people in the damaged vehicle. No sooner had they taken up a covered position, smack in the middle of the kill zone, and a Fedayeen 'gunner' stood up from his covered and concealed position and took off at a dead run away from the ambush! One of the troops shot him instantly—and another enemy stood up! This one was believed to be the spotter for the mechanical ambush. Again, the troops fired on the escaping Fedayeen guerilla, hitting him squarely in the back as he ran.

Lesson learned? Well, to be honest it took a few days of pondering, and a couple more repeat performances before we realized what was happening. The enemy had become accustomed to our SOP of driving through the kill zone. They habitually set off mechanical ambushes and assailed us with machinegun fire as we passed, hoping to inflict casualties.

However, in the unlikely event that the enemy were successful in stopping the convoy, the Fedayeen were not prepared to follow up their momentum with an assault. In fact, they were convinced quite the opposite—that we were dismounting in order to form an assault against their ambush. At this time, the Fedayeen were so used to Coalition Forces driving past them at high rates of speed, they only ambushed with 2 or 3-man teams. One man acted as a spotter, and the other men being the gunners.

Consequently, our tactics changed. We began to move just outside of the effective range of the main weapon system, perhaps 100 meters for a mechanical ambush or 200-300 meters for direct fire systems. Then the convoy would 'circle the wagons' and make a decision to either probe by fire, call in for help, or move on. For the moment, the technique seems to have done the trick. Only time will tell.

Perhaps the main learning point is this: the enemy are not stupid, and if you plan to establish just one drill for all possible scenarios, the enemy will respond by countering your single drill with the course of action that best suits him. Be flexible. Have more than one solution, and rehearse them all!


Section IV

TACTICAL BATTLE DRILLS:

DEFENSIVE POSTURES

Tactical Battle Drill #6

ESTABLISH A SECURITY/LISTENING HALT



Courtesy of One Shepherd


A patrol halted. Members would pull security in a prone position when halted for several minutes or more.

Sometimes a patrol has just got to stop and smell the roses, as they say. There are many reasons a patrol might stop for a minute or even an hour. The PL might need to confirm his position on the map or GPS. The patrol might have passed some phase line in their route and wants to listen and observe their new surroundings. Some member of the patrol might have dropped a piece of equipment that needs re-securing. Or, frankly, the patrol may just need a rest. The possible

reasons are too numerous to mention. But having an established SOP is essential in maintaining security in all directions outside of the patrol.

THE SECURITY HALT

This position is designed to maintain 360° security for the patrol from attack by the OpFor. To do this, the patrol will form into a cigar-shaped circular defensive position, which is employed using the clock method. The patrol will assume the security halt each and every time the patrol stops. In fact, the patrol members continually scan their assigned sectors of fire during the entire patrol, whether they are stopped or moving. The only time the security halt position is *not* immediately assumed is when the "Freeze" hand & arm signal is given.



Sequence of Events

Upon receiving the "Halt" hand & arm signal, all patrol members take a knee and face out to cover their assigned sectors of fire. Those specific sectors of fire are assigned in the following manner:

- The point man continues to face in the direction of travel—the 12 o'clock position.
- The drag man turns about to face in the opposite direction of travel—at the 6 o'clock position.
- The remainder of the patrol face alternatively left or right—making up the 1 to 5 o'clock positions on the right hand side of the security halt, and the 7 to 11 o'clock positions on the left hand side—and each member monitors their sector of fire.

If the duration of the security halts extends more than three minutes, all members between the point man and the drag man take two or three steps out, away from the middle of the security halt.

They will attempt to position themselves at their assigned intervals, but will seek cover behind large tree trunks, boulders, dirt mounds or in small ditches and holes in the earth. From a bird's eye view, the perimeter of the security halt has just taken the cigar-shape. The intervals may become slightly irregular, but that will not significantly effect the security position as long as each patrol member maintains eye contact with the man to his left and right, and immediately behind him. The point man and drag man remain in their original positions, but may also seek the best cover immediately available.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

A more developed security perimeter is established when the halt time period is extended.

If the security halt lasts longer than five minutes, each patrol member will drop their rucks and assume a prone position, facing out towards their sector of fire. The PL will commonly take a centrally located position in the middle of the cigar-shaped perimeter at this point, though he is free to move about as he determines.

Sometimes, the security halt becomes a long-term halt or even an improvised ORP. In these cases, the PL will indicate this to the element leaders who then tighten or expand the security position as needed by physically repositioning the members of their team. Sectors of fire become more concrete as the PL comes to each position and gives each patrol member the left and right TRP of his sector of fire.

THE LISTENING HALT

The listening halt is nothing more than a security halt with a very specific purpose... that being to adjust to a new environment by listening to the sounds and observing the sights around the patrol.

Sequence of Events

The listening halt is occupied in precisely the same manner as the security halt. Once the PL has passed the word back that this security halt will be used for a listening halt, the patrol members immediately take two or three steps outward to seek some form of cover. Each patrol member faces into their assigned sector of fire, but instead of assuming a prone position, they will all simply sit on the ground and take a few seconds to make themselves comfortable. They will drop their rucks, if carried, and remove their hats or helmets. They will take a quick drink of water and then settle down to complete silence.

The effort here is to listen to the sounds of the new environment while letting your eyes adjust to the sights and light levels. For this reason, listening halts are commonly implemented when:

- A patrol has just passed through the FEBA.
- Twilight or dusk overcomes a patrol.
- Or the terrain changes dramatically, such as before a patrol passes by a village.

Summary

Experience has shown us that listening halts are often neglected. When this happens, the patrol is more likely to make unexpected contact with the OpFor. Can you imagine the consequences of unexpectedly bumping into an enemy armored column? This type of OpFor movement would easily be detected in advance by employing a listening halt.

In contrast, some units use security halts with much more regularity, but all too often the security becomes too relaxed. The troops don't want to take a knee due to the heavy loads carried. The PL and subordinate leaders can overcome these tendencies with good leadership. Setting a good example and taking a sincere interest in the members of your team goes a long way in developing unit discipline and good morale. Of course, a well-rehearsed SOP doesn't hurt either!

Lessons Learned

In the spring of 1987, a task force from the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division aided in the security of the Puerto Rico island. Small recon teams throughout the countryside were dispersed to seek intelligence on a band of guerillas that intended to disrupt the islands democratic process.

The recon team had only just begun their patrolling when they soon suspected they were being trailed. The patrol came to a halt just inside a tree line that gave way to a large, open field dominating the ridgeline they had moved along. In compliance with their SOP, the members of the patrol sat quietly and listening to their surroundings when

several of the patrol members heard movement from the tree line on the far side of the spur—not much more than 10 meters away.

From the bushes someone opened fire with a handgun, popping several rounds in rapid succession just over the heads of the patrol! The paratroopers responded in kind, peppering the far tree line with M16 rifle and carbine fire. The patrol broke contact immediately and moved down the draw, away from the enemy.


Lessons learned? It is still unknown if the recon patrol was being followed by a couple of instigators who simply wished to test the paratrooper's mettle, or if the patrol had actually bumped into the flank security team of an enemy's full-fledged ambush. In either case, the patrol's discipline and willingness to conduct security/listening halts seems to have averted contact with the enemy on their own terms. That surely would have proven more costly to this lightly armed patrol!

Tactical Battle Drill #7

ESTABLISH AN OBJECTIVE RALLY POINT

Every mission has an objective, whether that objective is to observe the activities of a road junction, or conducting a raid to obtain a prisoner, or simply to go into the restaurant and have a few beers with friends. In all of these cases, there will be a point in which you rally together to take a head count, finalize plans, and move into position. Case in point, for the mission involving a beer with friends, your objective rally point would be the parking lot of the restaurant.

The ORP is used in every mission that involves a combat patrol. This section will focus on the emplacement and work order of the ORP. To some the task seems daunting. But in truth it's a common, every-day procedure. It's very natural to come together and conduct a final coordination prior to attempting even a mundane mission...such as dinner and a beer.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

A patrol waits in the ORP for the leader's recon to return.

THE OBJECTIVE RALLY POINT

The ORP is a patrolling practice that affords 360° security for the patrol as it rallies for the final time prior to moving into position around the objective. The ORP must provide concealment from OpFor observation while plans and equipment are finalized, yet it must be close enough to move swiftly to and from the objective without the patrol members becoming disoriented. The operative description for an ORP would be close but discreet.

Specifications of the ORP

How close? It's hard to say. Again, you want to stay out of the OpFor's view and far enough that the noise of final preparations on your equipment won't be detected. The rule of thumb is "300 meters or one terrain feature". Keeping one sizable terrain feature between the ORP and the objective significantly reduces the amount of noise and completely removes the ORP from sight. Or, if the terrain is rather open and easy to traverse, the ORP must be kept 300 meters away from the objective. Though, for smaller, squad-sized patrols 100 meters might do nicely. It really depends on the type of terrain and the nature of the patrol's final preparations.

Security is always the first priority of any mission. This is particularly true for the ORP. Security must be maintained in 360° and never fall below the 50 percent level, even while conducting the order of work. To facilitate security, any patrol member who needs to leave the ORP will have to coordinate leaving and re-entering, and this information will have to be communicated to every member inside the ORP. All departures and re-entries must be conducted at the 12 o'clock position. This position faces the suspected direction of the nearest OpFor...which should also be the direction of the mission at hand. By coordinating to leave and come back through the 12 o'clock position instead of the 6 o'clock position, members of the patrol will not be required to walk through the assigned sectors of fire of every member in the ORP. This coordination of movement reduces the chance of fratricide.

Sequence of Events

No farther than 200 meters out from the PL's planned site for the ORP, the patrol is placed into a security halt. A leader's recon is then conducted on the ORP site, to be certain the terrain is appropriate for use. The leader's recon typically involves four members of the patrol—the PL, the point man, and a two-man security team. Before leaving the security halt, the PL must give the APL a five-point contingency plan to coordinate for their return to the security halt.

Once the leader's recon has reached the designated ORP site and the PL has determined that the site is appropriate (or has selected another site nearby), the PL places the two-man security back to back at the 6 o'clock position of the ORP. Now, think of the security team as a couple of buddies who are saving a great parking spot for your car. You don't want them to leave the spot because someone else might take it. And if a bad guy does take your parking spot...well, you don't want to come zooming in there and smash his fender only to find out the bad guy is much bigger than you and holds a black belt in karate! No, no. You'd want your buddies to come back to you and say, "Hey, some really big scary looking guy just took our parking spot. Let's find another one." So, this security team will be left at the ORP to watch the spot, and to guide the remainder of the patrol into position. The PL will leave a five-point contingency plan with the security team before he and the point man return to the patrol at the security halt.


The PL and the point man return to the rest of the patrol back in the security halt. The patrol resumes its order of march, and since the point man has already been to the ORP and back, he can lead the patrol right to the security team at the 6 o'clock position. Once the point man has made contact with the security team, the patrol is again halted and the PL moves forward. From the 6 o'clock position the PL will move the patrol in to occupy the ORP in accordance with the method of their SOP.

The 'Wagon Wheel' Method

The wagon wheel forms the patrol into a large circle through an exercise of "follow the leader". Once the circle has been completed, the exact positions of the members are adjusted as needed to offer the best cover and to provide sectors of fire in 360°.

Sequence of Events

When the patrol links up with the two-man security team at the 6 o'clock position of the ORP, the PL comes forward. Keeping the security team at 6 o'clock, the PL walks in a clockwise circle around the area of the designated ORP. The drag man stops at the 6 o'clock position and the PL will meet them there after walking all the way around the ORP. This marks the perimeter of the ORP.



With all the other members of the patrol standing in this large circle at regular intervals, the PL then moves to the very center. He will send the two-man security from the 6 o'clock position up to the 12 o'clock position. This leaves the drag man at 6 o'clock. Next, the PL will assign each member an exact location in the ORP by positioning them behind the nearest tree, stone, or mound of dirt and assigning a sector of fire. If time is an issue, the PL can delegate this task to element leaders.


This forms a circular defense. If the patrol is very small, a minimum of positions at 12, 3, 6 and 9 o'clock must be maintained and observing their sectors of fire.

The 'Triangle' Method

This method is good for large patrols that can be broken into three elements. It also requires a small variation of the leader's recon. Instead of leaving just one security team at the 6 o'clock position, the PL will leave three security teams. These teams are left back to back at the 10 o'clock, 2 o'clock, and 6 o'clock positions.

Sequence of Events

When the PL links up the rest of the patrol with the security team at 6 o'clock, he will lead the first element from the 6 o'clock position up to the 10 o'clock position. He will then walk that first element from the 10 o'clock to 2 o'clock positions and physically place each member of the element in a straight line between the two security teams. The PL then returns to the 6 o'clock position.



Waiting at 6 o'clock is the second element of the patrol. The PL will walk the second element from the 6 o'clock to the 10 o'clock positions and physically place each member of the element in a straight line between these two security teams. Then, the PL will have to return again to the 6 o'clock position.


Waiting still with the 6 o'clock security team is the third element. The PL will walk the third element in a straight line between the 6 o'clock and the 2 o'clock security team, physically placing each member of the element. Then the PL will move toward the center of the ORP and call in his element leaders to be sure they are all aware of each other's location and tied into each other's sector of fire.

Obviously, this complicated maneuvering takes quite a bit of practice to get it right. Add in the possibility of conducting this drill under the cover of darkness and you can see why it *must be rehearsed!* In case you're wondering why each security team must have two men positioned back to back, that is because the team member facing out is supposed to be providing security, while the team member facing inside the perimeter is suppose to act as a guide for the PL when he is placing each element. At night, the guiding member of each security team must have a red lens flashlight, or chemlite, or they may use the face of a tritium compass on which the PL guides. These lights will provide a visual reference to keep the PL walking in a straight line.

The triangle method is excellent for larger patrols because in the triangle perimeter, the machineguns or automatic rifles are placed at each of the three apexes of the triangle—6, 10 and 2 o'clock. That means no matter what direction the OpFor may approach the ORP, two of the three machineguns can be brought to bear on the attacking force! However, for a much smaller patrol, the triangle method would not be suitable.

The 'Occupy by Force' Method

Because of the large number of people required for a leader's recon, security team, etc., a small patrol (fireteam or squad-sized) will often walk directly up on top of their ORP and conduct a security halt. This practice is known as occupying the ORP by force. The implications are that if the OpFor are detected on or around the designated ORP, the patrol will make a last minute decision as to either engage the OpFor in order to occupy the terrain, or to quietly move the ORP to a new position.



Sequence of Events

Upon reaching the center of the designated position for the ORP, the PL will halt the patrol and indicate to the patrol members that they are at the ORP. Each patrol member, except for the point man, drag man and PL, will face either left or right in an alternating pattern and take several steps out to form a cigar-shaped perimeter. This leaves the PL in the center, the point man at the 12 o'clock position, and the drag man at the 6 o'clock position.

Either the PL or element leaders will then ensure each man is behind adequate cover and assigned a sector of fire. As with the wagon wheel method, a minimum of the 12, 3, 6, and 9 o'clock positions must be maintained and covering their sector of fire.

PRIORITIES OF WORK FOR THE ORP

Once the ORP has been established, there will be considerable work to accomplish. After all, the ORP is not the mission! The ORP is merely a secure place in which the patrol can finalize its preparations for the mission. Priorities of work are scheduled in the chronology listed below. However, some of these priorities will be scheduled concurrently, or they may not be included in the planning and preparation at all.

Priorities of Work

1. *Security is always the first priority.* The ORP cannot be maintained at levels lower than 50 percent. That means, for example, if it is time for lunch, half of the patrol can eat quietly while the other half of the patrol maintains a vigilant guard of their sectors of fire.
2. *A leader's recon of the objective* should be conducted. This recon team will leave and enter through the 12 o'clock position and will have to be coordinated with the patrol members in the ORP. Typically, the APL will remain in the ORP while the PL, the security team leader, and a security team will conduct the recon.
3. *All special equipment is prepared.* You cannot expect to ready explosives, anti-armor weapons, or conduct radio checks while sitting in position on the objective! That would simply be too much noise and activity. The OpFor would certainly see or hear the patrol. Instead, these preparations are finished in the ORP—which is, after all, very near the objective. So be quiet.
4. *Plans are finalized or altered.* The leader's recon may come back with surprising information that either slightly or dramatically alters the plan of the mission. Or, sometimes the failure of special equipment may require some improvising in order to complete the mission. In any case, these adjustments must be made by the PL in the ORP and every member must be informed!
5. *Weapons must be cleaned.* This is particularly true if the patrol made contact while in route to the ORP, or if the movement to the ORP took considerable time and moved through a notably dirty environment—such as fording a river or being inserted onto a sandy beach. Still, no more than 50 percent of the patrol members may do this at one time. The other 50 percent pulls security.
6. *Sleep and eating plans may be initiated.* If the situation dictates, the ORP may implement an eating and/or sleeping schedule. Of course, 50 percent security must again be maintained.

Summary

Every mission has its objective. The ORP is the last stop prior to the objective, where the patrol can come together to tally its numbers and equipment, to finalize the mission plans, and even to rest prior to conducting the mission. What method we choose to implement the ORP will depend largely on the terrain, the mission, and the number of troops available. But every combat mission will include an ORP. It must be assumed that an ORP is dangerously close to the OpFor! Security becomes paramount. And if the ORP will be occupied under the cover of darkness or in terrain with limited visibility, the exact method of occupation must be rehearsed prior to the patrol's movement!

Lessons Learned

Back in 1989, when retired 1st Sergeant Larry Keitt was still a young platoon sergeant assigned to the 1/61st Road Runner Battalion of the U.S. 5th Infantry Division, the American military embarked upon Operation "Nimrod Dancer" in an effort to tighten security in Panama. The Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) were at that time led by the corrupt and defiant dictator, Emanuel Noriega.

In the weeks prior to Operation "Just Cause"—the U.S. invasion of Panama—the PDF openly antagonized the American forces that had been stationed there for almost a century to defend the Panama Canal. Now the PDF antics had become lethal. PDF gunmen attacked several U.S. servicemen and even their families. In one instance, an American sailor was viciously beaten by a gang of PDF while his wife was repeatedly raped. The tension was building quickly.

The Road Runners were deployed, and Keitt's platoon sat in the jungle heat of a Panamanian afternoon. They were in a company-sized ORP overlooking Noriega's personal villa on the far side of the canal. The soldiers were alert and in good morale, but due to a ridiculous policy at that particular time, the machine gunners were forbidden from loading their weapons unless fired upon. This was not true for the riflemen, but being so close as to actually observe the PDF on the other side of the canal, the troops were getting a bit jumpy.

Platoon sergeant Keitt stepped toward the center of the ORP to speak with the company commander, insisting that the policy of not loading the machineguns was unnecessarily jeopardizing lives. No sooner had he voiced his objection than an urgent call over the radio requested his presence on the perimeter of the ORP.

Keitt hurried to the location of the problem, and found a PDF soldier facing squarely at one of the members of his platoon. Having an acute understanding of the U.S. forces rules of engagement, the PDF troop had quietly approached the ORP from a covered route. Only after being noticed at very close quarters did the PDF troop raise his AKM carbine—the muzzle just inches from the surprised soldier's nose!

To the American soldier's credit, though he had urinated himself, he remained calm and otherwise steady. The PDF troop had a dozen M16 rifles pointed back at him. This standoff lasted for a few tense minutes with the Road Runners wondering if the PDF troop was suicidal enough to pull the trigger. Again, demonstrating a shrewd knowledge of the U.S. policy of engagement which stated that U.S. troops could only fire back if fired upon—there was, as of yet, no shooting war—the PDF troop lowered his weapon, smiled broadly at the soldier he had just terrorized, and simply walked away to rejoin the rest of his gang at the villa.

Lessons learned? Well, other than the fact that some policies merit little adherence, it seems rather obvious that the ORP was placed much too close to the objective. The ORP is a place in which the patrol should be able to ready itself without being observed by the enemy! The PDF had clearly seen the Road Runners' ORP, and the company commander's nonchalance about the whole affair reflected a mindset of "this is training, not reality". That attitude nearly cost the commander the life of one of his soldiers.

Tactical Battle Drill #8

ESTABLISH A PATROL BASE

Establishing a patrol base is a mission unto itself, however it is also a means to an end. While the PB must be placed in a concealed position, I certainly wouldn't try to argue the intrinsic value of merely hiding a patrol. Instead, we hide the patrol so that the patrol can break into smaller elements, or act as a single element to conduct further missions. So the value of properly establishing a PB is to provide a base of concealment and security from which we can strike the OpFor.

THE PATROL BASE

The PB is a static position out of which a patrol may operate a series of missions. It is used for a short period of time, *no more than 24 hours*, and must remain obscured from OpFor observation. Security is maintained at 360°, and while there is no requirement to keep the PB at a minimum of 50 percent security, the percentage of troops maintaining security is kept at the maximum amount that the work priorities will allow.

Specifications of the PB

The rule of thumb on where to place a PB allows the PB to be no closer than 500 meters from the OpFor, or better yet to maintain a major terrain feature between the OpFor and the PB. All members of the patrol who depart or re-enter the PB must do so at the 6 o'clock position. This is in direct contrast to the ORP—which enters and departs from the 12 o'clock position. However, the effort of the ORP is to move forward, towards the mission. The effort of the PB is to provide discreet, clandestine operations. Leaving at the 6 o'clock position means that the patrol members are less likely to arouse OpFor scrutiny. Furthermore, the machinegun or automatic rifle team positioned at 6 o'clock can easily guard the single trail in and out of the PB.

The PB is a temporary, static position that uses concealment as its primary defense. As such, there is no need to develop fighting positions, bunkers or trench systems. However, to provide a minimum amount of cover, some build up of the PB defenses should be tolerated—in as much as it can be accomplished quietly! Entrenching tools and machetes make a good deal of noise. Barricades are preferable to digging, but hasty fighting positions or 'shell scrapes' are permitted.


Sequence of Events

The PL establishes an ORP within 300 meters of the anticipated PB site. The PL conducts a leader's recon of the PB site, leaving a five-point contingency plan with the APL back in the ORP. The leader's recon includes the PL, point man, and a two-man security team.

Once the PL is satisfied with the anticipated PB site (or has chosen a suitable alternative site) the PL leaves the security team at the 6 o'clock position of the PB with a five-point contingency plan. The PL and point man move back to the ORP.

In the ORP, the PL picks up the rest of the patrol and alerts them as to any change of plans. The point man is familiar enough with the terrain to lead the patrol up to the six o'clock position. If this is done at night, the security team member facing back must have a visual reference for the point man—a red lens flashlight, chemlite, or tritium compass. The point man will link the security team with the patrol.

The 'Wagon Wheel' Method




When the patrol links up with the two-man security team at the 6 o'clock position of the PB, the PL comes forward. Keeping the security team at 6 o'clock, the PL walks in a clockwise circle around the area of the designated PB. The drag man stops at the 6 o'clock position and the PL will meet them there after walking all the way around the PB. This marks the circular perimeter of the PB.

With all the other members of the patrol standing in this large circle at regular intervals, the PL then moves to the very center. He will send the two-man security from the 6 o'clock position up to the 12 o'clock position. This leaves the drag man at 6 o'clock. Next, the PL will assign each member an exact location in the PB by positioning them behind the nearest tree, stone, or mound of dirt and assigning a sector of fire. If time is an issue, the PL can delegate this task to element leaders.


This forms a circular defense. If the patrol is very small, at least the positions at 12, 3, 6 and 9 o'clock must be maintained and observing their sectors of fire.

The 'Triangle' Method




This method requires a small variation of the leader's recon. Instead of leaving just one two-man security team at the 6 o'clock position, the PL will leave three security teams. One team is left back to back at the 10 o'clock position, another at the 2 o'clock position, and the third at 6 o'clock.

When the PL links up the rest of the patrol with the security team at 6 o'clock, he will lead the first element from the 6 o'clock position up to the 10 o'clock position. He will then walk that first element from the 10 o'clock to 2 o'clock positions and physically place each member of the element in a straight line between the two security teams. The PL then returns to the 6 o'clock position.



Waiting at 6 o'clock is the second element of the patrol. The PL will walk the second element from the 6 o'clock to the 10 o'clock positions and physically place each member of the element in a straight line between these two security teams. Then, the PL will have to return again to the 6 o'clock position.

During the third phase of the triangle method, the third element is still waiting at the 6 o'clock security team. The PL will walk the third element in a straight line between the 6 o'clock and the 2 o'clock security team, physically placing each member of the element. Then the PL will move toward the center of the PB and call in his element leaders to be sure they are all aware of each other's location and tied into each other's sector of fire.



For the fourth phase of the triangle method, the PL will move to the center of the patrol base to set up the command post. Obviously, this complicated maneuvering takes a bit of practice to get it right. Add in the possibility of conducting this drill under the cover of darkness and you can see why it *must be rehearsed!* In case you're wondering why each security team must have two men positioned back to back, that is because the team member facing out is supposed to be providing security, while the team member




facing inside the perimeter is suppose to act as a guide for the PL when he is placing each element. At night, the guiding member of each security team must have a red lens flashlight, or chemlite, or they may use the face of a tritium compass on which the PL guides. These lights will provide a visual reference to keep the PL walking in a straight line.

The triangle method is excellent for larger patrols because in the triangle perimeter, the machineguns or automatic rifles are placed at each of the three apexes of the triangle—6, 10 and 2 o'clock. That means no matter what direction the OpFor may approach the PB, two of the three machineguns can be brought to bear on the attacking force! However, for a much smaller patrol, the triangle method would not be suitable.

The 'Occupy by Force' Method

A small patrol can often walk directly up on top of their PB and conduct a security halt. This practice is known as occupying the PB by force. The implications are that if the OpFor are detected on or around the designated PB, the patrol will quietly move away and designate a new position for the PB.



Upon reaching the center of the designated position for the PB, the PL will halt the patrol and indicate to the patrol members that they are at the PB. Each patrol member, except for the point man, drag man and PL, will face either left or right in an alternating pattern and take several steps out to form a cigar-shaped perimeter. This leaves the PL in the center, the point man at the 12 o'clock position, and the drag man at the 6 o'clock position.

Either the PL or element leaders will then ensure each man is behind adequate cover and assigned a sector of fire. As with the wagon wheel method, a minimum of the 12, 3, 6, and 9 o'clock positions must be maintained and covering their sector of fire.

PRIORITIES OF WORK FOR THE ORP

In the case of a PB, this mission is completed upon establishing the PB. However, the PB is still a means to an end, and another mission or a series of missions have already been planned and scheduled to take place within the next 24 hours. There is plenty of work to be done.

While the work priorities here are similar to the work priorities of the ORP, there are significant differences! Don't make the mistake of assuming everything is the same. What is spelled out below is the chronology of the work priority, though admittedly some of these tasks will be achieved concurrently with other tasks, and some tasks will not be necessary at all. Which tasks are mission-essential and which are not depends, of course, upon your mission.

Priorities of Work

1. *Security is always the first priority.* The ORP cannot be maintained at levels lower than 50 percent. That means, for example, if it is time for lunch, half of the patrol can eat quietly while the other half of the patrol maintains a vigilant guard of their sectors of fire.
2. *An alternate defensive position must be designated.* Typically, the PL will indicate to the element leaders that the ORP will serve as a fallback position in the event the PB is over-run. This information must then be disseminated to all of the patrol members.
3. *An ambush team must cover the trail into the PB.* At least two, and preferably four patrol members must backtrack approximately 100 meters from the 6 o'clock position and then step off of the trail. This ambush team will observe the trail for a half hour or so to be certain no OpFor has followed the patrol into their PB. This must be done immediately after the PB has been occupied!
4. *Communication must be established between all key positions.* Field phones and land lines should be run to at least the CP, 12 and 6 o'clock positions. OP/LP positions are not required in the PB.
5. *An R&S team must conduct a recon of the immediate area.* After communication has been established, the PL must pass the word that a two-man recon & security team will skirt the PB area just outside the visible sectors of fire. Everyone must be informed! Otherwise, you'll have patrol members firing on their own R&S team.
6. *Mines and flares may be implemented.* Once the R&S team confirms that the area immediately in front of the sectors of fire is relatively secure, those positions designated to employ mines or flares should carefully place them at the far end of their visible sectors of fire—but no more than 35 meters out.

7. *Hasty fighting positions may be constructed.* Barricades are the preferred method as digging and cutting are far too loud and may give away the position. If a 'shell scrape' is dug, care must be taken to camouflage the exposed earth.
8. *Plans are finalized or altered.* The patrol's missions may be altered slightly or significantly in time. The PL must make these adjustments and every member in the PB must be informed.
9. *Weapons must be cleaned.* This is particularly true if the patrol made contact while in route to the PB, or if the movement to the PB took considerable time and moved through a notably dirty environment—such as fording a river or being inserted onto a sandy beach. Still, no more than 50 percent of the patrol members may do this at one time. The other 50 percent pulls security.
10. *Sleep and eating plans may be initiated.* If the situation dictates, the PB may implement an eating and/or sleeping schedule. Of course, the necessary security must again be maintained.

Summary

The PB is where light infantry spend a disproportionate amount of their time when operating as a counter-insurgent, clandestine force. Indeed, it is the only relatively secure position that is afforded to patrols forward of the FEBA. As such, a concealed and secured implementation is essential. If the PB is at any time compromised, the PB must be moved immediately. It is just too vulnerable of a position and is not intended to be a defensive perimeter.

The common mistakes made by patrols when occupying and maintaining a PB include relaxing security and noise discipline, failing to conduct an initial ambush of the trail into the PB, and not implementing early warning devices such as trip flares, wired CS canisters, and anti-personnel mines. All of these infractions have a significant effect on the effort to keep the PB secure from attack. The results have been catastrophic. Again, a PB is not a defensive perimeter, and many troops act as if it is just that! Once inside the PB, they let their guard down as if they have re-entered an FFL. Only good leadership and excellent discipline by the troops can overcome this tendency.

Lessons Learned

As a squad leader in the 1/503rd Battalion of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, Ieti Teo was patrolling in the small mountains near Warrior Base, just south of the Korean De-Militarized Zone in the fall of 1995. His company had been walking for more than a day and the troops were very tired as they moved into a triangle-shaped patrol base.

The guides had established each apex by activating a chem-light (Cilium) and leaving it partially exposed in the darkness of the ground. The plan was that each guide would meet their platoon at the six o'clock position and walk them to the chem-light.

The first two platoons reached the six o'clock position and were properly placed between the ten to two o'clock apexes, and the six to ten o'clock apexes. The guide for the third platoon led his platoon on quite a lengthy romp through the mountain forest before, at long last, the guide spotted a glowing light from the ground. Exhausted, the guide announced to the platoon sergeant that the platoon was finally online. The platoon positioned itself into two-man buddy teams and the squad leaders assigned sectors of fire, just as they had trained. Curiously, no one—not the squad leaders, or platoon sergeant, or even the platoon leader bothered to make sure the extreme right and left positions were tied into the last men of the other two platoons of the company.

At first light, the company commander was quite surprised to find that the perimeter between the two to six o'clock apexes was completely vacant! Where was the platoon that was supposed to occupy that part of the company's patrol base? The commander's RTO got on the radio and asked the lost platoon for their location. The platoon leader seemed a bit confused and claimed that he was "in the patrol base". Asked to check to his left and right, the platoon leader came back on the radio in a couple minutes and demanded to know where everyone was, and why "the company was moved" without anyone telling him!

It seems that the platoon's guide from the night before had missed his chem-light marker completely, and having done so continued to move on azimuth until he saw what turned out to be a form of mountain moss that emits a soft luminous glow. The platoon, in fact, was one entire kilometer off target!

Lessons learned? Where should I begin? For starters, it's a very good idea that each guide walks his length of terrain prior to linking up with his element. He should be careful to pace off the distance and watch his azimuth so that he becomes familiar with the length of ground and the time it takes to navigate it. Secondly, the apex must be marked with something more formidable than merely a chem-light. A two-man security team is far more preferable...though the idea of a security team using a chem-light for which a guide may steer is a clever idea for nighttime occupation of the patrol base.

Last and not least is that each element leader must ensure that their far left and far right positions are tied securely into the other two elements (in this case platoons) of the patrol base! Without this precaution, there is no way to ensure that the sectors of fire at the apexes are interlocking. That shortfall could prove fatal under the pressure of an enemy probe or attack.

Tactical Battle Drill #9

ESTABLISH A HIDE POSITION

There are times when a small patrol operating forward of the FFL will need to take a rest without the hassles of implementing a PB. This happens for many reasons. Perhaps the patrol entailed a march that could not be achieved in a single day. Possibly the FFL retreated to a new position. Or, more commonly, the patrol itself is of such a small size that a full-blown PB is neither necessary nor feasible. In these cases, the patrol can opt to implement a hide position in order to eat and rest.

THE HIDE POSITION

The hide position, or simply 'hiding', is similar to the PB in that it is a perimeter that uses concealment for its primary defense. However, the hiding is not a position from which we will finalize plans or conduct missions. It is, as the name suggests, a place to hide from OpFor detection when a fire-team or squad-sized patrol needs to rest.



Courtesy of One Shepherd

For small patrols only! Note the two patrol members on the end pull security back-to-back.

Specifications of the Hiding

The hiding is established ideally no closer than 300 meters or a terrain feature away from any OpFor position. It is often placed in the most inhospitable terrain, such

as in thick patches of thorn bushes or jagged rock formations. While a bit uncomfortable, this terrain acts as a deterrent from the OpFor walking into the patrol's hiding.

The hiding offers 360° security in that the entire patrol is positioned shoulder to shoulder. Because the patrol is so close that they act as a single position, as few as two men can easily maintain this security. They do not require any other communication system other than word of mouth and, sitting back to back, they can cover a 360° sector of fire.

No one departs or re-enters the hide position! It is used for no more than 6 hours and is vacated when the entire patrol is ready to continue their march. Hidings are never re-used for fear that the OpFor will eventually discover this pattern and then easily overwhelm such a position.

THE 'BACK TO BACK' METHOD

This method is more practical for wooded and heavily vegetated terrain. Laying down in this type of terrain offers the watch team no view of the likely avenues of approach or escape. And frankly, if the patrol is exhausted enough that it has to use the hide position, placing the watch team on their bellies is just asking for trouble. An exhausted troop is much more likely to fall asleep lying down than sitting up—no matter how disciplined.

Sequence of Events

The PL will designate on a map the approximate area he wants to establish a hide position. Because the patrol is so small, the PL will take the hiding by force. More often than not, this entails a bit of walking around in the desired location until the patrol locates terrain very inconvenient to traverse. At that point, the PL halts the patrol and indicates to the patrol that they are in their hiding.

Patrol members move toward the PL's position until they are shoulder to shoulder, take a knee and face left and right in an alternating pattern. All patrol members drop their rucksacks. Half of the patrol members are designated to ready their sleeping bags and mats while the other half pull security. Once the first members have readied their sleeping positions as comfortably as possible, they sit on their equipment and pull security while the other members ready their sleeping bags and mats. No tents are pitched, no trip wires are implemented, and no fighting positions are prepared.

The PL determines how many members of the patrol will pull security and what the duration and schedule of the guard shifts will be. Typically, hidings require at least two men to pull security at a time, and *never less than 20 percent of the patrol*.

Since there will be no anti-personnel mines or trip flares used, CS canisters or fragmentation grenades are given to the first guard shift and then passed to subsequent guards. If the OpFor does walk nearby the patrol, great discipline must be enforced to allow the OpFor to pass by. On the other hand, in the unlikely case that the OpFor actually walks up onto the hiding patrol, grenades can be easily used on the OpFor while the patrol makes a quick escape. Direct fire should be strictly avoided at night since the muzzle flashes from the rifles and machineguns will disclose your position and give the OpFor an opportunity to suppress and destroy the small patrol.

Radios are handled in a similar manner—passed from guard to guard—to be sure that the patrol keeps in touch with higher command. If the hiding is conducted during nighttime hours, night vision devices are also passed from guard shift to guard shift.

THE 'STAR' METHOD

The star method is used for flat, open terrain such as a desert, high mountain tundra, or grasslands. In this type of terrain, sitting up is less feasible because your position will be disclosed to OpFor observation. So the entire patrol lies on the ground to lower their profiles.

The implementation of the star hide position goes much the same way as the back-to-back method, only that instead the troops interlock their ankles so that the watch team can kick the man to their left and right to an alert status without making noise. Also, the two-man watch team will not be right next to each other, but on opposite sides of the formation.



Courtesy of One Shepherd
The 'Star' Method—lying on their bellies, the patrol can kick each other to alert.

As you might have guessed, it might prove to be a daunting task to find terrain that is difficult to traverse in middle of the grassland prairie. The best a patrol could do would be to place a far distance between it and the enemy position and blend into the vastness of the countryside.

Summary

Hidings provide a reasonable security position for small patrols. However, when patrols become tired, undisciplined or lazy, hidings are often overused due to the low requirement of security. Hidings have their purposes. Attempting to use a hybrid of PB/ hide position will place the patrol members in great danger. These two security positions have completely different functions and a PL should never confuse the two! If a larger patrol needs rest, the PL must establish a PB and implement a sleep plan.

Lessons Learned

Having air assaulted during the last remaining light of day onto a small, sparsely treed rise in the dense Kentucky wilderness in 1987, A Company from the 3/187th Rakkassan Regiment, 101st Air Assault Division established a night defensive perimeter. With security established and all apexes of the defensive triangle interlocked with the machinegun to their left and right, an R&S team was dispatched to clear the area just outside of the company's visible sectors of fire.

A squad from 1st platoon moved quietly through the six o'clock position, proceeding 75 meters toward the thick tree line. Their route took them through a patch of lowland swamp, with knee-high grass and fallen logs crisscrossing the open field. It was now completely dark, and the humidity of the night began to fog the night vision goggles worn by each member of the patrol.

About 10 meters out from the tree line, the point-man came to yet another large fallen log to climb over. He glanced back patiently, waiting for the line of troops to make their way forward from the previous obstacle. Then, looking forward, he lifted his foot high and carefully placed it on the far side of the log. Immediately, the ground shifted and he lost his footing. The point-man sat with a thud, straddling the fallen tree.

Suddenly the opposite side of the log came alive with activity! A rifle bumped loudly against a limb of the dead tree and waived in front of the point-man, attempting to find a sight picture. Another figure rolled on the swamp floor, exactly where the point-man had stepped!

In a flash the squad leader and the remainder of the lead fireteam was upon two very surprised, and clearly agitated OpFor scouts from the 82nd Airborne Division. The squad leader grabbed the scout's flailing rifle, and shoved the barrel of his own M16 against the chest of the prone scout.

"Don't make me shoot you at this close distance," the squad leader said calmly. "Even with the blank adaptor on, the round will still burn you." And with that logic, both scouts yielded their position—now surrounded by the 9-man patrol.

Lessons learned? Well, first that R&S patrols are an effective measure when you're not certain what lies beyond your defensive perimeter! The 82nd Airborne scouts, it turns out, had parachuted in the day before and were dispatched in small teams over a very large area to observe likely LZ sites for their "enemy". A Company's landing had been observed and their whereabouts were known to the OpFor, judging from the long-range radios the OpFor scouts were carrying.

Secondly, the scouts had made poor judgment in placing their hide position so close to their enemy's perimeter. Surely they must have guessed that A Company would be too lazy to carry out proper security procedures. There is no other logic for being so close when there were other observation points further out. They carried no explosive simulators, so a sapper/sabotage mission seems unlikely.

Also, the scout team would have been much better off establishing a hide position within any of the numerous thorn patches that plague the Kentucky countryside. If they had chosen a relatively large patch, the 101st patrol would most likely have pursued another path after becoming burdened by such thicket.

All the way around, it seems the scouts chose a poor hide position. It was too close, too easily accessible, difficult to defend, and offered no escape route! You can imagine that the Rakkassans were well prepared for the OpFor attack that, predictably, came early the next morning.

Tactical Battle Drill #10

ESTABLISH A DEFENSIVE LINE

The Land Battle Doctrine reduces the job of the infantry to either attacking to seize territory, or conducting defensive operations to hold territory. So the defense, at least in theory, is half of what we do. Of course it isn't really a "battle drill" as much as it is a process. In fact, most of what you have read up to this point has involved patrolling techniques—which truly are drills—that may be used either to defend territory or to prepare for an attack. But it's only logical to include with all of these tactical battle drills the development of a defensive line, which is also known as a Forward Friendly Line.



A patrol leader emplaces a machinegun position and assigns a sector of fire.

Courtesy of One Shepherd

THE DEFENSE (FFL)

The defensive line is a static position near the FEBA that is intended to halt an OpFor attack into a specified area. Which is a fancy way of saying that a defense involves the traditional concept of a "front line". Unlike patrol bases, rally points and security halts, the FFL does not typically defend in 360° but rather loosely in a straight line. The FFL is not a continuous line of soldiers dug into the earth. It may tie one military unit with another unit, or with an area that is 'covered' by land mines,

chemical contamination, or simply impassable terrain such as a river. Of course it takes a great deal of coordination to be certain there are no gaps in the FFL.

Advantages of the Defensive Position


Terrain	The FFU will become familiar with the terrain of the FEBA. You should understand the terrain of your position as well as the OpFor's possible routes of attack—high speed avenues of approach and defiladed positions.
Position	The FFU will choose the most beneficial position to defend. This position must afford a clear view of the FOEBA while providing cover and concealment for each element member.
Logistics	While the FFU's resources must be distributed over a specified area, the supply lines are typically short for the defensive position. That means overwhelming firepower, immediate medical aid, and high morale.
C3	Command, Control and Communication lines are also much shorter. The advantages of which are too numerous to list here, but consider the coordination of firepower between elements and you get a quick understanding of the importance of interlocking fires.

Specifics of the FFL

The mission to establish a defensive line is given to an element of substantial size. Of course, the size of the element depends on the size of the territory to be defended. But as a general rule of thumb, establishing a defensive line is a task for at least a platoon and it may require a significantly larger element.

An FFL consists of developed fighting positions that form into a series of connected "lazy W's" in order to add depth to the defense and maximize the use of interlocking sectors of fire. Typically, the FFL defends against one direction in approximately a 120° frontal-fan that interlocks with friendly units or impassable terrain to the left and right of your element.

The level of security varies significantly, but generally no less than 25 percent...or as much as is required to man every other position. Key positions, such as machinegun and mortar emplacements, are constantly manned. Finally, remember that as the FFU your element will be called upon by other units whose mission will require them to coordinate passing through and re-entering your FFL. When tasked to this type of operation, every member of the FFU must be informed as to the coming and going of each patrol.



Sequence of Events

Prior to moving up to the FOEBA, the PL will be well informed as to the terrain and friendly units in the area, as well as the OpFor activity. A recon of the area will have been conducted—if not by the PL then at least by another element leader who can indicate these considerations on a map. The PL must be informed prior to undertaking such a mission.

The PL will then move the patrol into an ORP at an appropriate distance from the designated FFL position. Once the ORP has been established, the PL will conduct a leader's recon of the FOEBA and FFL. The PL must issue a five-point contingency plan with the APL before leaving on the recon.

The PL moves up to the FOEBA with at least a security team. The security team is placed in over-watch at the designated FFL position. This allows the PL to move more freely about the terrain to determine how best to place the defensive line. The leader's recon may require moving the entire recon team across the FOEBA to determine possible routes of OpFor attack. This information may be crucial in deciding how the FFL should be laid into place.

Once the PL makes up his mind and writes down a few helpful notes, the security team is given a five-point contingency plan and left over looking the FFL position to monitor the FOEBA. The PL returns to link up with the ORP.

At the ORP, the rest of the patrol has formed into elements that will make up the *left line*, *right line*, and may include an optional *middle line*. The PL will disseminate any

changes to the original plan at the ORP. Once everyone has understood these changes, the PL will lead the patrol and link up with the security team at the FFL. The order of march depends on the unit SOP, but if a middle line is used it will typically follow directly behind the PL. The left and right lines follow in the march.

Upon linking up with the security team and ensuring that no OpFor have recently moved in to pose a threat, the PL will position the middle line first. Then the right and left lines are position. With each element, the PL will designate the location of fighting positions for crew-served weapons and indicate their sectors of fire. Finally, the PL will designate a CP at an appropriate distance behind the line, somewhere towards the center of the entire patrol. The PL must choose a 'fall back' line—an alternate position that can still cover the same sector of the FOEBA. This information, and the location of the CP must be disseminated to every member of the patrol. Finally, the PL must coordinate with units to his left and right to be certain he has adequately filled the gap in the line. Supporting elements to the rear, such as medical aid, re-supply, and indirect fire must be informed of the new FFL and coordinated with as well.

At this point, the element leaders will take control of their elements. They will assign each member a fighting position and a sector of fire, ensuring that all sectors interlock with at least the position to their left and right. The element leader designates his own position and creates a sector sketch to illustrate the interlocking features of his element.

Element leaders designate each fighting position using a lazy 'W' format in order to interlock fires between positions. The fighting positions are all two-man positions, and are placed only close enough that they may mutually support each other's immediate front. Of course, the term "immediate front" will vary in actual distance according to different types of terrain. But at a minimum, the positions must be able to cover obstacles forward of the fighting positions. These obstacles, mines and concertina wire, are placed out of hand grenade range (40 meters or more) in front of the lazy 'W' and must be in full view of the fighting position so that the troops may employ grazing fires to defend the obstacles.

As many OP/LP's as necessary will be positioned forward of the FFL. These positions must be maintained while the fighting positions and wire/mined obstacles are emplaced.

With OP/LPs in place, communication must be established between key positions. This typically involves the use of field phones and landlines (wires). Field phones are more secure than radios and are not concerned with high traffic and frequency availability. And while field phones have significantly less range than 2-way radios, most field phones can transmit over the distance of one or more kilometers. That should be ample distance for a defensive position.

As the FFL develops, the PL collects the sector sketches from the element leaders to create his own master sketch of the FFL. This sketch will include all obstacles, particularly mine fields, and OP/LPs.

PRIORITIES OF WORK FOR THE FFL

An FFL continually develops its fighting positions. After all positions are dug and have adequate overhead cover, supply and communication trenches will be dug from the CP to key positions. Eventually, all positions may be included in this trench system. Equally as important to developing the FFL itself, is the continued monitoring of the FOEBA. This can be achieved to some degree from inside the FFL and its OP/LPs, but more likely will require reconnaissance and ambush patrols forward of the FEBA.

What follows below is simply a reiteration of what has already been delineated. It is included as a quick reference:

1. *Security is always the first priority!* The PL must make use of over-watching security teams and OP/LPs while developing the FFL.
2. *Assign key positions.* The positioning of mortar and machinegun crews must not be delegated to subordinate leaders. The PL must do this himself—from the beginning.
3. *Assign a secondary line.* The PL must designate a secondary defensive line that is capable of defending the same section of the FOEBA. This information will be disseminated to each member of the patrol.
4. *Establish communication.* As soon as element leaders take over their tasks, landlines must be run from the CP to all key positions, including the positions of the element leaders.
5. *Assign sectors of fire.* Element leaders must assign each member a sector of fire and be sure they are all interlocking. A sector sketch of the entire position must be made, including each fighting position and type, obstacles and emplaced mines, OP/LPs, and defiladed terrain in front of the element's line.
6. *Coordinate with your left and right.* The PL must now make sure his element ties in with its left and right limitations—those friendly units to his immediate left and right. Furthermore, if there will be supporting units to his rear, the PL will have to coordinate with them as well.
7. *Dig in.* Fighting positions must be advanced and obstacles emplaced. That is, after all, the nature of the mission to establish a defensive line.
8. *Sleep and eat.* Your element will probably be here for a while. Eating and rest plans will need to be developed. This will involve creating a guard shift schedule so that a minimum level of security can be maintained. Keep in mind that some events and times will require 100 percent security, such as stand-to in the early morning and each evening.

Summary

The defense has many advantages, however knowing exactly when and where (or even "if") an attack will come is definitely *not* one of those advantages. The defense of the FFL can be a tedious, even boring task. This is never more true than in inclement weather. With ice and/or rain the ground softens, and so does the alertness of our senses. We put on rain clothing, which further mutes our ability to see and hear an enemy force sneaking across the ground. It is an uncomfortably miserable situation, and it is perfect weather to attack. Keeping the troops vigilant and alert at these times will be a challenge of excellent leadership.

Lessons Learned

In the spring of 1983 at the National Training Center (dessert warfare) at Fort Irwin, California, Phil Cacace commanded an OpFor combined arms company—including both mechanized infantry and armor. He played the role of "enemy" for the US troops.

On one such occasion, Phil's company would spearhead the attack of the (fictitious) 73rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, destroying the US forces on a piece of terrain affectionately known as the "Whale" so that the rest of the regiment could pass that chokepoint and envelope the US defense at the rear. The plan required the company to dash online across a vast stretch of open dessert in plane view of the enemy's frontal defense, then split apart and attack into the numerous valleys and draws that characterized the Whale's front. It was a risky and daunting task.

The company revved their vehicles and, at the designated time, hit their SP at an impressive 45 mph! Zooming across the dessert floor, they kicked up a plume of dust thick enough to give some concealment from US gunners. Furthermore, the tracking systems on some of the anti-armor weapons systems could not track a vehicle moving at that pace. Phil's company covered the terrain at an alarming speed.

The ditch and wire obstacles that the US troops had placed forward of their fighting position in anticipation of slowing the onslaught did very little. The armored vehicles merely jumped the ditches at that speed, and wire gave easily to M113 APC and M551 tanks dressed up to look like Soviet armor. The breach of the obstacles was completed almost instantaneously. The company of 73rd MRR vehicles rendezvoused only momentarily at the foot of the steep hill—safely tucked beneath the view of the US gunners in a defilade. They identified their perspective valleys and assaulted in so quickly that they did not have time to dismount their infantry!

The US troops were overwhelmed by the speed and hard-hitting effect of the armored force. The OpFor was now solidly in the rear of their defense and between their

elements. There was nowhere to go. Phil recalls the look of total disbelief on one US machine gunner's face as he spun his gun and tried to fire on the vehicles to his rear.

Lessons learned? (1) The defense must coordinate each weapon system to be used at the maximum range allowable by terrain in order to engage the enemy as far out as possible. (2) Dead space must be adequately covered or the enemy will use it against us. (3) We must defend in depth, so that a breach in the line does not compromise the entire defense. (4) The defense must identify and develop alternate positions that will allow the unit to defend the same sector of terrain in the event the unit must fall back.

Section V

TACTICAL BATTLE DRILLS:

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Tactical Battle Drill #11

THE RECONNAISSANCE

Let me point out that the recon is the *only* combat patrol in which the objective is NOT to make contact with the enemy. So let me be very clear on this. The “unspoken goal” of a recon patrol is to never fire their weapons!

If the enemy suspects your patrol has compromised any information regarding their resources, they will simply move those resources. And all of your hard work will be for nothing! You will have failed, miserably. Understand?

So why reconnoiter? Well, recon patrols provide timely and accurate information on the enemy's resources and activities, as well as on the terrain surrounding the enemy forces. Without this information, all of the other types of combat patrols are pretty much useless. A raid, ambush or deliberate attack would be nothing more than random shots in the dark.

Your goal as a recon patrol is to observe the enemy *without being detected*. The commander will task a patrol out to a designated area or zone of the map on which intelligence is needed. The commander will also establish Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) for those resources the recon patrol must pay particular attention.

Of course, there are many things to do and consider while planning and conducting a recon patrol. The following tips are things your patrol should NEVER do:

- Never visually or audibly disclose your presence to the OpFor
- Never leave trash or debris during a patrol
- Never tamper with the OpFor or their equipment
- Never fire upon the OpFor—UNLESS your patrol is being fired upon.

AREA RECON

Known to some old timers as the “point recon”, the area recon is used to gather information about a specific location on a map (such as a bridge, hilltop, or road junction), and the area immediately surrounding that location. Typically, no more than a two-man team is dispatched to conduct the reconnaissance, although sometimes a second two-man team may be sent if a large area is involved. The small teams are intended to minimize the chance of being detected, and to allow quick coordination as they withdraw from the targeted area.



A reconnaissance patrol enters the treeline on the far side of the FEBA.

Courtesy of One Shepherd

Sequence of events

Upon occupying the ORP, the PL confirms the location of the ORP and the targeted area of reconnaissance. All special equipment is prepared for use, and plans are finalized (a leader's recon forward of the ORP should not be necessary, but is an option). The PL will issue contingency plans to the three security teams--left, right and ORP--and recon team(s).

The left and right security teams are dispatched from the ORP first. They will take up positions along high-speed avenues of approach, no further than 300 meters to the left and right of the targeted area. These security teams will alert the recon team(s) of enemy activity as enemy enter or move out of the targeted area. Security teams feed this information either directly to the recon team, or through the security team leader in the ORP.

Once in position, the PL will dispatch the two-man recon team(s) to approach the targeted area. Typically, the PL remains behind at the ORP and acts as the security team leader. However, the PL may opt to move as part of a recon team and leave another patrol member in charge of the ORP and security teams.

Single Team Method: Using the clock method, the recon team approaches the targeted area from its closest point. This point now becomes the six o'clock position of the targeted area. The recon team will observe all enemy activity and resources, getting as close as their concealment will allow.


The recon team records all pertinent information:

- A sketch of their vantage point, including terrain and enemy structures
- An exact number of enemy personnel sighted
- A descriptive list of all equipment, uniforms and markings
- The time of guard shift, eating and sleeping shift rotations
- The direction, time, and size of any patrols coming or going from the area.

The recon team then maneuvers to the approximate nine o'clock position and repeats their observation and recording activities. They will continue on to the twelve o'clock position, then the three o'clock position, giving the recon team information from all four vantage points...if such a maneuver is possible. At a bare minimum, the recon team must observe the targeted area from two over-lapping vantage points. And as always, time is a factor. The PL must take into account appropriate amounts of time into his plan, and the recon team must be constantly aware of their time constraints.

Double Team Method: Because time is limited, a PL may choose to dispatch two recon teams to the targeted area, to speed up the gathering of intelligence. To coordinate this so that there is little chance of the two recon teams actually making contact, the teams are assigned opposite vantage points.

Both teams are dispatched together, and proceed toward the closest point of the targeted area. Upon locating this six o'clock position, a designated recon team would then withdraw slightly, and proceed to the approximate twelve o'clock position.



Both recon teams record the same pertinent information as mentioned above. However, the recon team at the six o'clock position will proceed only to the vantage point of the nine o'clock position, and then return to the ORP. Likewise, the recon team at the twelve o'clock position will proceed only to the three o'clock vantage point, and then return to the ORP.

Dissemination of Information: Once the recon team(s) return to the ORP, all information must immediately be disseminated among every member of the recon patrol. If there is time, additional copies of the vantage point sketches and lists should be made. This will increase the likeliness of the gathered information making it back to the FFL if the patrol is ambushed in route.

The PL moves the recon patrol back to the FFL through a pre-designated route. Upon arrival inside the FFL, the PL and members of the patrol report directly to their commander.

ZONE RECON

The zone recon is used to gather information within a specific zone on a map (such as in a valley, along a road, or within a village). Typically, a squad of two fireteams is dispatched to conduct this type of reconnaissance, though a smaller element may do. The larger team quickly covers the larger area involved, and offers better security for the patrol.


Sequence of events

The sequence depends greatly upon which method is being used. For smaller zones, a buddy team patrol will be appropriate. A fireteam-sized patrol would also likely use the butterfly method, since coordinated movement of a large recon patrol would be difficult using this method. However, a larger zone will require a larger recon team to cover the area. A squad-sized patrol will utilize the converging route method. The sequence of both methods are described below.

Butterfly Method: The PL halts the patrol in an ORP once the patrol has entered the targeted zone. All equipment is prepared and plans are finalized. No leader's recon will be conducted. Instead, the fireteam is divided into two recon teams--minus the PL who will secure the ORP. The PL then establishes a sort of on-going contingency plan for each time the patrol must split up.

Remembering that the patrols primary direction of travel indicates the 12 o'clock position, the first recon team is sent out of the ORP's six o'clock position and will wrap around the ORP clockwise. This team will move in toward the ORP at approximately the nine o'clock position, then continue on to the twelve o'clock position completing the left wing of the "butterfly". The first team will re-enter the ORP at the twelve o'clock position, within the time allotment designated by the PL.

At the same time the first recon team is headed out, the second recon team heads out in the opposite direction--from the ORP's twelve o'clock position. This team will also move around the ORP in a clockwise direction to avoid contact with the first recon team. The second team will move in toward the ORP at approximately the three o'clock position, then continue on to the six o'clock position to complete the right wing of the "butterfly". The second team will re-enter the ORP at the six o'clock position, within the time allotment designated by the PL.



The distance each recon team will travel out from the ORP depends greatly on the needs of the mission, the visibility of the terrain and the size of the zone. The PL will establish this in the ORP. But the function of the recon team is clear. They will gather all information regarding the enemy and the OpFor resources. These patrols should pay particular attention to moving enemy patrols, or signs of such movement. These signs include:

- Foot trails
- Fresh trash and cigarette butts along trails
- Boot prints and vegetation bent or pushed down, and the direction of travel
- Vegetation pressed down at enemy security stops--how many pressed spots?

Ultimately, these patrols look OpFor movement, the size of their patrols, and the direction of OpFor patrols. Also of great importance is the type of activity. For example, is the enemy running re-supply routes or ambush patrols? If an OpFor patrol base, outpost or resource (such as a mine field or water source) is located within your zone, these must be thoroughly investigated.


Upon returning to the ORP, each recon team disseminates its information among each member of the patrol. If anything of significance is found, it is best that each man makes a written record to keep with him until the patrol returns to the FFL.

The PL will lead the recon patrol out to the next ORP in the targeted zone, and this entire process repeats itself until the PL is satisfied that he has adequately covered the targeted zone. At that time, the PL moves the recon patrol back to the FFL and disseminates all information to his/her commander.

Converging Route Method: The significant difference between the converging route method and the butterfly method is that with the converging routes, the two fireteams will NOT meet again until they rendezvous at the far side of the zone! This means that not only does a rendezvous point need to be clearly established on a visible piece of terrain or land mark...but a near recognition hand signal must be established to ensure that the fireteams do not mistakenly follow each other's patrol. (Or worse yet, actually fire upon each other!)

The PL halts the recon patrol in its ORP. All equipment is prepared and plans are finalized. No leader's recon will be conducted. Instead, the PL will divide his patrol into two fireteams. The PL must travel with one fireteam. The PL then establishes an on-going contingency plan until the fireteams link up again. This plan MUST include:

- A near recognition hand signal
- A far-side rendezvous point.



With a far-side rendezvous point established on an easy-to-find landmark or terrain feature, the two fireteams depart. They will move down parallel paths through the targeted zone, stopping from time to time to conduct recons using the butterfly method. Only instead of designating a series of smaller ORPs for each fireteam, these are now informal rally points.

In this manner, a zone twice the width can be covered. The patrol will move faster as well, because there will be a quick, informal dissemination of information each time the two-man recon teams come together in their rally points. The patrols look for the same information as mentioned earlier, giving special attention to enemy patrol movement. Again, the danger here is making contact with the adjacent fireteam. In these cases, both teams should simply give the near recognition hand signal, and move on their way.

Once the targeted zone has been covered, both fireteams link up at the designated rendezvous point. The PL takes charge of the dissemination of all collected information, making certain that each member of the patrol receives the information. The PL then moves the recon patrol around the targeted zone--if possible--and back to the FFL. A decision to go back through the targeted zone carries with it the possibility of an enemy ambush, if in fact the OpFor observed your movement. Upon arrival in the FFL, the PL will disseminate his/her information to the commander.

Summary

First and foremost is that a good reconnaissance involves getting the necessary information, and then getting away clean. No shooting means a successful recon patrol. Another lesson to keep in mind is to look at OpFor patrols and positions in the same manner we look at our own. Using the acronyms METT-T(C) and OCOKA, and answering the six "W"s (who, what, when, where, why and how) allows you to cover all considerations of pertinent information. Which means that at a minimum, you'll need to bring with you a reliable pen and paper on which to write. Finally, special equipment can make or break the recon patrol. If it will be conducted at night, night optical devices must be employed. If a raid or deliberate attack is your ultimate goal, a Polaroid or digital camera will prove invaluable! Remember, no matter how clever your implementation of method or equipment, a good reconnaissance relies upon stealth.

Lessons Learned

During a field training exercise with One Shepherd, a squad moved cautiously through a sector executing a well-planned movement to contact. At one point the PL, a young Greek troop by the name of George Chronis, decided to send a two-man recon team forward to check out a choke point in the terrain of his sector. George gave the men clear picture of his intent and issued the team a contingency plan. The two troops dispatched over grassy knolls and disappeared into a lush tree line.

Not long after entering the tree line, the recon came upon an OpFor base camp held by a very small contingent of enemy. One troop took up a good position in over-watch, while the second chose to enter the base camp. He lifted the flap of a lean-to and found an "enemy" sleeping at his feet. A quick double-tap rang out, and an instant later came the response of small arms fire from the opposite side of the OpFor camp. The recon team extracted themselves very quickly, not wanting to be ensnared in a fight on their own.

When they returned to the rest of the patrol, George was furious! There were many questions. The patrol had been given a mission to clear that sector. Now the enemy knew of his patrol's presence, and probably knew he was coming their way. George felt he had no choice but to go forward or else fail in his mission. Hoping that the enemy had chosen to take flight, the PL lead his team into the precarious situation and...well, let's just say he didn't fare too well. The terrain offered a distinct disadvantage to his maneuver element, and the OpFor was waiting in ambush for his arrival. Good thing this was just training!

Lesson learned? Unless we are ordered otherwise (or our lives depend upon it) never take anything, never leave anything, and never kill anyone on the objective during a recon! I don't care how many times you saw it in the movies. Can I be any more clear about this?

Additionally, it might be said that as leaders we must constantly re-evaluate our mission. It is quite right to give higher command a clear picture of how the battlefield is changing in front of us, and to ask for guidance. In this case, the PL could have requested more resources to accomplish the task, or even asked for more time so that the patrol could move against the OpFor at a more comfortable pace.

Don't assume that all time hacks are written in stone. In truth, these are often more arbitrary than the military would like to admit, and there is no harm in taking the additional time to complete the task at minimal costs. A leader should not make the fatal mistake of allowing the urgency of time to play into the OpFor's favor.

Tactical Battle Drill #12

THE AMBUSH!

Finally—some action! Some pay off. You'll find nothing but exciting action from here until the end of this book. And the ambush has the greatest potential of pay off for all your hard work. It's where light infantry patrols earn their dollar, so you'd better read this chapter, then read it again until it's ingrained in your mind.

We're going to talk about the two classifications of ambush, *near* and *far*. We'll also discuss the two most common types of employing methods from a list of many, *linear* and *the 'L'*. The reasons for an ambush are too numerous to list, but when weighing the choice between conducting a near or far ambush the choice is simple. You must only determine whether you have the resources to overwhelm and destroy your target, or if you will merely damage it. The method for employing an ambush depends upon the principals of METT-T(C). [For advanced uses see Appendix A "Ambush Methods".]



Courtesy of One Shepherd

THE NEAR AMBUSH

The near ambush is used to *overwhelm* the target. That means your ambush patrol should be larger than the OpFor patrol. The general rule of thumb is a 2:1 ratio, however near ambushes have been successfully conducted on a 1:1 ratio—meaning the patrol ambushed an OpFor element equal to its own size. But we NEVER employ a near ambush on an OpFor element larger than our own patrol!

‘Tenacity’ is the key to a successful ambush—violence on the objective! The near ambush uses pure, physical shock to carry its momentum and stun its target. To achieve this, the ambush patrol must act as one body, one force. This is not hype. I’m very serious about this point. The ambush patrol must keep a vigilant watch over their comrades in arms, they must communicate quickly and effectively, and when that first shot of the initiating weapon cracks its report—*everyone should shoot!* It must sound like deafening thunder! It should sound like a firing squad! In effect, it is a firing squad.

The alternative to acting as one body, one force is disappointing at best, and disastrous at worst. If the initiating individual fires his weapon on a near ambush and the ambush team slowly crescendos their rate of fire as each member attempts to find a suitable target...well, this gives the OpFor element plenty of time to react. They will turn on their heels, rush into your line, and play havoc on your heroic plans. They will viciously fight for their lives! And where will your precious ambush patrol be then? Still trying to pick out targets of opportunity to plink at? Hah. More probably they’ll be dead.


So let’s get this straight—right from the beginning. A high volume of fire has more shock value than accurate fire. Your effort in a near ambush is to *shock* then *overwhelm* the target. In order to do this your patrol must act as a single entity and shoot rapidly when they hear the initiating shot of the ambush! If you want to play ‘sniper’...then use a far ambush. That stuff is not for the near ambush. You will be so close to the OpFor in a near ambush that you can smell them. You don’t need competition marksman skills here. Okay?

As a final note before we get into the working parts of the near ambush, I will use the linear ambush as my model for implementing the near ambush. There are many other methods of near ambush—all of which are listed in detail in Appendix A of this manual. Any of these are fine choices, depending on the terrain of the kill zone, but they all require significantly more coordination than the linear method. Most near ambushes use the linear method because of its ease of coordination. And when planning for tactics, it’s best to use the old axiom of KISS—“Keep It Simple, Stupid”.

Specifics of the Near Ambush

The near ambush has a different mission than the far ambush. As such, the near ambush has unique characteristics. The characteristics of the near ambush are:

- The near ambush is designed to *overwhelm* the OpFor target.
- The near ambush is *never* implemented on targets larger than itself.
- The near ambush is conducted *within* hand grenade range.
- The near ambush employs obstacles on the *far side* of the kill zone.
- The near ambush is composed of *three* elements, the Security Team, the Support Team, and the Assault Team.



Sequence of Events—Linear Method

The patrol will occupy an ORP an appropriate distance away from the designated ambush site. The PL will pull together his leader's recon team and issue a five-point contingency plan to the APL prior to leaving for the recon. At a minimum the leader's recon will include the PL, a two-man security team, and either the leader of the assault team or the support team (whichever team he will *not* personally lead).

At the designated ambush site, the PL ensures that it is an appropriate terrain (using OCOKA). He does this without contaminating the kill zone—meaning he shouldn't actually walk through or onto the kill zone, but should move around to view it from the far right, far left and from the middle of his intended ambush lineup. If the terrain is not suitable for a near ambush, the PL must choose the closest site available to implement an ambush.

The PL will then post the two-man security team just back from the middle of the intended ambush lineup. This point will later become the Release Point. The security team is positioned back to back, with one man facing the kill zone and the other facing back in the direction of the ORP. The PL will leave these men with a five-point contingency plan and return to the ORP. The security team must monitor all OpFor activity and report this to the PL upon his return, especially if the OpFor has stopped on or near the ambush site.

After returning to the ORP, the PL coordinates any changes to the original plan with every member of the ambush patrol. Final preparations are conducted in the ORP, and the PL pulls together the patrol. The order of march will be the PL, the Security Team, the Support Team, and finally the Assault Team. This is exactly the order of march because this is exactly the order in which a near ambush is set in!

The PL leads the patrol to the security team at the Release Point. He links up the two-man security team with their Security Team Leader. If the intended location of the left and right side security can be seen from the Release Point, the PL will have the Security Team Leader place his teams into position. If the locations cannot be seen, the PL positions the left and right security teams, *taking the Security Team Leader with him*.

Once the left and right security teams are in position, the PL returns to the Release Point and picks up the Support Team. He positions them online, in front of the Release Point, and offset slightly to the left or right. The PL returns back to the Release Point and picks up the Assault Team. They, too, are placed online in front of the Release Point and take the opposite (left or right) side of the Support Team.


With everyone in place, the PL will take his place as the leader of either the Support or the Assault team (this is determined early on in the OpOrder). He will typically conduct a communication system check, and then everyone settles down for a nice, long wait. Security is kept at 100 percent. No sleeping!

The ambush patrol continues to wait in position until:

- The PL gives the "time" signal that indicates the patrol must return.
- The PL gives the "no fire" signal and allows a large OpFor team to pass.
- OR...the ambush is initiated!

The ambush patrol fires upon the kill zone only when:

- The PL initiates fire against the OpFor in the kill zone.
- OR—if the OpFor fires upon the ambush patrol.



Actions on the Objective

The actions on the objective will take no longer than one minute to complete!

All members of the ambush patrol fire into the kill zone—regardless of whether or not they see a specific target. The only exceptions may be the security teams who may not have a clear view of the kill zone.

The PL gives the signal to 'cease fire', to 'shift fire' or to 'lift fire' according to the OpOrder. At this moment, the PL must determine if it is reasonably safe for the assault team to move across the kill zone.

If the Assault Team will cross the kill zone, it will conduct the following actions in exactly this order:

1. Sweep the kill zone online, being certain to double tap all OpFor.
2. Secure the far side of the kill zone.
3. Send the necessary specialty teams back into the kill zone to search for PIR, POW, friendly casualties, or demolition teams to destroy weapons/radios.

The Assault Team Leader then give a signal to the PL indicating that the far side of the kill zone is secure and that the specialty teams have finished their tasks. The Assault Team will secure the far side of the kill zone until it receives the signal to pull back.



The PL then gives the signal for the Assault Team to fall back through the Release Point to the ORP. The Assault Team does this without hesitation and does *not* wait for any other team.

The PL gives the signal for the Support Team to fall back through the Release Point to the ORP. The Support Team does this immediately. Last, the PL will give the signal for the Security Team to fall back through the Release Point and move to the ORP. The PL will wait for the Security Team at the Release Point and move back to the ORP with this element. In this manner, the ambush has displaced in the exact reverse order that it was emplaced.

Reconsolidate & Reorganize

The first element to get back to the ORP should be the Assault Team. This means that the Assault Team leader is in command of the ORP and will form a 360° security until a senior leader replaces him. Ammunition and water must be distributed as needed. Casualties must receive medical aid. This will continue until all elements and the PL have returned to the ORP.

Once every member is accounted for, the PL will ask for a sensitive equipment check. Patrol members account for their assigned equipment by physically touching the item.

After the sensitive equipment has been accounted for, the PL will allow for the dissemination of PIR to all members of the patrol. This is necessary because, should the patrol become engaged and take casualties, the PIR must be relayed to higher command upon the patrols return. If the PL is the only patrol member informed of the PIR and the PL becomes a casualty, then the effort of the patrol would be lost.

The designated route of return and plans to carry/evacuate casualties and/or POWs will be followed in accordance with the OpOrder. Continue the Mission.

THE FAR AMBUSH

Now this is fun. The far ambush is nothing less than a grandiose sniper mission. After all, if one sniper team is good, then half a dozen or more is even better, right? Just throw in a machinegun position or two and you've got impressive sniping power! And hey, if you're expecting OpFor armored vehicles as a target, just add in a few rocket launchers. You know, anti-armor ambushes involve several two-man camouflaged elements known as 'hunter-killer teams'. How is that any different than the sniper and his spotter? Sure, it's all the same.



Courtesy of One Shepherd
Due to significant distances, skilled marksmen are key to the success of the far ambush.

The goal of the far ambush isn't to overrun its target. In fact, there isn't even an assault team for a far ambush. The goal is to *inflict damage* on the OpFor. That's it. You can get as fancy as you want. And for the sake of our discussion on the far ambush, we will use the 'L' ambush method as a sample model. A complete list of all ambush methods and their appropriate applications can be found in Appendix A of this manual.

Specifics of the Far Ambush

The far ambush also has characteristics unique to itself. Those characteristics of the far ambush are:

- The far ambush is designed to *inflict damage* to the OpFor target.
- The far ambush *can be* implemented on targets larger than itself.
- The far ambush is well *outside* hand grenade range.
- The far ambush employs obstacles on the *near side* of the kill zone.
- The far ambush is composed of *two* elements, the Security and Support teams.
- The far ambush **MUST** establish quick routes of escape.

Sequence of Events—The 'L' Method

Once inside an ORP that has been established at an appropriate distance away from the intended ambush site, the PL will pull together a team to conduct the leader's recon. This team will include the PL and the entire Security Team. Prior to heading out on the recon, the PL will leave the Support Team Leader with a five-point contingency plan.

The PL will move the recon team to the intended ambush site and post the Security Team in a position that affords a complete view of the ambush site. Then the PL and the Security Team Leader will move to the far left, far right and middle to determine if the terrain is appropriate, where to place the Security and Support teams, and to identify routes of escape. Furthermore, the kill zone must have some type of natural obstacle between the OpFor and the ambush patrol to slow down the OpFor's counter attack...such as a wide open field, a creek bed, or better yet a cliff. If no natural obstacle exists, then a man-made obstacle will have to be employed and camouflaged. Man-made obstacles include concertina wire and/or land mines. If the terrain is simply inappropriate for this mission, another location must be chosen nearby.

When the PL has chosen an ambush site and made decisions as to where the Security and Support teams will be placed, he will position the entire Security Team toward the middle of the ambush line so that they can view the terrain of the site. The PL will leave a five-point contingency plan with the Security Team Leader and return to the ORP.

Back at the ORP, any changes to the original plan will be disseminated among every patrol member. Final preparations are completed and the Support Team is formed

together. The Support Team will break into two parts, Support Team A and Support Team B, according to the OpOrder. Support Team A will follow the PL, with Support Team B pulling up the drag. The PL will link up the Support teams with the Security Team.

This link up point is the Release Point. Here the PL will release each element to its element leader. He will reiterate to the Security Team Leader where he wants the left and right Security teams to be placed, and the Security Team Leader will place his teams as he determines. Once in place, the PL will point to the positions of both of the Support teams. The Support Team Leader will place his teams as he determines is best. The PL will move with whichever of the two Support teams he decides will give him the best view of the kill zone and command of the elements.


Now, with all elements in place, the PL will conduct a communication systems check. The entire patrol will wait in place for the ambush to initiate. In the far ambush, due to the distance between elements, the left or right side security will often be the first to see the OpFor element and will have to keep the PL posted on their movements and estimated time of arrival.

It is unlikely that the OpFor will detect the ambush patrol in a far ambush mission. Still, the same rules apply to the far ambush that apply to the near ambush:

- The PL gives the "time" signal that indicates the patrol must return.
- The PL gives the "no fire" signal and allows a large OpFor team to pass.
- OR...the ambush is initiated!

The ambush patrol fires upon the kill zone only when:

- The PL initiates fire against the OpFor in the kill zone.
- OR—if the OpFor fires upon the ambush patrol.



Actions on the Objective

The actions on the objective will depend upon the OpFor element's ability to react. If the ambush is going well—no counter attack is made, no other OpFor elements come to their aid, or no artillery fire is called in on the ambush patrol—then the far ambush may continue to fire until the OpFor escapes from the kill zone or the ambush patrol use up all of the ammunition designated for this mission. This may take a minute, this may take an hour. Of course that doesn't mean use *all* of your ammunition! You still have to escape. And remember, the longer you stay, the more likely the OpFor is able to position a counter-attack or counter-ambush.

Both Support teams will automatically withdraw to the ORP when the PL gives the signal to 'cease fire'. There is no need to pass through the Release Point. This will waste time due to the distance between elements.

The PL will be traveling with one of the Support teams. Once he calculates that he has passed the imaginary line equal to the Release Point, he will signal the Security Team to withdraw. The Security Team Leader *will* rally his element in a concealed area *behind* the Release Point to make certain he has accounted for his entire team. Then the Security Team will proceed to the ORP.

Reconsolidate & Reorganize

The PL should be the first back to the ORP and will form that element into a 360° security and hold the ORP until all patrol members are assembled. Ammunition and water must be distributed as needed. Casualties must receive medical aid. This will continue until all elements and the PL have returned to the ORP.

Once every member is accounted for, the PL will ask for a sensitive equipment check. All patrol members will account for their assigned sensitive equipment (weapons, radios, night vision devices, etc.) by physically touching the item.

Far ambushes do not specifically attempt to gain PIR, however, any significant information must be quickly disseminated. The designated route of return and plans to carry/evacuate casualties will be established in the OpOrder. Continue the Mission.

Summary

On the near ambush, the most common mistakes is the failure to fire after the initial shot. This slow escalation of the ambush patrol's fire gives the OpFor target vital seconds with which to react. A squad-sized ambush patrol will typically engage targets for only 15-seconds of fire! That's enough time to shoot two magazines at the rapid-fire rate. So you can imagine that the most confusing scenario for the ambush patrol members is when the OpFor target has moved into the kill zone and instead of hearing an initiating shot from the PL, the patrol members hear an audible 'click'. This means the PL's weapon has misfired (or the initiating machinegunner's weapon). In this instance, *the 'click' must be treated as the initiating shot*. If it isn't treated as such, the first shot will come from the OpFor! So much for your tenacity and shock value.

Far ambushes take a lot of care to plan a route of escape, but then make the mistake of staying too long. The targets of opportunity are usually rich in the far ambush, and the risk of personal injury is much less significant than in the near ambush. This advantage creates the tendency of leaders in the far ambush to stay too long. The OpFor will invariably determine your position and maneuver to your rear section. That means all of the carefully planned escape routes are worth nothing, useless! It takes a cool head and a careful balance for the PL to know when they have inflicted about as much damage as necessary, and when to withdraw. Remember, the goal of the far ambush is not to completely destroy the OpFor...just to *inflict damage*.

Lessons Learned

In the central highlands of Vietnam, 1966, an experienced Special Forces sergeant led a small band of Montagnards into a near ambush position. This would be one of several networked ambushes that would envelop the enemy as they attempted to escape a massive attack by a main force of the U.S. Army. Everything was planned and set as the ambush team laid into position.

Somewhere in middle of the night, as the U.S. troops hit the enemy hard at the mass of their defenses, the enemy lines began to collapse into chaos. The mountain passes rang out with explosive ambushes, each netting some enemy activity. For Staff Sergeant C.A. Bless, the enemy came running down the path in the opposite direction, trying to reinforce the defenses rather than flee. Their numbers were much too large for the sergeant's team, and many of the enemy carried B-40 shoulder-fired rockets.

In the excitement of the moment, the sergeant initiated contact with the enemy in his kill zone. The initial volley of fire had quite an impressive effect, but this feeling of elation was quickly held in check by the return fire of rockets exploding along the ambush team's line.

The ambush team broke contact and headed down their escape paths as fast as possible, having taken several casualties themselves. The confusion escalated further when a fork in the mountain pass confused the wounded patrol. The sergeant took the wrong turn and only realized this when he came to a clearing he didn't recognize. A rifle shot rang out from the far tree line, striking the sergeant through the cheek and sending him to the ground. He stood again, and retreated under fire back up the mountain path. Again the sergeant was shot, this time in the lower back over his kidney, but he continued to run along the path until his ambush team found the correct turn in the path and finally located the PZ. Helicopters safely extracted the entire team.


Lessons learned? Don't EVER shoot at something bigger than your team in a near ambush! And plan those escape routes carefully—walk them prior to mission, if at all possible.

Tactical Battle Drill #13

THE RAID

The raid is the most difficult task given to any infantry patrol. It requires the coordination of sound intelligence collected from a well conducted reconnoiter, perfect timing, stealth, and nothing less than brilliant leadership. As such, planned raids must be rehearsed until every individual understands his/her role, position and timing...AND the role, position and timing of every single member of the raiding patrol!

Good intelligence, special equipment, thorough rehearsals, and brilliant leadership are all necessary and essential for the successful raid.



Physical dynamics

Raids are implemented to temporarily overwhelm stationary targets deep within enemy territory. They are used to destroy or capture enemy resources, or to destroy or capture enemy personnel, or to liberate personnel allied with your cause. In any case, the success of your patrol depends on its ability to complete the task and then quickly fade into the surrounding terrain.

Your patrol will be in a dynamic position, while the enemy will be in a static position. This is just the opposite of an ambush. The enemy will likely have good communications with reinforcements in the immediate surroundings, making your patrol all the more vulnerable to a counter-attack. This fact dictates that severe time constraints exist from the moment the raid begins, until the moment your patrol withdraws from the objective.

Obviously, a raid will be much more successful if your patrol has the element of surprise. To maximize this surprise, attack at a time when the enemy is least likely to expect an attack. Attack when visibility is limited. And, if possible, attack from an unexpected avenue of approach—such as through seemingly impassable terrain.

Finally, a raid must utilize a certain “shock effect”. This comes in the form of violence on the objective. Surprise, a generous dose of firepower, and a tenacious attack stun and disorientate the enemy. The psychological effect of violence should not be underestimated. If the enemy on the objective believe that your patrol is actually much larger than it is due to your use of massed firepower and violence, they are less likely to stand and fight your assaulting team. Furthermore, after your patrol has withdrawn from the objective, the enemy will pursue your patrol much less aggressively if they believe your numbers are very large.


Elements of the raid

This again is very similar to the ambush. The raiding patrol breaks down into three main elements, the security team, the support team, and the assault team.

The security team is most commonly deployed to the left, right and sometimes rear of the raiding formation as it is deployed around the objective. They carry rifles, light machineguns, anti-personnel mines and possibly some anti-armor capabilities to stave off any reinforcing vehicles. Their main purpose is to deter the enemy from reinforcing the objective, and to seal the escape of any enemy running from the objective.

The support team is commonly deployed center of the raiding formation in such a manner that they have a clear view of the objective. They carry heavier weapons of mass destruction, such as machineguns, and grenade or rocket launchers. This team is primarily responsible for the shock effect, as well as inflicting as many casualties upon the enemy as possible to ensure the success of the assaulting team.

The assault team is deployed as closely to the objective as stealth and coordinated fire support allow. They are lightly armed with rifles but may have special equipment carried with them. This team is responsible for the destruction, capture, or liberation of the target. And upon assaulting across the objective, they are also the most exposed—and least armed element of the raid.



Raids also have sub-groups within the assault team. Examples of these specialty teams would include demolition or EOD teams, NBC recovery teams for Hazmat items, grab teams for abduction, POW & search teams for PIR, and aid & litter teams for wounded patrol members. Of course, you won't need all of these teams on a single raid unless you are a 007 agent who was sent to save the world from a mad scientist whose nuclear bomb was implemented in this dastardly act of terrorism whilst a ravenously beautiful model-turned-engineer was bound and gagged within the blasting radius of this all-too-familiar Hollywood device of destruction. Just so you know.

Sequence of events

Once the ORP has been properly secured and occupied, the patrol leader WILL conduct a leader's recon of the objective. As a minimum, he will take with him a two-man security team, and the leader of the support or assault team (whichever one he will not be positioned with). Of course, it is generally considered a good idea to bring all three element leaders, if this is possible.

The PL will leave a contingency plan with the highest-ranking troop in the ORP and then continue on his way. He conducts a physical inspection of the objective, making certain that everything is as planned. If not, he/she will have to improvise changes to the plan...and since there will be no time or space for rehearsals, the option to change the plan should only be used in extreme circumstances.

Before the PL leaves the objective, he drops off the two-man security team with commo devices. He positions the security team in such a manner that they can maintain constant observation of the objective (this spot will later become the release point) to ensure that reinforcements do not arrive, nor that the target leaves. A contingency plan must be left with this security team as well. And the PL and element leader(s) move back to the ORP.

The PL issues any changes to the plan in the ORP and finalizes all preparations. Picking up the rest of the patrol, the PL leads them out of the ORP and towards the release point in the following order:

- PL leads at point
- Security team
- Support team
- Assault team pulls up the drag.

Upon reaching the release point, the PL checks with the on-site security team to make sure everything is okay. The PL then links the entire security team up with their leader, and gives them time to move into their designated position. Unlike the ambush, the PL does NOT have the option of positioning each element. On a raid, the elements have all rehearsed exhaustively on where to go. Time must be allowed for each team to position themselves, and this requires the use of communication devices.

The PL releases the support team next, and may travel with that element if he has not assigned himself to the assault team. The assault team positions themselves lastly, and due to the close proximity of their position to the objective, they must be given ample time to move.

All elements wait for:

- The fixed time to initiate fire, OR
- The designated signal to fire, OR
- The PL gives the "No Fire" signal (in which case the patrol withdraws).

Actions on the objective

Immediately upon the initiating fire, *all members* of the patrol fire upon the objective—regardless of whether or not they have a target. The only exception to this may be the security team, who may not have a clear sector of fire assigned to the objective.

After effectively devastating the objective, the PL gives a designated signal to lift or shift fires, and the assault team begins their choreographed attack across the objective. Now, a big misnomer is that the term "lift or shift" fires actually means "cease-fire". Let me dispel this myth right now.

Shifting your fires means that the support team's direction of fire will shift either left or right in order to suppress fleeing or reinforcing enemy. If you have coordinated the sectors of fire well, this should be done. If the coordination of elements does not permit a shifting of fires to be done safely, then lifting your fires means that the support team will continue to fire harmlessly, well over everyone's heads. Why? Because the effect of this incredible volume of fire momentarily paralyzes the enemy's effort to fight back. A cease-fire, on the other hand, gives the enemy still on the objective the impression that your patrol is in retreat. The enemy is more likely to detect and engage the assault team—who, again, is only lightly armed. So the answer is to either lift or shift fires, but do not cease-fire until an appropriate time!

The assault team crosses the objective in pre-arranged buddy teams...

- double-taps all enemy combatants (shooting non-combatants is bad manners)
- secures the far side of the objective, AND
- conducts the sub-tasks of the specialty teams.

Once finished with their task, the assault team leader gives the PL the signal that they have accomplished the mission and that his team is ready to move.

The PL must then give three designated signals. The first notifies the assault team to fall back through the release point to the ORP. The second notifies the support team to do the same. And the third signal notifies the security team to fall back via their designated route to the ORP.

In the ORP, the PL will work with his/her element leaders to reconsolidate and reorganize. The patrol will account for all members and equipment of the mission. Any crew served weapon or priority equipment will be reassigned if the operator has become a casualty. Water and ammunition must be equally redistributed. The patrol then falls back to a pre-designated position, usually one terrain feature back from the ORP, and then stops to disseminate all information and PIR regarding the raid to each and every patrol member. This must be done prior to movement back to the FFL.

Summary

The raid is the crowning glory for any infantry unit. It means crossing that fine line where conventional warfare mixes in with the special operations of the world's elite special force units. It is the stuff of brilliant tacticians and heroes. But if you think you can conduct a raid while on the fly—think again. Of the literally hundreds of exhaustively

planned and rehearsed raids assigned to no less than the three airborne divisions (one British, two American) that were dropped from the sky into France on the night of June 5, 1944, only one platoon accomplished their mission on time. That's right, only one! Good intelligence, special equipment, thorough rehearsals and brilliant leadership are the only hope for a successful raid. Impromptu bravado will never do.

Lessons Learned

In the months following the Persian Gulf War, military sanctions and no-fly zones were imposed on Saddam's regime to counter the brutal attacks against the Shiite and Kurdish people of Iraq. Tasked to the effort of rescuing and recovering downed allied pilots who patrolled the skies over the no-fly zones was C Company 3rd Battalion, 10th Group of the U.S. Special Forces.

The company's six 12-man A-teams each rotated a week of standby status, in which the team would exhaustively rehearse their mission—in effect a form of air assault raid that was designed to secure the crash site and locate the downed pilots. This training took into account a wide myriad of possible scenarios, and each had to be addressed by the Green Beret team. In essence, the team would ride two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters from their base in Turkey with extra fuel tanks into the AO. They would then secure the pilot on one bird, and then load the team back on the other for extraction.

And so it was that in 1992 a British Harrier Jump-jet was reported as having gone down in the extreme northern section of Iraq. The assigned A-team rushed to the airstrip to catch their Blackhawks and await dispatch. To the team leader's astonishment, he was met at the airstrip by not only his 12-man A-team, but an additional A-team and a composite command group. It seems that C Company's commander had decided that those members of the company who did not possess a combat patch could join the rescue operation, ad hoc. The immediate problem being that the two Blackhawks could not hold the 27-man posse!

Precious time was lost as a third bird was acquired, but still the Blackhawks were over-crowded. The extra interior fuel tanks would have to be removed quickly to accommodate for the ammunition and equipment of all the extra Green Berets.

After a flight of approximately five hours, and nearing the Iraqi border, it was clear that the Blackhawks would all have to refuel. There was simply too much weight in the birds! So one-by-one, the helicopters took their turn lining up behind a C-130 air tanker to refuel in flight. More time lost.

As the rescue team entered Iraqi air space, and just minutes out from the suspected crash sight, the flight formation was met by what one Green Beret described as

a "wonderful fireworks display of green and red". The birds were taking ground fire and the pilots strained at the controls of the overweight Blackhawks.

Upon touchdown at the crash sight, it was discovered that another American aviation unit had responded to the pilot's SOS and had picked him up a short time earlier. The Green Berets went on to secure the sensitive items of the Harrier jet and extracted back to Turkey.

Lessons learned? *Don't vary from the plan!* A plan must be flexible to adapt to the changing requirements of the situation, true. But the wholesale scrap of a well rehearsed, well understood plan without anything substantial to replace it is absolutely suicidal!


In this case, precious time was lost to accommodate for individuals who had no business even being on the mission. The birds were overly laden with troops and equipment, and so had to refuel in flight due to the removal of extra fuel canisters. That meant *more* time lost! The loss of time resulted in another unit becoming involved, and in all probability the first helicopter to pick up the downed pilot alerted the Iraqi gunners in middle of the night. Those gunners waited anxiously for another target—the original rescue team. Upon returning to Turkey, the flight crews noted that each of the Blackhawks had a minimum of a dozen bullet holes! It's sheer luck that none of the Green Berets or flight crew were hit.

Tactical Battle Drill #14

THE ATTACK

The attack is potentially the most lethal of all combat missions, both on the giving and receiving end. The resources of the modern battlefield are devastating. Coordination of these resources is a daunting task.

The U.S. Army's top field archivist and tactician, S.L.A. Marshall, described the modern battlefield as "organized chaos". Though Marshall coined that phrase half a century ago, it is no less true today. Organized chaos—loosely translated—refers to the dynamic and chaotic characteristics of the battlefield. This chaos cannot be controlled, but can be directed towards a common goal. The problem being that no two parties will have the same perspective of the raging battle, and yet somehow everyone must use the same reference points, the same language.



The Assault team maneuvers forward to protect the Breech team.

Courtesy of One Shepherd

The commander on the ground will be tasked with more responsibilities than he will ever be able to meet. The only hope for success is to prioritize the tasks as they become pertinent, a sort of triage of responsibilities. On the battlefield this is an art form.

The advantages of the defense over the attack are 3:1. This means that to successfully assault a defending force across its entire front requires a minimum attacking force three times larger than the defending force. Three times larger! So, is it hopeless without these numbers? No. Despite the advantages that secure the defensive position, the attack still possess the advantage of the initiative. The attacking force chooses the *time and place* to assault. This is no small advantage. [See Appendix B for an in depth perspective of the roles of the defense and offense.]

The effort of the attack will be to consolidate resources and bring these resources to bear against one small section of the defensive line. Prior to the attack, the attacking force must make good use of recons and/or probes by fire to determine the most vulnerable points of the defense, as well as the most concealed routes approaching these points. The vulnerable point(s) along the defensive line will be the focus of the attack, particularly for the assault team.

Deliberate Assault vs. Movement to Contact

A deliberate assault can be implemented against a known, established defensive line, or it may be implemented along an axis of movement. The latter of the two objectives is often called a "movement to contact", though it has gone by several similar catchy phrases such as a "sweep and clear" and the "search and destroy" mission.

The advantage of the deliberate assault—attacking an objective with an established defensive line—is that with effective recons, your patrol will know exactly what and where the OpFor resources are. The disadvantage is that those resources are usually formidable.

Conversely, the advantage of the movement to contact—attacking an objective along an axis of movement—is that, typically, this type of OpFor position has *not* been properly developed as a defensive position. However, the disadvantage is that it's impossible to know this with any certainty. And you may expect a great deal of maneuvering by the OpFor.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

The movement to contact drill is used to gain or regain contact with the OpFor. Remember, that generally, the more we are in contact with an enemy force, the more we

are tying them down to a given location. (Of course, the same is true for our force.) But the effort is to get the enemy to commit their forces to an area so that we may overwhelm them with our superior numbers and firepower, or destroy them piecemeal with our small force through superior tactics.

We gain or regain contact with an enemy through aggressive patrolling.

The movement to contact is a form of attack—convoluted and imprecise as it is, but an attack just the same. In truth, it is a series of tasks that must be completed in sequence in response to each threat as it becomes salient.

The essence of the movement to contact might aptly be described as the drill of "find them, fix them, and f--k them". For all the other techniques that become necessary to move your team up to the OpFor—attack formations, crossing danger areas, weapon handling drills, arm & hand signals, blah, blah, blah—the success of the movement to contact is still measured by your actions on the objective.

Regardless of where you make contact with the enemy, or even how effectively you maneuvered up to their position, you will conduct the same drill on the objective:

"Find 'em"—Identify a distance and direction of the OpFor position from your team.

"Fix 'em"—Suppress the OpFor in order to restrain their movement and fire control.

"F--k 'em"—Maneuver to the flank and physically destroy your opponent.

Actions on the Objective

Making contact with the OpFor isn't always what you might think it is. The popular belief is that as soon as you see the bad guys you start shooting, and ask questions later. That's probably true...but only if things are going really badly for you.

Otherwise, we pass this information back along our formation to allow everyone to prepare for action. When we work together as a team, our efforts are multiplied. And we are much more likely to be successful.

Sequence of Events

But what information will our troops need to know? Well, for starters, they will need to know the *direction* and *distance* of the OpFor. Then the PL will need to communicate some scheme of maneuver that everyone in the patrol already understands. And frankly, that's all you will have time to say!

The direction is given using the 'clock method'. Remember it is the direction of movement—*not* the direction you happen to be facing—that represents 12 o'clock! So, the general direction of movement is 12 o'clock, which means that 6 o'clock is to the

rear of the formation. That means 3 o'clock will always be to the formation's *right*, and 9 o'clock will always be to the formations *left*. Get it?

A common mistake is to try to be too specific. Don't split hairs with this method. There is no need to say, "Enemy at 1:30." That's too difficult to understand. We use whole numbers only, like, "Enemy at 1 o'clock." To be honest, even this is a rough estimation. If the OpFor is actually at 2 o'clock, that's okay. The point is that everyone understands a general direction now.

Likewise, the distance is given in meters—but again, there is no need to get too specific. "Enemy at 1 o'clock, 38 meters," is a bit much of a calculation for the situation. Then there are a hundred questions going through people's minds.

"Is that 38 meters from me? Or is that 38 meters from the troop who first saw them? And who first saw the enemy—the PL, the drag-man, or the point-man? And was the enemy moving? Which way? Are they closer than 38 meters now or farther away?"

Unless it's a specific requirement of some weapon system that is supporting your patrol—such as indirect fires, this precision is not necessary. Simply give the direction in 100-meter increments. The exception being distances less than 100 meters. Saying "50 meters" can usually sum that up. In the event that the OpFor is significantly closer than 50 meters, it will probably be immediately apparent! Of course, if not, the old hand & arm signal of jabbing your pointed finger or muzzle twice in rapid succession toward the threat gets the point across very quickly. "Bad guys are HERE!"

Which brings me to my next point, now that we know *what* we are going to say, *how* do we say it? Why, hand & arm signals, of course. Can it be quietly whispered down the formation? Uh, okay. If the situation permits, that's a good idea.

Of course, if the situation is that the OpFor has fired upon your patrol first, you'll probably find yourself screaming this information at the top of your lungs. It's okay. You have my permission. In fact...just like a hand & arm signal, once you've received the message, you must pass it along the formation. So, if someone screams, "Enemy—10 o'clock, 100 meters!" You will scream in response, "Enemy—10 o'clock, 100 meters!" Get it?

At this point the PL will give some hand & arm signal for a new formation or scheme of maneuver. The fire-team or squad closest to the OpFor position will typically set up a base of fire to suppress the enemy. (But of course, that just depends on vantage point.) The fire-team or squad not engaging the OpFor position will then bound to the left or right—determined by the PL. If the bounding element can successfully maneuver against and destroy the OpFor position, they will do so once they have come on line with

the flank of the enemy. If not, they will come on line and close the distance with the OpFor position to suppress it.

It's important to know that on the battlefield, the perceived threat is typically the closest one. An enemy 3 meters away with a knife is a bigger threat than an enemy 100 meters away with a rifle...or an enemy 1000 meters away with a mortar. Understand?

So when the bounding fire-team or squad comes on line with the OpFor's flank and closes the distance, the enemy will focus their fire on that flanking force. This significantly, or entirely, relieves the fire upon your team holding the base of fire. Now they are free to either assault forward into the OpFor position, or move to an even superior position to lay fire into the OpFor. The bounding team may now finish their task of destroying the enemy. It's a dance, a little here, a little there until the job is done.

Typically, the OpFor will flee from their position once they've seen that their position has been compromised. If there are no other OpFor positions in the immediate area that require neutralizing, your patrol will start the whole process over! You will pursue the OpFor. You will find them, fix them to a set position, and...well...destroy them. Let's leave it at that.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu tells us that if we encounter an enemy force that is large enough and confident enough to stand and fight us head-to-head, then we must draw them out of their superior defensive position. A classic tactic of the Khan clan during the 12th and 13th Centuries was to ride a small force up to the defensive walls of the city and begin an attack. After being beaten from the defensive line, the attacking Khan would pretend to be much more wounded than it actually was, and turn to run in retreat. The defensive force, being so confident, would ride forward, out of the security of it's walled position in order to crush the remaining Khan force. But it was a feign attack. And just beyond sight of the defensive walls were the rest of the Khan force waiting in a 'V-shaped' cross fire. The pursuing enemy would be caught in the open, unprepared.

Does it work every time? Nope. But it is one of many possible solutions. The point to be made here is that the movement to contact is far more dynamic in regards to the terrain than the classic deliberate assault. In this case, neither the enemy nor your attacking force is restricted to a given location on the ground. Both sides can be expected to maneuver forward, backward, and from side to side. The challenge will be to take advantage of that maneuverability in order to force the OpFor to commit to a location. Then attack.

THE DELIBERATE ASSAULT

Sequence of Events

In the event your patrol is tasked to conduct a deliberate assault upon an established defensive line, you will go through a 9-step process for the planning and execution of actions on the objective. The exact details of each step are not spelled out because every situation will present unique requirements. However, the procedure itself is a "one size fits all" guide. It's unlikely that your patrol will avoid any step of the procedure, so you'd better get to know it. In fact, it's a good idea to bookmark this page as a quick reference.

Occupy the ORP. The patrol conducts final preparations of equipment in the ORP. A leader's recon of the objective is optional. If the information of the OpOrder was issued in a timely manner, the PL may feel comfortable enough to continue without a leader's recon. Otherwise, it's a good idea to go see what's in front of you.

Form the attack. At the designated time, the PL will form the patrol into its attack formation and assign an order of march. This is the beginning of the 'actions on the objective' for the deliberate assault.

Fix the OpFor position. Once your patrol has determined the direction and distance of the OpFor position (your objective), the Support Team must maneuver to take up its assigned position allowing them to suppress and/or observe the OpFor.

Engage targets on the objective. Do not indiscriminately fire upon OpFor positions if you still have the element of surprise! Allow bounding elements such as the assault team to get as close to the objective as possible. Also, the patrol must expose only as large of a force as necessary to achieve each task. This will conceal the size and intent of the deliberate assaulting force. *Bypass obstacles!* The patrol must keep its momentum forward. This means that danger areas are bypassed—the attack formation should provide adequate security. Bypass any obstacle that is not an objective of your patrol. Now you have to use caution here. If you are bypassing an enemy OP/LP or a minefield, you will want to clearly mark that area as dangerous. Otherwise, friendly units following up your assault may stumble onto that obstacle. It's a good idea to bring along yellow caution tape (or chemlights at night) to mark these areas.


Breach the defensive line. The Assault Team must move forward and neutralize the OpFor obstacles at the lowest possible terrain. If the OpFor have not been engaged, the Assault Team will use stealth in approaching its objective. If a firefight is already underway, the Breach Team or its assigned Security Team will employ smoke canisters to mask their movement. An excellent idea is to simultaneously dispatch a feign attack (tactical deception) from another angle. This will confuse the OpFor as to the location of the actual Assault Team.

Exploit the breach. The Assault Team will signal the PL once it has opened a path through the obstacles and the Security Team has seized a foothold on the OpFor defensive line—that means the first couple of fighting positions on the opposite side of the obstacles. The Support Team (and feign attack force) will then move from their overwatch positions up through the breach. The entire patrol will roll the flanks of the OpFor, and then penetrate deep into their area of command and control.

Clear the objective. With the entire patrol penetrating the OpFor defensive line, each element is assigned specific tasks, such as taking out bunkers or providing for left and right security. This phase of the attack must be thoroughly rehearsed during the OpOrder.

Reconsolidate and reorganize. Account for troops, ammo, equipment and water. Ensure key weapon systems are manned. The PL must stay in contact with higher command to relay the progress of the attack and to coordinate for supporting resources. Friendly casualties must be evacuated, as will POWs. In truth, the reconsolidation and reorganization process may occur even before all the objectives have been accomplished. It is an ongoing task.

Continue the mission. After taking the objective, the patrol prepares for a possible counter-attack by the OpFor. Your patrol may be asked to defend, attack or withdraw.



Actions on the Objective

On a deliberate assault, the actions on the objective begin as soon as the patrol departs the ORP in its attack formation. This is because the patrol anticipates engaging the OpFor prior to the defensive line. And that mindset must begin as soon as the patrol forms into its attack—at the ORP.

The support team provides suppressing fire for the assault team. Note the feign attack.

Form the attack. The order of march and attack formation are formed according to the OpOrder. If the battle becomes protracted, such as the case with an attack along an axis, the lead position will have to be rotated among fireteams. The entire patrol should be prepared to distribute ammunition and water to those fireteams who have borne the burden of the fighting and are running low in supplies due to prolonged engagements with the OpFor.

Keep up the momentum of your forward movement.

- **Use stealth until contact has been made.** Do not run when a slow, steady pace will do. For every member of the patrol, a slow pace can seem unnerving. This is particularly true for the PL. However, the point man and his lead fireteam must be allowed to look carefully for land mines, OpFor OP/LPs and other obstacles. It is to your patrol's advantage to see the OpFor position first!
- **Do not break your attack formation for danger areas.** The attack formation will provide your entire patrol with enough security to move forward.
- **Bypass all unassigned obstacles.** However, *mark* all obstacles clearly. Follow-up elements will neutralize these obstacles later. Visible markings allow these obstacles to be neutralized with minimum friendly casualties.
- **Use only the elements needed to complete a task.** Do not deploy the entire patrol against an OpFor position if only one or two fireteams are needed.
- **React with violence once contact has been made.** Your patrol must grab the OpFor by their pant belts and hang on for dear life. It may seem to be a momentary relief when OpFor troops run away. The OpFor is only repositioning to inflict greater casualties on your patrol! Do not allow the OpFor to fall back in an organized retrograde. You must attack viciously until they surrender or flee in a panicked state of retreat.

Position the Support Team. Once the PL gets a fix on the OpFor objective, he will deploy the Support Team to a position that affords the best view of the objective. This position should allow for excellent grazing or plunging fires against the OpFor defensive line, as well as allow the Support Team to monitor the Assault Team's movement forward.

The Assault Team

The Assault Team actually consists of two elements, the Breech team and the Security Team. The Breech team, of course, is responsible for neutralizing land mines, wire obstacles and the like. The Security Team insulates the Assault Team by positioning itself to the left and right side of the Breech Team. The Breech Team will be too occupied with the obstacle to fire back in defense of itself. The Security Team will do this for them. After all, the quicker the obstacle is neutralized, the quicker the Assault Team gets to a relatively safe position.

Move the Assault Team forward. With the Support Team in position, the Assault Team moves up to the objective. We have no choice but to **assume all obstacles are covered** by OpFor machineguns, observation and artillery! The following considerations must be used in choosing a route to the objective:

- Look for the lowest possible ground, a defiladed position. The OpFor cannot provide adequate grazing fire or observation of obstacles that are in a defilade.
- Use natural forms of concealment, such as a heavily vegetated section of the defensive line or times of darkness in order to get to the obstacles undetected.
- Use smoke canisters if no other adequate form of concealment exists. But only use smoke if engaged, otherwise you'll prematurely give away your intention. If your patrol has been engaged, throw the canisters on the far side (OpFor's side) of the obstacle. Be sure the wind is in your favor, blowing the smoke across the OpFor's front—but do not mask the Support Team's suppressive fire.
- Use tactical deception when resources make it possible. Deploy a feigning attack force at another point along the OpFor defensive line. Allow them to use smoke to convince the OpFor that the effort is sincere. This will confuse the OpFor as to the location of the actual Assault Team and will slow their response to the assault.

Clear all obstacles. The Assault Team neutralizes obstacles in the following manner:

1. The Security Team takes up positions to the immediate left and right of the obstacle, allowing enough room between them for the Breech Team.
2. The Breech Team moves up between the Security Team then compromises the obstacle and marks a pathway through it (tape at daytime or chemlights at nighttime).
3. The Security Team moves through the marked path to the far side of the obstacle and the process repeats itself until all obstacles are breeched.

Secure the far side. The Assault Team will fire and maneuver on those local OpFor positions that cover the breech with direct fire. Once the Assault Team gives the signal to the PL that all obstacles are cleared and the far side secured, the PL moves the entire Support Team forward through the marked path.

Clearing the Objective

The OpOrder spells out exactly who has what responsibility and role for this phase of the attack. This must be well rehearsed. Also, contingency plans must be made in the event that certain leaders or elements become inefficient due to high numbers of casualties.

Move the Support Team through the breach. Having an established hold within the OpFor defensive line, the PL will move the Support Team to link up with the Assault Team. The entire patrol will attack the flanks of the OpFor position from within its defensive line. The following actions must be taken to secure the patrol and dislodge the OpFor from their fighting positions:

1. A designated element will secure left or right—whichever direction the patrol is *not* moving toward, to defend against a counter-attack.
2. The rest of the patrol fires and maneuvers against the flanks of the OpFor fighting positions along their defensive line.
3. An 'L'-shaped cross fire is employed against each position:
 - The lead fireteam suppresses the fighting position and communicates its location to the following fireteam.
 - The following fireteam bounds to the rear of the fighting position and knocks it out with rifle, grenade or rocket fire.
 - The bounding fireteam now provides suppression against the next fighting position while the other fireteam bounds around to the OpFor's rear...and the process repeats itself.

Prepare for a counter-attack by the OpFor! The PL will reconsolidate and reorganize after the objective has been cleared. A 180° security must be established to protect the patrol's front and flanks. Key weapons must be manned and ammunition redistributed. Friendly casualties must be cared for and evacuated. Water must be distributed to the patrol. And POWs must be evacuated.

Continue the Mission. There will be no need to return to the ORP because no equipment will be left behind. (The ORP typically becomes an aid station to evacuate casualties.) From here, the patrol will be tasked to defend the position, continue the attack, or withdraw from the line.

Summary

There are two types of successful leader on an attack. One will obstinately trudge forward—a real 'blood and guts' pragmatist who uses speed and determination as the means to minimize his losses and exploit his success. The other will look and listen to the rhythm of the battle, constantly seeking the least defended path and focusing his resources on that pressure point. There is merit in both approaches...indeed both present distinct advantages.

For the troops following the blunt, obstinate leader, they know that the battle plan is unlikely to change. Their leader is forceful and decided. He will attack only when he is certain to win. This gives great confidence to the troops, and they understand their role in the battle and the commander's intent implicitly.

The troops of the analytical leader adjust to change quickly. They know the battle plan can make hairpin turns in alteration, yet this type of leader wins the confidence of his troops through the merit of his successes. The troops will follow him through the fires of hell. They must be able to act independently upon the commander's intent, and effectively communicate changes to the battle plan.

There is no 'silver bullet', no single factor for success. The battle is chaotic. Soldiers want to know—No, they *need* to know what kind of leader they are following and what is expected of them. Yes, experience will breed familiarity among troops and leaders. But confidence can also be hammered out in detailed OpOrders and effective rehearsals. The worst you could do is to send a troop marching and not tell him how far he is going. We fear the unknown. *Be certain your troops are informed!*

Lessons Learned

A platoon of the 25th Tropic-Light Infantry Division was conducting a movement-to-contact patrol close to a Vietnamese farming village in the spring of 1967. It was late in the afternoon yet the PL noticed all the farmers were pulling back from the fields much earlier than usual.

Several of the younger soldiers in the patrol took note of similarly strange behavior. As the patrol neared the village, the families of each of the forward-most houses calmly walked out of their homes and headed deeper into the village. Within moments, the patrol began to take fire from those houses.

Taking the enemy positions under fire, the patrol reported that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) quickly abandoned these posts and withdrew into the village. The company commander prodded the PL over a field radio to "be aggressive". The PL decided he had the momentum and pushed his patrol quickly into the village while trying to envelope the town to its sides as well.

Once inside the village, the PL could no longer determine the enemy's defensive line. Every other house seemed to be shooting at his patrol, and the tree line surrounding the back and sides of the village fired into the village. The enemy seemed to be everywhere at once, placing their fire into their own positions as well as the patrol. This simply did not reflect the conventional sectors of fire and defensive position that the young lieutenant had been taught to fight.

With mounting casualties, the PL had few feasible options. He calculated that he could no longer advance against the enemy, nor could he withdraw and leave behind his own casualties. He reported to a frustrated company commander that his patrol would require reinforcements. And so it was that a simple chance encounter developed into a full-blown operation that tied up a company plus element, complete with artillery and close air support resources, while casualties mounted for the American patrol.

Lessons learned? First and foremost is that leaders have to learn to listen to their subordinates on the "front line". These soldiers know more about their own personal safety and how to assure that safety than the leaders behind them—regardless of whether that leader is 40 meters behind them, or 4 kilometers behind them. The soldiers of this patrol understood that the village knew of their activity, and that likely so did their enemy.

Secondly, there is a great sense of haste in western armies. Perhaps it is because we enter the battlefield so quickly, with airborne or air assault operations that our units fail to hit the brake and slow the patrol to a meticulous, and methodological pace. Or perhaps it is due to the physical training and emphasis on strength and endurance that leads us to erroneously conclude that battles are won at great speeds. Whatever the reason, the patrol needs the authority to move at its own pace. Stealth is required prior to making contact...and even after contact the PL must take the necessary time to determine how his patrol will engage the enemy. He must designate routes of withdraw should his patrol become ensnared in an engagement too large for his team. And he must request, and be given, the combined arms support necessary to neutralize the enemy position.

Third, the PL must loosen the control over the movement of his troops. He must show confidence in their ability to maneuver on the battlefield. There is again a misconception that infantry troops need to be moved in mass, in a similar manner as marching a formation. That is simply not the case. A tank crew is boxed in and moves with the tank. An artillery crew is just about useless without its gun, and so moves as a team. The infantryman moves as an *individual*—as a part of a team! But we must be very clear about this; even though the infantryman moves along a loosely aligned skirmish line mindful of the man to his left and right, he will chose his next position and method of moving to that position as an individual. And just as he will move forward on the battlefield, so too can he withdraw from the battlefield—as an individual who is part of a team!

Fourth and lastly, is the assumption that the enemy fights in that same manner as we are trained. The NVA did not place the same value on terrain as the US leadership. They were as likely to defend the reverse slope as the forward slope of a ridgeline. The NVA might take up position in between a saddle rather than selecting a hilltop. The enemy in Vietnam commonly used battlefield deception—such as abandoning the first structures of a defense in order to lend the illusion of being caught off guard and to

lure in an overly aggressive American patrol. And the notion of a defended perimeter with outward lying, interlocking fields of fire was apparently foreign to the NVA, who preferred to pull the enemy into a well-organized 'U'-shaped defense with crisscrossing fields of fire. Difficult to coordinate? Inclined toward fratricide? You bet! But even more confusing for the patrol caught in the middle of such a defense.

We have to conduct battle drills that allow the patrol and individual the flexibility to achieve their goals—without looking for a "one size fits all" solution. We must implement these battle drills and rehearse them regularly.

Section VI

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

AMBUSH METHODS

The best rule of thumb when coordinating tactical elements and their fires is to keep it simple. In regards to ambushes, that typically translates into the linear or the 'L'-shaped method of implementation. However, some types of terrain and the size or nature of movement of the target may dictate the necessity to coordinate a more elaborate method of ambush. What follows is a list of ambush variations, a simple description of each, and an illustration of their implementation and applications.




Linear Ambush

The linear ambush has a practical application for both far and near ambushes. It allows consolidated command and control, and is effective for either overwhelming the target or for breaking contact and evading the target. The linear ambush has an optimal effect when implemented against linear kill zones, such as high-speed avenues

of approach—wooded footpaths all the way up to multi-lane highways.

(For an illustration see "The Near Ambush" section in Tactical Battle Drill #12.)

Parallel Ambush



The parallel ambush—in effect two interfacing linear ambushes—has a practical application for the far ambush *only*. It is effective for inflicting significant damage to the target, and then breaking away to avoid further contact, though coordination between teams is a challenge. The parallel ambush has an optimal effect when implemented against long, open kill zones with high ground to either side, such as a narrow valley with walls and vegetation that allow decent sectors of fire.


'L'-Shaped Ambush

The 'L'-shaped ambush also has a practical application for both far and near ambushes. It allows a relatively consolidated command and control of its elements, and is effective for either overwhelming the target or for breaking contact and evading the target. The 'L'-shaped ambush has an optimal effect when implemented against wide, open kill zones and bends in the path of high-speed avenues of approach. Ideally, you would *not* place an element on the opposite side of a kill zone for fear the target could isolated your element as the target maneuvers to avoid fire.

(For an illustration see "The Far Ambush" section in Tactical Battle Drill #12.)

'T'-Shaped Ambush


The 'T'-shaped ambush—in effect two 'L'-shaped ambushes back to back and covering opposite quadrants—has a practical application for both far and near ambushes. It allows a relatively consolidated command and control of its elements, and is effective for either overwhelming the target or for breaking contact and evading the target. The 'T'-shaped ambush has an optimal effect when implemented along the top of a spur with kill zones to either side of that spur. This method is used when we know the direction the target is moving, but are not sure as to which path it might take.



'V'-Shaped Ambush


The 'V'-shaped ambush is incorrectly assumed to be the same as the 'L'-shape. They differ in both their application and implementation! The 'V'-shaped ambush is applied almost exclusively to near ambush situations. It allows decent coordination of troops, but is employed *only* when overwhelming the target is a certainty. The 'V'-shaped ambush has an optimal effect when implemented along the walls of a spur or draws, with

the apex of the formation planted in either high ground or low ground, respective to the use of a spur or draw.




'X'-Shaped Ambush

The 'X'-shaped ambush is simply two 'V'-shaped ambushes placed back to back. No surprises there—near ambush applications *only*. This type of coordination gets a bit tricky, but has a practical application when the path of the target is *known*, and the direction of approach is *unknown*. The 'X'-shaped ambush has an optimal effect when implemented along the walls of a spur or draw, in-as-much-as the base of fire at the apex is positioned at high or low ground, respectively.




'U'-Shaped Ambush

The 'U'-shaped ambush is very similar to the 'V'-shaped ambush, except that the 'U'-shaped ambush is applied to the far ambush *only*. The 'U'-shape makes use of a larger supporting element at the base of the formation. The coordination of troops and elements presents a challenge, but this formation has an optimal effect when implemented against large open areas, such as a narrow valley that affords good sectors of fire. This is a particularly effective method for the anti-armor (far) ambush.




'H'-Shaped Ambush

Two 'U'-shaped ambushes, back to back, make up the 'H'-shaped ambush. This method has applications for the far ambush *only*, and the command and control can be absolutely daunting! It is optimally implemented along large open areas with parallel high ground for the support elements and anti-armor teams. The 'H'-ambush is used when the target's path is *known*, but the direction of approach is *unknown*.



Networked Ambush

The networked ambush is not a method of implementation. Rather it is a *tactic* of implementation. Realizing that some targets are simply too large and/or spread out to engage with a single ambush patrol, ambushes may be networked together in order to achieve an optimal effect. As the enemy moves away from the primary ambush—or for that matter as they maneuver away from a primary deliberate attack—the enemy will form into broken, smaller elements and follow predictable high-speed avenues. Secondary and tertiary ambush patrols can be used to augment the primary ambush or attack. However, each patrol's direction of fire must be carefully coordinated so as not to bring other friendly patrols under fire. This is also true for the planned routes in and out of each patrol's assigned ambush site.



Appendix B

CONCEPT OF THE OFFENSE vs. DEFENSE

EGGSHELLS AND WOODEN BOATS

Let's take a minute to look at the big picture of offensive and defensive operations. To get a grasp on this, it helps to back up and get an historical perspective.

Way back when ships were still made of wood and sails, the cannon were strapped to the sides in order to fire out of portholes. Of course, portholes couldn't be placed in the front of the ship very effectively. That would result in a fast sinking ship. So instead, the guns lined up on either side. And to effectively engage the enemy ships, why you just pulled up along them broadside and punched it out with the enemy gunners until one of the ships either sank or burned to the ground, er...sea level in this case. We've all seen the old black & white movies with pirate ships, right? Sure. We know how it's done.

That was a tough way of doing business until somebody figured out they could make better use of their firepower via the invention of the gun turret and steel siding. But for the army on the ground, tactical doctrine still involved a long line of infantry and cavalry pulled alongside each other in order to knock each other about the battlefield until one of the armies either retreated or burned to the ground. The battle doctrine of those days recognized that the defense's number of troops attacked by a force three times as large would produce a victory for the offense. This belief would cumulate in the bloodbath we now refer to as World War I, which quite literally resulted in the world fighting until entire generations of men were left dead and broken.

What went wrong? Good question. With the First World War came three new inventions that gave a decided advantage to defensive operations. Tactics had simply not adjusted to the introduction of barbed wire, machinegun, and auto cannon. Barbed wire—wire obstacles effectively stopped or slowed the momentum of the attacking infantry and cavalry. Machineguns—fully automated firearms produced horrifying carnage of the infantry and cavalry stuck and bunched up in the wire obstacles. Auto cannon—advanced artillery technology meant that not only could accurate defensive fires cover the defensive lines, but also they could be massed so effectively as to form a 'protective wall' in front of the defense. The old 'three to one' ratio was no longer producing victories for offensive operations. The First World War did not reach an end or conclusion; it merely ran out of people to kill and had to wait 20 years for the world's population to catch up.

Fortunately, by the onset of World War II, the land battle doctrine had learned much from the venerable egg. Yes, I said 'egg'...as in unborn chickens.

You see, we tend to think of eggshells as fragile. But give the eggshell it's due. It forms a perfect defensive perimeter around the embryo and keeps out most germs, bacteria and viruses. More importantly, the eggshell keeps the embryo from being crushed to death by its host—the mother hen. In fact, you might recall your six-grade science experiment where the strongest boy in the class placed an (un-boiled) egg in his palm and wrapped his fingers solidly around the egg. He then squeezed the egg until his face turned purple...and to everyone's surprise we discovered that the eggshell resisted this crushing power quite easily. The pressure was simply disbursed along the eggshell and no harm came to the egg.

You could take that explanation a step further and point out that if you were to thrust part of a discarded eggshell at any point against a whole egg, the egg would withstand the impact of a material as strong as itself. So why do we think of eggshells as fragile? Simple. You stacked the deck when you broke your egg against the side of the frying pan.

Regardless whether you use the edge of the frying pan, a spoon, or the countertop, all of these surfaces are much harder than an eggshell. Too, they are considerably greater in mass than a tiny little egg. But far more importantly, *you focused your energy at a single point along the egg's defensive wall!*

That's why we are successful in cracking open the egg, or walnut, or coconut. We pool our resources together and force them against a single point until we create a breach along the defensive wall. Then we compromise that breach.

That is what the leaders had learned by the Second World War...to focus their resources in order to create a breach, then to compromise the breach of the defense with a quick strike to the command and control sections in the enemy's rear. As the enemy line collapses, the offense gains momentum and benefits from the enemy's further confusion.

Now an informed novice could make a solid argument that none of this was new, and that in fact this strategy had been known and used since the days of the slingshot and club. Okay, fair enough—as a strategy. But at the *tactical* level, these lessons had not been learned. The evidence of this argument rests on the battlefields of the First World War, and for those unfortunate armies who steadfastly stuck to that outdated doctrine in the early years of World War II (such as Ethiopia, Poland, France and the Soviet Union).

So, what have we learned from old navies and chicken eggs? (1) Don't attack the enemy's defense along its entire front. (2) Focus your attack at one point along the enemy's line. (3) Keep the momentum by capitalizing on the breach and compromise

the enemy's command and control. Oh...as a footnote, you could add that where you encounter the enemy's wire obstacles, you can expect machinegun and artillery fire.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The defense has decidedly a greater number of advantages than the offense. It's best to compare and contrast the two in order to gain a respect for each.

For instance, logistically speaking the defense has the upper hand. The logistics of the offense are stretched over long, thin lines, which are vulnerable to enemy attack, inclement weather and poor road or track conditions. In contrast, the defensive logistics are usually right under foot—literally. Water, munitions, food, medical, and engineering supplies are commonly stockpiled along the defensive line.

Regarding communication, once again, the defense enjoys the advantage. The defensive line typically employs landline field telephones that are often more secured to transmit. Additionally, the defense still holds the option of resorting to two-way radios, runners, or even audio-visual signals such as horns and flags. Because the offense is in motion, it seems bound to the latter group of communication means—radios, runners or audio-visual signals. These forms of communication are effective, but are also insecure or time consuming. So, the command and control advantage is tipped in the defense's favor.

At a tactical level, the defense enjoys several key advantages. Cover—such as fighting holes and trenches that lowers a man's profile into the earth and offers overhead cover from indirect fire, better protects the troops in a defensive position. These troops also enjoy clearly defined sectors of fire that are interlocked with the positions to their immediate left and right, and supported by attached resources such as mortars and machineguns and concertina wire.

The troops in defense know the terrain in front of them and behind them. They've studied it and have already decided the likely avenues of approach by their enemies. They are rested and well informed. And seldom can any of this be said for the offense.

So why do we say "the best defense is a good offense"? What is it that makes the offense such a desirable option? To understand this, we must understand the defensive mission.

The defensive mission is to protect a given area. It must achieve this completely. Think back to the eggshell. Would the chicken embryo be protected with just part of an eggshell? Of course not. The eggshell must completely protect the given area—the perimeter around the embryo in this case.

Well, it's not so different for armies on the ground. They have an area they are assigned to protect, and they must do that. To be effective, they will struggle to spread their resources over a large area. Certainly they will interlock their fires to be more effective, but they still cannot mass all of their fires at one spot. Furthermore, their static position makes it more difficult for them to move about the battlefield and adjust to the attacking force...though obviously some reserve force is typically used to dynamically reinforce the defensive line.

The fact to the matter is, that for all of the planning that goes into a defensive line, the troops in defense *do not* know exactly where or when the attack will take place. So the initiative is solidly in the hands of the offense. That's a distinct advantage.

The initiative is not the only advantage appreciated by the offense. As stated earlier, a massing of resources is another advantage of the offense. Remember that in essence the defense is dedicated to a given area. To be certain, not all defenses are static, but they are tied to the terrain. This means they are less dynamic because they are still spreading their resources over their assigned area. The offense acts as a penetrating force—like the edge of a spoon as it strikes the eggshell.

Simply put, the offense pulls together its resources and concentrates its firepower at a single point along the defensive line. The offense does this at the exact time and place of its choosing. These advantages are few, but potent.

ADVANTAGE	OFFENSE	DEFENSE
Short, established lines of logistics.		√
Secure command, control and communication.		√
Familiarity with terrain.		√
Covered and concealed fighting positions.		√
Established and interlocking sectors of fire/obstacles.		√
The capacity to concentrate resources at a given point.	√	
The initiative—the choice of 'where and when'.	√	

Appendix C

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Like any other profession or discipline, there exists a language of jargon and symbols which participants must come to understand in order to collaborate with others. What follows is a fairly comprehensive list of the language used throughout this text.

AA—An acronym meaning Assembly Area. That area just behind the FFL where a patrol may gather into a 360° security position to finalize plans and rehearse their mission prior to passing through the FFL.

AAR—An acronym meaning After Action Review. The reviewing process after a mission's end in which the component teams attempt to understand the sequence of the mission and learn from the cause and effect circumstances.

APL—An acronym meaning Assistant Patrol Leader. The second individual in command of any given patrol.

Axis—A zone marked on the map in which a patrol will conduct operations, illustrated by either parallel lines or terrain features to limit lateral movement.

Azimuth—A compass bearing or direction, expressed in either mils or degrees.

Back Brief—A segment of the OpOrder in which patrol members take part in a question and answer period, in order to restate the mission in concise terms.

Battalion—A military unit consisting of approximately 600 troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, a light infantry battalion will include three line companies, one heavy weapons company, and one headquarters company. A mechanized infantry battalion might have an additional line company.

Bearing—The direction in which an element is moving. This may be expressed in terms of an azimuth or may be given in simple terms of orientation, such as North, North East, and etcetera.

Bivouac—A military campsite in the traditional sense, having visibly pitched tents organized into orderly formations for the control of troop movement.

Break in Contact—An incident that results from a single formation unintentionally breaking into two separate formations. Communication must be re-established between the two elements in order to continue the mission.

Brevity Codes—Short code words, typically one word per meaning that have no direct connotation to the message they are intended to encrypt. An example would be that the code word '*Buick*' means '*Established ORP*'.

Brigade—A military unit consisting of approximately 2000 troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, an infantry brigade will include three battalions and a brigade headquarters company. Often supporting units such as artillery, engineers, and airlift aviation may be temporarily assigned as attachments to the brigade.

Bypass—A method of dealing with obstacles in which the patrol simply goes around the obstacle in an effort to avoid it.

Call Sign—Short code for radio transmissions, usually consisting of one letter and two numbers after it, which identify the calling and receiving stations.

Cease Fire—An order or signal given to stop the firing of all weapons. Often given when the fires are dangerously close to friendly elements or when the fires have completed their desired effect.

CEO&I—An acronym meaning Counter Encrypting Operations and Intelligence. A highly sensitive code book (or card) that includes the call signs, radio frequencies, passwords and encrypting codes of the mission essential radio procedures.

Chain of Command—the hierarchy of leaders in any military unit, from the most senior leader to the most subordinate.

Challenge & Password—A combination of words used to identify friendly elements. The response must be in the correct order, initiated by the challenger. An example:

The challenger says, "Halt. Who is there."

The challenged says, "Sergeant Johnson from Bravo Company".

The challenger says, "Advance forward," and stops the challenged at a safe distance.

The challenger gives the challenge, "Saturn."

The challenged gives the password, "Flowers."

Having given the correct response is allowed to pass by without incident. I think every kid learns this by age 10. But what you might not know is that for security purposes, this system is never used forward of the friendly lines!

Clock Method—A system of identifying direction relative to the patrol's movement. The direction of travel is 12 o'clock, placing 6 o'clock at the rear of the patrol, while 3 o'clock is on the immediate right and 9 o'clock is to the immediate left side.

CO—An acronym meaning Commanding Officer. The officer in charge of any military unit at the company level or higher.

Commander's Intent—A concise statement of the broader goal of the mission, AND the end state. The statement of intent impresses upon each patrol member a deliberateness of action and allows for improvisation should the tactical situation require a deviation from the original plan.

Commo—An abbreviation meaning communication and/or communicative devices. 1. The state of having a channel of communication with another element. 2. Meaning any technological devices that have the capability to communicate over long distances.

Company—A military unit consisting of approximately 120 troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, an infantry company will include three line platoons and one headquarters platoon. A headquarters company will be similar in size, but includes no line troops. Instead it is made up of logistic and support elements such as intelligence, mortars, medical, mess, and transportation sections, and a scout platoon.

Concealment—Any materials or situation, such as darkness, which may camouflage an individual's position or movement from visible detection.

Contingency Plan—Instructions given by a leader when his patrol will split into two or more elements, which detail what each party will do in specific situations. (See also 'five-point contingency plan'.)

Cover—Any obstacle that offers protection from direct or indirect hostile fire and camouflages an individual's position from visual detection.

CP—An acronym meaning Command Post. This is the position of the senior leader and assigned personnel within any static position.

Cyclic Rate of Fire—A weapon system's capability in terms of the rate of projectiles fired. Specifically, the highest rate of fire as mechanically designed. A.k.a., full-auto.

Dead Reckon—A method of navigation in which the navigator uses only instrumentation, such as a compass, to maneuver through terrain.

Direct Fire—1. Refers to any weapon system whose ballistic trajectory is more or less in a straight line. 2. The act of shooting directly at a target, or receiving such fire.

Division—A military unit consisting of approximately 15,000 troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, a light infantry division will include three infantry brigades, one artillery

brigade, an air transportation brigade, a combat support battalion, a medical battalion and a combat engineer battalion. Mechanized infantry divisions will add two armored cavalry (tank) brigades but lose the air transportation.

Dogleg—A method of traversing terrain in which the route of the patrol is not planned directly to and from the objective, but rather takes a series of obtuse angles. This fools observers as to the true direction of the patrol's objective.

Double Tap—To fire twice, rapidly, at your target in an effort to disable it. Aim once, shoot twice.

Drag Man—The last man in the order of march; the troop at the end of the formation whose duty it is to maintain rear security and be certain that no other member of the patrol falls behind him.

E&E—An acronym meaning Escape and Evade. A maneuver in which the patrol avoids all contact with the enemy in an effort to escape physical harm or capture.

Element—any group of soldiers, two or more, who make up a portion of a larger group. This term is synonymous with 'unit', though it includes even the smallest teams within an identifiable unit.

EndEx—To end the exercise or mission, or stop all activities related to the completion of the mission.

EOD—An acronym meaning Explosive Ordnance Disposal. A combat engineer unit whose soldiers are specialized in the removal of bombs and unexploded ordinance.

ERP—An acronym meaning Enroute Rally Point. These are rally points that are designated by the patrol leader while enroute to the objective. They are used as an ongoing contingency plan in the event the enemy overwhelms the patrol, and are typically assigned every 300 meters or after every major terrain feature.

ETA—An acronym meaning Estimated Time of Arrival. This estimate is often used as part of a contingency plan, or to develop the plan for an OpOrder.

ETD—An acronym meaning Estimated Time of Departure. This estimate is used to plan time hacks for an OpOrder.

FEBA—An acronym meaning the Forward Edge of Battle Area. The terrain immediately to the front of the FFL. A.k.a. 'No Man's Land'.

FFL—An acronym meaning Forward Friendly Line. The most forward deployed friendly unit's defensive line.

FFU—An acronym meaning Forward Friendly Unit. The most forward deployed military element aligned with your cause.

Fireteam—A military unit consisting of approximately four troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, an infantry fireteam will include a fireteam leader/grenadier, a machinegunner, and two riflemen. Often the riflemen will be tasked with a missile system, giving the fireteam anti-armor capabilities. The fireteam is the building block of any infantry unit, and is the smallest element that can deploy independently.

Five-Point Contingency Plan—A plan issued by the patrol leader to element leaders as that element separates from the rest of the patrol. The plan creates contingencies for situations by giving five pieces of information:

1. Why the element is departing.
2. Where the element is going.
3. Who, specifically, makes up the departing element.
4. When the departing element will return—and what to do if it doesn't.
5. What actions to take if either element comes under fire.

Flank—The terrain to the immediate left and right of any element that cannot be covered by direct fire due to limited resources or limiting terrain.

Frag-O—An abbreviation meaning fragmentation order. These orders are amendments to the original plan, and are typically issued after the patrol has departed the FFL.

Fratricide—The act of inflicting casualties upon your own forces or allied forces. A.k.a. 'friendly fire'.

Freq—An abbreviation meaning frequency. A radio's operating frequency.

GNDR—An abbreviation meaning grenadier. A soldier whose job it is to launch or throw grenades in order to suppress enemy fires, create holes in their defense, or route the enemy out of defiladed positions.

Grab Team—A specialty team assigned in a raid or ambush whose responsibility entails the abduction of designated individuals from the objective.

Grazing Fire—1. A method of firing a weapon in reference to the ground. 2. Direct fire that never rises higher than one meter off the surface of the ground.

Grenadier—A soldier whose job it is to employ a launcher or throw grenades in order to suppress enemy fires, create holes in their defense, or route the enemy out of defiladed positions.

Head Count—1. The number of people on a patrol. 2. A method of discreetly counting the members of a patrol while still moving.

Hide—A security position that has no other purpose than to allow a small patrol to rest for several hours at a time. Hide positions are never used more than once.

IED—Improvised Explosive Device. Less than conventional explosives used in mechanical ambushes. A favorite tactic of guerilla fighters and terrorists.

IMT—An acronym meaning Infantry Movement Techniques. Techniques that allow soldiers to move from one position to the next even while under direct fire.

Indirect Fire—1. The act of shooting bombs or other explosives at a target in an indirect, or lobbing manner. 2. More commonly, artillery fire.

Interlocking Fire—a designated sector of fire that is aligned to overlap with another sector of fire at both the left and right of the position. All sectors of fire should interlock no farther than 30 meters out from each position.

LBE, LBV or LCE—Acronyms meaning Load Bearing Equipment, Load Bearing Vest, or Load Carrying Equipment, respectively. The nylon or canvas webbing with which a soldier carries ammunition, explosives, water and radios. The minimum carried fighting harness.

LDR—An abbreviation meaning leader. A soldier whose responsibilities include the accountability of troops and equipment, the professional development of subordinates, and the prioritizing and implementing of mission essential decisions.

Leader's Recon—The reconnaissance forward of an ORP. Conducted to determine the suitability of the objective, or to collect the most recent intelligence about the enemy activity and strength on the objective.

Line Troop—also line platoon, line company. Soldiers whose specific job it is to defend and/or seize terrain, or attack the enemy. More specifically, those soldiers who occupy positions in a combat team as a rifleman, grenadier, machine gunner, anti-armor missile operator, RTO, medic, and artillery forward observers...or any leader of these soldiers. In all fairness, armored tank crews are also included in the ranks of those soldiers who seize and defend territory.

LZ—An acronym meaning Landing Zone. A suitable area designated for the landing of troops via helicopters for combat missions. A point of insertion.

MA—An acronym meaning Mechanical Ambush. A near ambush that makes use of anti-personnel and/or anti-armor land mines instead of using troops with direct fire weapons. Though the killing zones of mechanical ambushes are commonly observed, the patrol is not required to fire, making it much safer for the patrol members.

Machine gunner—A soldier whose job it is to employ a machinegun against enemy targets in order to suppress or destroy these positions with high rates of fire and deeply penetrating bullets.

METT-T(C)—An acronym meaning Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain and Troops available (also Civilians present). Essential considerations when planning a mission and issuing a Warning Order.

Example:

"Our mission is a deliberate attack. The OpFor is the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment who is presently at 65 percent strength but still of considerable morale. We have eight hours to plan and rehearse the mission, and four hours to execute the mission. The attack will take place in sparsely vegetated farmland surrounding the village. Crops are high, making visibility low, even in daylight hours. We will be joined by first platoon on our right and second platoon on our left, with heavy weapon anti-armor crews from Echo company firing support from the rear of the assault line. There are no civilians expected to be in the village."

MG—An abbreviation meaning machinegun. A heavy-barreled, bipod or tripod mounted firearm capable of shooting rifle cartridges at cyclic rates of fire.

MGR—An abbreviation meaning machine gunner. A soldier whose job it is to employ a machinegun against enemy targets in order to suppress or destroy these positions with high rates of fire and deeply penetrating bullets.

NBC—An acronym meaning Nuclear, Biological and Chemical. A classification of warfare and related weapon systems which make use of unconventional materials.

NCO—An acronym meaning Non-Commissioned Officer. There are many levels of sergeants and corporals who are responsible for the care, accountability and professional development of the troops. It is said that officers issue orders, and the NCOs ensure these orders are accomplished.

NLT—An acronym meaning No Later Than. A limit of time that designates a deadline for an operation to either start or complete.

No-Fire Rule—1. A standard of conduct that allows a patrol leader the option *not* to initiate fire during a raid or ambush. 2. A rule of engagement which states that within the parameters of a near ambush, a smaller ambush patrol does not fire upon a target that is larger than itself.

NVD, NVG or NVS—An abbreviation meaning night vision device, night vision goggles and night vision scope, respectively. Night vision *goggles*, such as the popular PVS-7B model use passive light technology for nighttime operations. Night vision *scopes* use passive light or infrared technology. Night vision *device* is the more encompassing term and includes passive light and infrared technology, but also includes much simpler, cheaper devices such as the high-power tactical weapon lights.

OBJ—An abbreviation meaning objective. 1. The physical location of the enemy or location of the mission goal. 2. A point on the map or terrain where the mission will be conducted.

OCOKA—An acronym meaning Observation, Cover & concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain, and Avenues of approach. Tactical considerations for securing any static position, such as when determining a location to establish a defensive line, ambush, patrol base, ORP...or when tasked to assault any such position.

OP/LP—An acronym meaning Observation Post and Listening Post. A position forward of the defensive line whose members are responsible for giving early warning to the main element in the event of an enemy attack, reconnoiter or probe.

OpFor—An acronym meaning Opposing Forces. I don't know why the U.S. military had to do away with the old standby term 'enemy'. Perhaps it was too insulting. I mean, if you ask the enemy if they *are* the 'enemy', I'd guess they'd say 'no'. So, 'opposing force' is decidedly much more sensitive. Glad we cleared that up.

OpOrder—An abbreviation for operations order. 1. A detailed explanation of the mission plan that is issued to the entire patrol. 2. A five-paragraph mission plan that includes:

1. *Situation*, both of the enemy and friendly.
2. *Mission*, the commander's intent and the time hacks.
3. *Execution*, a detailed step-by-step explanation—given by the patrol leader.
4. *Service and Support*, includes the supporting units.
5. *Command and Signal*, the relevant chain of command and all signals used.

Order of March—Sometimes called 'the O of M'. This order explains where each unit will line up in the patrol's formation.

ORP—An acronym meaning Objective Rally Point. A temporary security position occupied no closer than 300 meters or one terrain feature away from the objective, in which final preparations for the mission are conducted.

Pace Count—1. The number of steps any soldier has to take to walk 100 meters. 2. The distance a patrol has walked, expressed in meters by a patrol member designated to keep track of the pace count.

Parapet—The dirt mounds to the sides and rear of a fighting position. (Or an extension of the stone wall...if you're shooting arrows from atop a castle.) This dirt helps protect the troops from direct and indirect fire. However, they are easily seen if not properly camouflaged.

PB—An acronym meaning Patrol Base. A temporary position that provides 360° security out of which an element may conduct a series of patrols. Never used more than 24 hours at a time.

Phonetic Alphabet—A system of phonetically spelling so that the letters can be understood over the static of radio transmissions. Especially useful for call signs, acronyms and abbreviations. The alphabet is said in the following manner:

<i>Alpha</i>	<i>Bravo</i>	<i>Charlie</i>	<i>Delta</i>
<i>Echo</i>	<i>Fox</i>	<i>Golf</i>	<i>Hotel</i>
<i>India</i>	<i>Juliet</i>	<i>Kilo</i>	<i>Lima</i>
<i>Mike</i>	<i>November</i>	<i>Oscar</i>	<i>Papa</i>
<i>Quebec</i>	<i>Romeo</i>	<i>Sierra</i>	<i>Tango</i>
<i>Uniform</i>	<i>Victor</i>	<i>Whiskey</i>	<i>Xray</i>
<i>Yankee</i>	<i>Zulu</i>		

PIR—An acronym meaning Priority Intelligence Requirements. Those items for which a patrol has been specifically ordered to search the enemy personnel, especially radio frequencies, CEO&I, call signs, brevity codes, maps and GPS plotting information.

PL—An acronym meaning Patrol Leader. The senior leader of any patrol, the commander.

Platoon—A military unit consisting of approximately 30 troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, an infantry platoon will include three squads and a command section of three troops, the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and an RTO. Mechanized infantry platoons include two extra troops...a driver and track commander for the command armored fighting vehicle.

Plunging Fire—1. A method of firing a weapon system in reference to the ground. 2. Direct fire that plunges down from high angles, such as from mountaintops and buildings, or at the maximum effective range of the weapon so as the direct fire has a considerable arch.

Point Man—The first man in the order of march; the troop at the front of the formation whose responsibilities include navigating while being certain he does not disclose the patrol's position or lead the patrol into an ambush, minefield or fall off a rather steep cliff.

POW—An acronym meaning Prisoner Of War. Sometimes called 'PW'. Those soldiers who have been captured by their enemy.

PZ—An acronym meaning Pickup Zone. A suitable area designated for the loading of troops, casualties and POWs via helicopters after or during combat missions. A point of extraction.

R&S Team—An abbreviation meaning Recon and Security Team. This team is responsible for ensuring the patrols security by (1) circling around the patrol's static position to determine the threat, or (2) posting itself to the front, rear, and/or sides to deter a possible threat and give early warning to the patrol, or (3) peeling off from the patrol while moving to remain behind at a set distance to look for enemy teams that might be following the patrol's movement.

Rally Point—A designated position for the patrol to regroup in the event that it comes in contact with an overwhelming enemy force in the near future. See also ERP, ORP.

Rapid Rate of Fire—Firing a weapon system in semi-automatic mode at a rate of approximately 10~15 rounds per minute per individual, in order to engage or suppress enemy targets.

Recognition Signals—Visual or auditory signals that lend immediate recognition between elements, such as colored flashlights, colored panels, flares, hand & arm signals, passwords, running passwords, number combinations or the good ol' bird call. Recognition signals are usually classified as 'far'—visual, and 'near'—auditory.

Recon—An abbreviation meaning reconnaissance or to reconnoiter. To remain undetected while visually scouting out or inspecting a location for enemy status and activity.

Reconsolidate & Reorganize—To gather together in a secure position in order to reconsolidate your team's defense, and reorganize necessary resources among members of a patrol. Key considerations are "LACE"—meaning liquid, ammunition, casualties, and equipment. Crew-served weapons and radios must be manned and operated.

Release Point—1. The point during a mission that the patrol leader releases authority to subordinate element leaders. 2. The physical location where the patrol will part into separate teams in order to achieve the mission goals.

Rifleman—The infantryman. The most basic element to any army. These are the soldiers whose responsibility it is to maneuver against, engage and destroy the enemy.

RM—An abbreviation meaning rifleman. Those soldiers whose responsibility it is to maneuver against, engage and destroy the enemy.

RTO—An acronym meaning Radio Telephone Operator. 1. Those soldiers whose responsibilities include the procedures and operation of radios and field phones, as well as encrypting and decrypting messages. 2. Any rifleman with a radio.

Rules of Engagement—Also known as ROE. A standard of conduct for soldiers that regulates the use of violence to achieve mission goals. More specifically, the standard of conduct states:

"Unless otherwise instructed by my chain of command—

(1) I will fire upon the enemy *only when*;

- I am ordered to fire by a member of my chain of command
- I, or my comrades, am fired upon by suspected enemy
- I, or my comrades, am in danger of death or bodily harm.

(2) I will shoot my weapon with the intention to *incapacitate*;

- I will aim center mass of the target, not necessarily at limb or head
- I will shoot until the enemy runs away or surrenders, or...
- I will shoot until the enemy collapses and offers no resistance."

Running Password—1. A special form of the password used only forward of the FFL when the situation is too urgent to allow time for the normal password process. 2. A single word that is shouted by friendly forces for recognition when being chased back into a friendly defensive position by an enemy force.

Sector of Fire—A designated sector assigned to each member of a patrol in which they must engage targets in the event of enemy attack.

Sector Sketch—A drawing of an elements assigned sector(s) of fire, especially indicating the interlocking of the sector with elements on the left and right flank.

Security—In the broadest terms, the act and means of soldiers protecting themselves and each other from physical harm.

Security Halt—A patrolling technique in which the entire patrol stops and forms a 360° security perimeter to rest, collect information, account for troops and equipment, or to make decisions.

SitRep—An abbreviation meaning situation report. A brief report in which the patrol leader relays mission essential information to higher command. This helps command visualize the mission as it unfolds, and allows them to amend the mission with frag-Os in order to achieve the mission goals.

Six 'W's—Who, What, When, Where, Why and hoW. The necessary questions for any tactical plan or report.

SMG—An acronym meaning Sub-Machinegun. A short, light barreled carbine capable of firing *pistol* cartridges at cyclic rates of fire.

SOP—An acronym meaning Standard Operating Procedure. Those tasks that are conducted often enough to merit a standard procedure so that the execution of the task becomes second nature, and all team members know how to respond with automaticity.

SP—An acronym meaning Start Point. The position and/or time of departure for a patrol.

Squad—A military unit consisting of approximately 9 troops. In the U.S. Army, for example, an infantry squad will include two fireteams and a squad leader. Up until recently, the U.S. Marines used three fireteams per squad, for a total of 13 troops. The Army originally included two large, five-man fireteams plus a squad leader for a total of 11 troops. The nine-man squad has become a standard due to the proliferation of armored infantry fighting vehicles, apparently all of which have a capacity of nine personnel. This is true even for light infantry units.

Sustained Rate of Fire—Firing a weapon system in semi-automatic mode at a rate of approximately 3~5 rounds per minute per individual, in order to maintain suppression of enemy targets.

TBD—An acronym meaning Tactical Battle Drill. An exercise implemented to perfect unit tactical SOP.

Terrain Association—A method of navigation that uses the soldier's knowledge or recognition of terrain features to traverse a route. If you think about it, this is how you know to get to the bathroom, even in a house you've never before visited.

Thumbs-Up Signal—A hand & arm signal that requires making a fist with the thumb pointed upward to indicate a message of "I understand" or "the situation looks good".

Time Hack—A limit of time regarding when the mission begins and ends, or when certain tasks must be accomplished.

TLP—An acronym meaning Troop Leading Procedures. This is a process leaders use to get them through the planning and preparation phase of a mission, from the moment they receive a mission, to the moment before they pass through the friendly lines.

Topo—An abbreviation meaning topographical maps. The map with which you will navigate and plan missions.

TRP—An acronym meaning Target Reference Point. Pre-plotted artillery fires along your route of movement that can be called in as needed. These will have to be coordinated with supporting units prior to starting movement.

Warning-O—An abbreviation meaning warning order. A brief statement issued by the patrol leader explaining an upcoming mission to the patrol members and/or the subordinate leaders. This includes at a minimum the mission statement, the time of the OpOrder, and the place where the OpOrder will be issued.

Way Points—These are easily recognizable visual references on the ground, or even terrain features, that are marked on the map (or GPS) for navigational purposes or to coordinate supporting logistical resources.

XO—An acronym meaning eXecutive Officer. This is an officer who is assigned as the second-in-command of any military unit at the company level or higher.

Appendix D

HEIRARCHY OF MILITARY UNITS & COMMAND

Presently, the U.S. Army consists of about 400,000 troops and has several armies within its command. Each army has command of several corps, and each corps has command of three to five divisions...and so on. Compare this to the U.S. Marine Corps, which quite literally has only one corps at this time, and you'll see the vast difference in size.

<i>Unit:</i>	<i>Approximate Troops:</i>	<i>Commanding Staff:</i>
Army	150,000~250,000	CO—General (O10)
Corps	50,000~100,000	CO—Lieutenant General (O9)
Division	15,000~18,000	CO—Major General (O8) XO—Brigadier General (O7)
Brigade	2,000~3,000	CO—Colonel (O6) XO—Major (O4) NCO—Command Sergeant Major (E9)
Battalion	600~800	CO—Lieutenant Colonel (O5) XO—Major (O4) NCO—Sergeant Major (E9)
Company	120	CO—Captain (O3) XO—First Lieutenant (O2) NCO—First Sergeant (E8)
Platoon	30	CO—Lieutenant (O1) NCO—Sergeant First Class (E7)
Squad	9	NCO—Staff Sergeant (E6)
Fireteam	4	NCO—Sergeant (E5) or Corporal (E4)

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Instructing NCOs of the New Iraqi Army, September 2003.

(Courtesy of The New York Times.)

At the time of publication for this book, Christopher Larsen was serving in Iraq, contracted by the U.S. Department of Defense to train the New Iraqi Army's NCO School in leadership, weapons and tactics. Since 1981, he has also been affiliated with One Shepherd, a leadership development organization that employs live tactical gaming simulation as a vehicle to facilitate leadership and teamwork among young adults. It is through his work with One Shepherd that this manual was inspired.

Christopher served in the U.S. Army from 1985 to 1994 as a non-commissioned officer in light infantry, air assault, and mechanized infantry capacities. Those units included the 101st Air Assault Division, the 2nd Infantry Division, and the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade. The Republic of Korea awarded Christopher the 'Im-jin Scout' designator for 90 days of combat patrols inside the 38th Parallel D.M.Z. He was also awarded the U.S. Army's Expert Infantry Badge. In 1988, as part of the 101st Division's support to the U.S.M.A. at West Point, Christopher worked with the 10th Special Forces Group teaching basic infantry tactics.

Christopher has a profound love of all things military—especially tactics. He doesn't have any short answers. Yep. He's one of 'those people'. Christopher holds a Master of Education in instructional systems design from the University of Missouri, and currently designs interactive learning environments at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

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